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COSTIND, a Chinese army unit known for its successful
penetration of the Clinton White House, has scored another big
success.

In 1997, Ge Hunbiao, the People’s Liberation Army general and
political commissar of COSTIND, quietly signed a treaty obtaining the
Pacific island of Tarawa as a PLA satellite tracking and control
station.

The new Chinese army base was declared fully operational in
January 1999. The position of Tarawa will allow China to
monitor U.S. ballistic missile and anti-ballistic missile (ABM)
tests just 500 miles north in the Kwajalein Test Range.

According to the General Accounting Office, “COSTIND” — the Chinese
Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense –
“oversees development of China’s weapon systems and is responsible for
identifying and acquiring telecommunications technology applicable for
military use.”

The Tarawa ground-based optical and radar-tracking system is
far more powerful than any system currently deployed at sea.
The base allows PLA forces to monitor and track U.S. ballistic
missile tests in the south Pacific test ranges without the
expense of forward-deployed Chinese navy tracking vessels.

The station also allows China to monitor U.S. forces in the
Pacific region. This capability includes military signals
intercepts, communications with PLA recon and ferret satellites,
and target acquisition for Chinese anti-satellite (A-SAT)
systems such as ground-based lasers.

A ground-based laser could be installed on Tarawa to give the
PLA a quick strike capability to shoot down or disable all U.S.
military satellites in time of war over the Pacific. However, a
laser may not be required to deny U.S. space assets from a
Tarawa base. The PLA could also use simple “barrage” radio
jamming or high-power microwave transmitters to disable U.S.
satellites with existing equipment at the site.

The base already allows the PLA to track U.S. fleet operations
via signal intercepts from Navy battle groups. Any major U.S.
response to hostile acts in the Asian region will require the
immediate deployment of U.S. carrier naval forces. These forces
will either come across the Pacific or through the Indian Ocean.
The Tarawa base allows direct signals intercepts and tracking of
U.S. Navy forces in the mid-Pacific area.

The PLA Tarawa base may also provide significant sonar and radio
emission signals intelligence to track U.S. submarine forces,
including the “Ohio” class of Trident missile boats which deploy
from the Pacific coast of Washington state. Secure fiber-optic
cable systems attached to microphones on the Pacific sea floor
surrounding the Tarawa atoll group may pick up undersea
activities for hundreds of miles.

The Tarawa signals intercept capability includes “traffic”
analysis, a form of information warfare that does not need
sophisticated decoding systems to determine U.S. intentions and
military reactions. However, breaches of secure code systems
(e.g. John Walker) could allow PLA forces to decipher messages
in real time from U.S. satellites and military forces.

Tarawa’s mid-Pacific location is perfect for “cooking.” A PLA ability
to decode U.S. military messages combined with high-speed U.S. built
computers may give the PLA the ability to intercept, decode and ALTER
American military communications in real-time. This capability is called
“cooking” in information warfare terms. Such a capability would put all
U.S. forces at grave danger of a Chinese first strike.

The base currently controls Chinese satellites in orbit. This
capability can include missiles or thermonuclear warheads in
flight through space. The PLA capability includes secure
correction/control of first strike nuclear warheads intended to
destroy strategic missiles and B-2 bombers on the American
continent.

Based on the position of the satellite station in Tarawa the
logical military deployment would be for China to build a
similar A-SAT site in the far western provinces (e.g.
Kazakhstan). Two A-SAT sites, one in the Pacific and one along
the western border, provides 100 percent PLA denial of U.S. space forces
covering the far-Asian areas of conflict (e.g. Sea of China, Sea
of Japan, Yellow Sea and Sea of Okhotsk). The center of PLA
A-SAT military operations, in geographic terms, is Taiwan.

COSTIND, the Chinese Army unit responsible for the successful
deployment on Tarawa, has a long history of anti-American
espionage operations including penetrations of the Clinton White
House.

President Clinton personally authorized LORAL Aerospace CEO
Bernard Schwartz to meet with a COSTIND General. In August
1994, Schwartz accompanied Ron Brown on the Presidential
Business Development Mission trade trip to China. At the behest
of Bill Clinton, Schwartz met with officials of the Chinese
defense industry, Lt. General Shen Rong-Jun, the vice minister
of the COSTIND, and Liu Ji-Yuan, the minister of China Aerospace
Corp. China Aerospace manufactures all Chinese army ballistic
missiles and space rockets.

Schwartz and Brown arranged to sell advanced secure satellite
telemetry control systems to the Chinese army and purchased
Chinese rockets to launch commercial satellites for Loral.

COSTIND General Shen had more than just the Loral success.
General Shen’s son, Shen Jun, penetrated Hughes to become the
top software engineer for all satellites sold to China. Shen
inspected all the Hughes satellite control and computer software
and can verify that no U.S. bugs or viruses have been planted
inside satellites sold by Hughes.

