Rep. Chris Cox, R-Calif., says that one third of the long-awaited
report on Chinese espionage bearing his name never made it past the
White House and may never be made available to the public.
However, political limitations cannot hold back the facts. What
Clinton deleted from the Cox report is just as important as what we are
allowed to see. For example, the Cox report noted that in 1996, China
had illegally shipped an air-to-air missile as cargo onboard an airliner
full of passengers.
According to the Cox report, “In 1996, Hong Kong Customs officials
intercepted air-to-air missile parts being shipped by (China National
Aerotechnology Import and Export Company) CATIC aboard a commercial air
carrier, Dragonair. Dragonair is owned by China International Trade and
Investment Company (CITIC), the most powerful and visible PRC-controlled
conglomerate, and the Civil Aviation Administration of China.”
What the Cox report left out was that in 1996, only 36 percent of
Dragonair was owned by the Chinese government. The remaining 64 percent
lion-share of the Hong Kong based carrier was then owned by Indonesian
billionaire Mochtar Riady.
Dragonair was fined for carrying the Chinese missile in the cargo bay
of an L-1011 airliner full of paying passengers. According to Aviation
Week & Space Technology (AW&ST), the missile was bound for Israel,
enclosed in a mislabeled box, partially dismantled, and only found by
accident. Both the volatile solid fuel rocket motor and the deadly
explosive warhead were intact and fully operational.
Missiles and airliners full of people should not be mixed. There is
an old U.S. Marine axiom: “Never load munitions and troops on the same
ship.” Airliners owned by the People’s Liberation Army, however, do not
operate along the same rules with or without illegal loads of munitions.
The Dragonair incident may shed light on unexplained civil airline
accidents such as TWA-800. For example, in the 1980s, a South African
747 blew up over the Indian Ocean while carrying a load of artillery
shells along with the paying passengers. The illegal load of cannon
shells exploded over the Indian Ocean, killing everyone onboard.
What remains unanswered is the role Israel played in the Dragonair
case — a U.S. ally anxious to obtain a copy of an enemy missile or a
willing aerospace contractor eager to upgrade a weapon for a paying
customer with stolen U.S.
And why no mention of the ever popular Mochtar Riady, the foreign
billionaire, and major contributor to Bill Clinton? Another issue left
unresolved by the Dragonair incident is the relationship between the
Chinese army and Mochtar Riady, owner of the Lippo Group.
John Huang, Riady’s handpicked man inside the Clinton White House,
had access to highly classified materials. Huang has cited his “Fifth
Amendment” rights over 1,000 times before pleading guilty to minor
The Cox report notes some very interesting parties helped John Huang
stay in touch with his boss. According to the Cox report, “Huang
maintained contact with representatives of the Lippo Group while he was
at the Department of Commerce.”
“During the 18 months that he was at Commerce,” states the report,
“Huang called Lippo Bank 232 times, in addition to 29 calls or faxes to
Lippo Headquarters in Indonesia. Huang also contacted Lippo consultant
Maeley Tom on 61 occasions during the same period. Huang’s records show
72 calls to Lippo joint venture partner C. Joseph Giroir.”
The one key fact missing from the Cox report is that “Maeley Tom” is
also an employee of the powerful beltway lobbyist company, Cassidy
Associates. In 1994, Cassidy Associates sent Democratic National
Committee donor Maeley Tom to Indonesia on a Ron Brown trade mission.
The same mission included DNC donors Charlie Trie, Pauline Kanchanalak
and Nora Lum.
Why no mention of the D.C. lobbyists? The answer may be that Cassidy
Associates also made hundreds of thousands of dollars in political
donations to both Republicans and Democrats. In fact, Cassidy
Associates made a total of over 2,500 political contributions between
1991 and 1998, nearly one donation every two days.
The Cox report also details for the first time the long ignored sea
leg of China’s strategic arsenal. “The JL-2 (Julang 2, or Great Wave 2)
is a submarine-launched version of the (Dong Feng, or East Wind) DF-31.
It is believed to have an even longer range, and will be carried on the
PLA Navy’s Type 094-class submarine. Sixteen JL-2 missiles will be
carried on each submarine.”
What does the Great Wave 2 means to the U.S. homeland? The Cox
report noted “The JL-2’s 7,500 mile range will allow it to be launched
from the PRC’s territorial waters and to strike targets throughout the
On May 27, 1999, the South China Morning Post reported that the
People’s Liberation Navy (PLN) had begun preparations to test the Great
Wave 2 (JL-2). PLN officials reported that the JL-2 is scheduled to be
deployed on the nuclear submarine Xia by 2000. The sub-launched missile
is slated to carry a single 2.5-Megaton, thermonuclear warhead, or three
“If the JL-2 were to employ a shroud to protect its warhead as do the
majority of submarine-launched ballistic missiles today,” states the Cox
report. “This would be the first use of a shroud or fairing on a PRC
The JL-2 explains why the Chinese were so interested in American
space contractor, Hughes, upgrading PLA rockets with “nose-cone” or
“shroud” technology. The Cox report details Chinese Lt. Gen. Shen
Rougjun and his penetration of Hughes through his son, Shen Jun.
