In 1995, Chinese Army Lt. Gen. Huai Guomo and several other key generals of the PLA, were taken on a tour of the U.S. Energy Department. The tour, part of a joint U.S-Chinese defense conversion project, included an invitation to the Chinese generals to form “joint” U.S.-Sino nuclear projects.
Details of the 1995 Chinese army meeting at the Energy Department were written in a report by the U.S. Commerce Department. The 1995 Commerce Department report is part of over 1,000 pages of materials on meetings with Chinese army officials obtained from a Federal lawsuit filed in 1998. The documents were forced from the Commerce Department in a Feb. 23, 1999 court order issued by Judge Robert Payne.
According to Commerce documentation, Assistant Energy Secretary of Policy Susan Tierney attended the meeting with the Chinese army. “She noted that the DOE Secretary visited China last month and that cooperation with China is a high priority,” states the Commerce report.
“(Tierney) noted that DOE and the China State Planning Commission have similar goals in the following areas: 1) Science and technology development (especially in energy); 2) Funding of research (such as fusion and fission).”
The Chinese general who attended the meetings, Lt. Gen. Huai Guomo, was then vice minister of COSTIND — the Chinese Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense. In 1995, Huai was under the command of COSTIND minister, PLA Gen. Ding Henggao. In 1994 Ding and Huai helped establish the Galaxy New Technology joint venture called “HUA MEI,” a deal which allowed the Chinese army to purchase an AT&T encrypted, secure, fiber-optic network.
The 1995 Commerce document is partially blacked-out (redacted) by the Clinton administration. According to the March 1995 report, Huai explained that his unit, COSTIND, had “six specialty areas: 1) Aerospace; 2) Aviation; 3) Electronics; 4) Ground Force Military Equipment; 5) Shipbuilding; 6) Nuclear.”
“The business leaders asked for POC’s (point of contact) for the 49 projects and Huai suggested they contact Col. Xu at the Embassy,” states the Commerce Department report.
“Barry Carter (Commerce) mentioned the package he was preparing which will include POC info. Ding offered his assistance in COSTIND if any company had difficulty communicating with industries in China. He said there are investment dollars put aside for the 9th five year plan, and they do not have to be limited to the 49 projects. … The Chinese said that anyone wanting to make deals should move forward rapidly so that it will be covered in the next five year plan which is just being drawn up.”
Then, according to the Commerce report, Huai asked several questions, concerning the financial and legal aspects of U.S. nuclear power. “Lt. Gen. Huai asked if the govt. takes back its money when industry develops the final product. … Does the business keep tech patent rights?”
“At the end of the meeting at Energy,” concludes the Commerce document, “the Chinese indicated that they would like to develop cooperation in the nuclear field. They expect to have problems in handling nuclear waste and would like to develop future cooperation in handling such waste. U.S. has no cooperation right now in the nuclear area, but China hopes to have some in the future.”
Huai had good reason to hope for future U.S.-Sino nuclear cooperation. Gen. Ding, his commander, gave the Commerce Department an official 1995 list of PLA-owned companies wanting business. The list included contacts and projects at the “China National Nuclear Corp.,” “The Academy of Engineering Physics” and “China Yuanwang (Group) Corp.”
Ding sent the list of official contacts from the Chinese defense industry, along with a personal letter, to be circulated to U.S. businesses by the Clinton Commerce Department. If any contact on the list should fail to respond, the Chinese army eagerly provided a “Col. Xu” as the prime contact at their Washington embassy, including the military attache’s direct phone and fax number. The PLA-owned companies operated with the direct blessing of the Clinton administration, seeking joint ventures, American investors, and U.S. technology.
While the “sales” division of Commerce was well-versed in PLA-owned companies as early as 1995, the same cannot be said of the export enforcement division of the same U.S. agency. A 1997 Commerce e-mail to Frank Deliberti at the Commerce Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) from Robert Bannerman in Beijing states, “This list, called ‘China’s Defense-Industrial Trading Organizations’ published by DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), was posted in several places in the BXA/OEE section I worked in a year ago.”
“I used the chart to discover that Yuanwang Group,” continued Bannerman. “The importer that is alleged to have imported the Sun Computer shipped to the National Defense Technical Institute of China in Changsha was directly under the control of COSTIND. I keep a copy of this chart in my files.”
The Commerce Department knew computers were being sold directly to the Chinese army. The U.S. Commerce Department acted as a contact point for both the PLA buyers and the American computer manufacturers. The same PLA-owned Yuanwang Corp. that Commerce would push as an official contact in 1995 for peaceful “defense” conversion projects, acquired high-speed Sun computers for the Chinese army in 1997.
According to another document from the Commerce Department, Defense Secretary Perry had promised Ding, “a Cray super-computer to be used directly by the Chinese weapons establishment to help design newer and safer nukes.”
The prime buyer of super-computers during the Cold War was the U.S. military. By 1995, Cray was a major defense contractor, supplying giant processors to the National Security Agency (NSA) and U.S. Air Force. Yet, in 1995 Cray was not doing so well. The collapse of the Soviet Union also dried up defense funds.
In 1995, eager to make new foreign sales, Cray sales representatives traveled to Beijing to meet with PLA officers during a Commerce-sponsored event. In 1995, Cray attended the “JCCT Meeting” in China. The Joint U.S.-China Technology summit held in October 1995 in Beijing, included major American defense computer manufacturers such as IBM, SUN, Apple, Digital, Silicon Graphics and Cray.
Nor was China’s missile program left begging for CPU power. In 1994, Tandem Corp. exported computers to China Great Wall Corp., a company owned by the Chinese army, during a Ron Brown trade trip. Commerce documents show that China Great Wall Industry is owned by “China Electronics Systems Engineering Company (CESEC), a subsidiary of the People’s Liberation Army.”
In 1993, Great Wall, along with nine other PLA-controlled companies, sold nuclear tipped M-9 missiles to Pakistan. In response, Great Wall was banned from purchasing U.S.-controlled technology such as computers.
Yet, only a few months later, Great Wall was allowed to buy over $100 million of U.S. computers. Tandem Corp. CEO James Treybig attended an August 1994 presidential trade mission to Beijing with Ron Brown. A Brown trade mission document states, “Tandem and China Great Wall Industry will announce in August their joint venture.” Another document found in the files of former Commerce Secretary Ron Brown states that Treybig “negotiated a $100 million dollar joint venture for Tandem Computers while in China.”
The PLA purchase of U.S. computer power was the perfect cap to Chinese nuclear espionage operations against America. The computers that power U.S. atomic weapon labs have evil twins inside Red China. The PLA super-computers can run American nuclear bomb design software and codes with little or no modification. They are identical to the computers at U.S. weapons labs right down to the vendor support.