In 1996, a COSTIND military agent actually penetrated the White
House. In 1996, Chinese Colonel Liu Chaoying passed money
directly to Bill Clinton through Johnny Chung. Colonel Liu is a
member of COSTIND’s Electronics and Computer Division. In 1996,
when she donated money to meet Bill Clinton, Col. Lui was then
working with China Aerospace Corp. for COSTIND.

Lt. General Shen and Col. Lui are not the only Chinese army officers
who worked with Bill Clinton to pass significant military technology to
China. In 1994, COSTIND commanding General Ding Genghao personally led a
raid on U.S. technology that, once more, took his agents into the
Clinton administration.

In 1994, Secretary of Defense William Perry was a close friend with
the American pawn of the COSTIND espionage, Professor John Lewis from
Stanford. Just by coincidence, COSTIND sub-commander General Huai Guomo
had something in common with Perry and Professor Lewis — they were all
close friends of a so-called Chinese defector named Hua Di.

Hua Di was born into a family of prominent Communist officials.
He studied missiles in Russia and worked in China’s missile
program for 24 years. In 1984, Hua went to work for the China
International Trust and Investment Co. (CITIC) a firm part owned
by the Chinese army. In 1989, Hua became a defector, leaving
China after the Tiananmen Square crackdown on student democracy
demonstrators.

Hua went to work as a researcher at Stanford’s Center for
International Security and Arms Control, whose co-directors are
former Secretary of Defense William Perry and Stanford political
science professor Lewis.

Hua Di and John Lewis shared more than an academic career. John
Lewis and Hua Di worked together in 1994 on the Hua Mei project,
using a company named SCM/Brooks. COSTIND Lt. General Huai
Guomo contacted Hua Di to start the joint venture called Galaxy
New Technology to work on “Hua Mei,” a real-time, secure, fiber-
optic system for southern China.

“Lewis and I were matchmakers,” recalled Hua Di about Galaxy New
Technology in 1996. “(COSTIND General) Huai is my good friend.”

Hua Di and his pal, General Huai, located Madam Nie Li who
became the civilian cover for Galaxy New Technology as the
Chinese co-chair. Madam Nie Lie was also the wife of Chinese
Army General Ding Henggao — the commander of COSTIND. Dr. Lewis located
Aldai Stevenson III, the former Democratic senator from
Ohio, to be the American civilian side.

In 1994, SCM/Brooks contracted AT&T to ship advanced, secure,
fiber optic communication systems directly to the Chinese army.
The shipment included “encryption” source code. AT&T officials
who sold most of the equipment and software to SCM/Brooks were
adamant that there was no need to check the Chinese firm, Galaxy
New Technology, since it was led by Ms. Nie Lie, a civilian.

Documents obtained from the Department of Defense using the
Freedom of Information Act show Mr. Lewis was being paid
by the Chinese army for Hua Mei while serving on the U.S.
Defense Policy Board and working for DoD as a paid contractor.

The so called “civilian” firm was heavily packed with Chinese
Army officers and experts. One member of Galaxy New Technology
management, according to the Defense document, was Director and
President “Mr. Deng Changru.” Mr. Deng Changru was also Lt.
Colonel Deng Changru of the People’s Liberation Army, head of
the PLA “SIGNALS” communications corps. Another Chinese Army
officer in the Galaxy New Technology staff is co-General Manager
“Mr. Xie Zhichao” who is really Lt. Colonel Xie Zhichao,
Director of the COSTIND Electronics Design Bureau.

The U.S. fiber-optic communication system currently provides the
General Logistics Division of the PLA with secure communications. The
Hua Mei system is safe from nuclear attack and secure from prying
signals intelligence monitoring.

China has resold the American technology in the form of the “Tiger
Song” (NATO code name) secure, fiber-optic, air defense communications
system to Iraq. “Tiger Song” despite being pounded by Allied cruise
missile and smart bomb attacks from operation “Desert Fox” is still
active, serving Iraqi Surface-To-Air Missile (SAM) systems.

In late October 1998, it was announced that “dissident” Hua Di
had returned to China. Hua had met with Chinese security
officials in late 1997 and was assured that he would not be
prosecuted. On Dec. 31, 1997, Hua returned to China. On
January 6, 1998, Hua was arrested and charged with passing state
secrets to U.S. officials. Stanford officials and John Lewis
wrote to the Chinese government appealing for Hua’s release.

Only a fool would run into the arms of the murdering security
services of the Communist Chinese state. Hua Di was no fool,
nor was he a “dissident.” Hua Di returned home a hero of the
Chinese Communist Party. Hua Di was one of many in a network of
spies run by COSTIND mastermind General Ding.

Hua Di passed false information to the west, obtained secure
communications for the Chinese army and penetrated into the
Clinton White House through the U.S. secretary of defense. Hua
Di served his nation, his party, and his commander, General Ding
of COSTIND.

General Ding Henggao of COSTIND deserves the highest honors the
People’s Liberation Army can bestow. COSTIND defeated America
and dramatically enhanced the strategic powers of red China
without firing a shot. The COSTIND espionage campaign against
the Clinton White House is the single most successful operation
of the 20th century.


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