In May 1994, Shen, was second in command at COSTIND — the Chinese
Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense.
Shen served underneath the PLA spy-master, Gen. Ding Henggao. In 1994,
COSTIND Gen. Shen attended several business meetings with Hughes.
During a 1994 visit, Shen’s son, Shen Jun, attended a business lunch
with his father and Frank Taormina of Hughes. Taormina later assisted
Shen Jun in obtaining a job at Hughes. The Cox report details “son” Shen
played a significant role in the interaction between his PLA
general-father and the highest of Hughes executives, including CEO
In 1994, Hughes executives were scrambling to avoid a major expense.
Hughes helped PLA engineers after the failure of a PLA Long March rocket
carrying a Hughes-built satellite. Hughes, anxious not to see a hike in
their satellite insurance rates, eagerly pinned the failure on the PLA
nose-cone “shroud” design and not on their satellite. The help included
proprietary software for nose-cone design and analysis derived from
years of ballistic missile tests in America.
Although, Shen Jun was hired at Hughes in August of 1994, according
to the Cox report, “a division of Space Systems/Loral was also
considering hiring Shen for a position that would have allowed him
access to classified information.”
In August 1994, Lt. Gen. Shen also met and consummated a series of
satellite deals with Bernard Schwartz, the CEO of Loral. The Beijing
meeting was arranged by President Clinton and included Commerce
Secretary Ron Brown. The technology obtained from Loral is also
detailed by the Cox report, including rocket guidance and encrypted
satellite telemetry systems.
However, missing from the Cox report is any reference to Ron Brown,
Loral CEO Schwartz and Gen. Shen’s meeting in 1994. Missing from the
report are the details involving Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown,
Defense Secretary William Perry and Shen’s commanding officer in the
Chinese army, Gen. Ding Henggao.
While the close working relationship between PLA Gen. Ding, Secretary
Brown and Defense Secretary Perry may be missing from the Cox report —
it has not been missed in federal court.
In a WorldNetDaily exclusive, this reporter has obtained two
previously unreleased letters from Secretary of Defense William Perry.
The letters were forced from the U.S. Commerce Department by Federal
Judge Robert Payne who ordered them to be released to the public in
1999. One Jan. 31, 1995 letter is addressed to Ron Brown and the other
letter is addressed to Gen. Ding Henggao.
“Dear Ron,” wrote Perry in his 1995 letter to Secretary Brown. “I
recently received a letter from General Ding Henggao, the Minister of
the Chinese Commission for Science Technology and Industry for National
Defense (COSTIND). As you know, General Ding and I head the
Sino-American Joint Defense Conversion Commission that was established
during my visit to the PRC this past October (1994).”
“I am most appreciative, Ron,” wrote Defense Secretary Perry. “Of the
support that the Department of Commerce is providing for this effort.
Unlike our defense conversion projects with Russia, Ukraine, and other
states in the former Soviet Union, there are no funds earmarked for our
activities with China. Hence, we need to rely on already established
channels and create informal ones to accomplish the task at hand.”
Perry’s second letter of Jan. 31, 1995 is addressed directly to
General Ding Henggao. “Dear General Ding,” wrote Perry. “I have asked
our Secretary of Commerce, Mr. Ronald Brown, for the support of his
Department to ensure U.S. businesses are apprised of the opportunities
that have been offered.”
“As you know, we have been working to develop a plan for air traffic
control cooperation that meets the expectations of COSTIND, as well as
the People’s Liberation Army Air Force,” wrote Perry to Gen. Ding. “I
am confident that at the second meeting of the Joint Defense Conversion
Commission, we will be able to receive reports detailing significant
progress in all of our endeavors.”
In fact, Perry wrote his letter to the Chinese spy-master with the
warmest of affections reserved for an old friend. “Best wishes in the
coming year,” wrote Perry. “And I look forward to our next meeting.”
The “informal channels” to “fund” the PLA operations required by
Perry and the PLA placed Ron Brown in direct contact with Chinese
military officers during the last few months of his life. According to
the testimony of Brown confidant, Nolinda Hill, the Commerce secretary
openly worried that the deals with the PLA were bordering on treason and
posed a threat to his life.
According to the GAO, the “air traffic control” that meets the
expectations of “the People’s Liberation Army Air Force” included a
Presidential waiver from Bill Clinton. According to a June 1998 report
to Congress, the GAO stated that “Waivers were also granted to permit
the export of encryption equipment controlled on the Munitions List.
One case involved a $4.3 million communications export to China’s Air
The PLAAF can use the equipment supplied by Clinton’s waiver for
offensive operations against U.S. forces in Asia. The next PLAAF bombs
that fall will do so with great accuracy, due mainly to the efforts of
Gen. Ding and his puppets in Washington.
What Clinton deleted from the Cox report is not altogether unknown
nor unavailable to the press — just under-reported. Clearly, the public
version of the bipartisan Cox report skipped over several key facts that
offended powerful political interests inside Washington and Beijing,
including the Chinese air force.