The following is a document providing a description and non-verbatim notes of a meeting between representatives of the Army’s Delta Force, the FBI and Attorney General Janet Reno. A redacted version of this document was recently released in response to a Freedom of Information Act request. But WorldNetDaily’s Special Forces source has the unredacted document. Here, wherever he feels he can, he has either filled in what has previously been blacked out a) exactly as it appears in the original uncensored document or b) provided a description, in his own words, of what the original says. WND’s source has also provided relevant explanations of certain abbreviations and terminology. These additions and comments appear in brackets in itallic.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Special Forces Operational Detachment – Delta
[WND's source says this is Delta Force]
[WND: This means Delta's commanding general ]
Commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg,
Meeting With members of the FBI and the Department of Justice.
The Incident in Waco, Texas.
- [unreadable word], the following is a synopsis of the meeting on 14 April
1993 in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director’s Conference Room.
The meeting began at approximately 15:30 Attendees were as follows:
Major General Schoomaker
Colonel William Boykin
[WND: Boykin was then a colonel in Delta Force and is now a general at
An 04 from DCSOPS
[WND's source says the above means a major from deputy chief of staff
for operations, which would be an assault team leader from Delta Force Squadron
Unknown Scientist (Expert on CS)
[WND's source points out CS means tear gas ]
Deputy Diector Floyd Clark
Special Agent Danny Coulson
Special Agent Larry Pont
Special Agent Dick Rogers (HRT Commander)
Department of Justice
Honorable Janet Reno (Attorney General)
[WND: as in Webster Hubbell ]
Two UI persons
[WND's source says of UI persons which means unidentified persons, that
they were "alleged at the time to to be White House personnel reporting
directly to Clinton who refused to be identified during the meeting."
- This meeting began with an explanation by the scientist on the effects
of CS on humans. He referred to experiments over the years with both humans
and animals. His assessment was that CS was non-lethal and presented very
little physical threat to the Branch Davidian occupants. The Attorney General
and others from the Department of Justice asked a variety of questions on
the effects of CS and the potential hazards. They were assured by both the
FBI and the scientist that the risks of serious injury associated with CS
were low. Attorney General Reno then asked both [redacted] to give an assessment
of the effects of CS. Our assessment was as follows:
- (U) Some people would panic, Quote: “mothers may run off and leave
- (U) Some would continue to function by using expedient techniques to
overcome the effects; e.g., use of a wet cloth on the face.
- (U) Even with protective masks, eventually the facility would become
untenable (inhabitants would have to eat and drink at some point).
- (U) In summary, we assessed that if the objective of the FBI was to
make the building uninhabitable, then CS would accomplish that. We stated
that it was our belief that if enough CS was [unreadable word], eventually
the inhabitants would not be able to remain inside.
- It was obvious that Attorney General Reno had already been briefed on the
concept of the operation. Special Agent Dick Rogers gave a brief summary of
his plan using a series of enlarged photographs of the compound and a model
made of cardboard and wood. The FBI saw this as an arrest situation and not
a hostage barricade. Their goal was to force the compound inhabitants out
of the building so they could be arrested. Dick Rogers stated to Attorney
General Janet Reno that his primary concern was for the safety of the FBI
agents and other law enforcement officers. Their view was that this was not
an assault. The stated intent was to incrementally “gas” the compound for
up to 48 hours. After 48 hours, the next step would be to use an armored platform
with a blade to start removing the front of the building.
- Attorney General Reno then asked for our assessment of the plan. We collectively
made the following points:
- (U) This was not a military operation and could not be assessed as
such. We explained that the situation was not one that we had ever encountered
and that the Rules of Engagement for the FBI were substantially different
than for a military operation. [name redacted] stated, “We can’t grade
your paper,” as a way of explaining our position.
- (U) If it was a military operation, we would focus on [about five words
redacted] The meaning was obvious. [redacted.] We acknowledged that there
were legal issues/problems associated with this approach
- (U) Consideration should be given to inserting CS into the [redacted
for about four sentences which WND's source says details a conversation
during which the military personnel explained to Reno the correct way
to use CS (tear gas) and the risks involved ] Deputy. Director Clark
stated that [redacted-- but in an e-mail WND's source says it is a
description of "what covert surveillance equipment was being provided
by Delta, and that Delta 'technicals' (commo and surveillance operators)
were going to 'maintain' the equipment (actually run it for the FBI)"
- The principles of surprise, speed and violence of action were essential
to any operation. [redacted] stated that momentum should be maintained
and that ground gained should not be relinquished. [WND's source says
"violence of action" usually refers to killing the "hostiles" ]
- The final issue discussed was timing. Attorney Reno asked simply, “Why now.”
The FBI’s response was:
- There is no reason to believe that Koresh has any intention of coming
- There are indicators that children are suffering abuse
- The effects of a prolonged stand-off on the HRT (Hostage Rescue Team)
were not an overriding issue, but something that must be considered.
- My final comments were that I believed that the HRT (Hostage Rescue Team)
should consider pulling their people off the target for a short period to
retrain and polish some of the [WND: difficult to read, looks like "perishable"
] skills. I made it clear that I was not encouraging an immediate execution
of the operation. My exact words were, “I don’t have a dog in this fight.”
My comments focused on the necessity to maintain perishable skills in order
to be ready if an approval came at some point. The FBI response was that the
HRT agents were, in fact, training in the Waco area on some makeshift facilities.
They were strongly opposed to leaving the target. [WND's source sent the
following e-mail interpreting this paragraph: "When Boykin stated he 'did
not have a dog in this fight' I believe he meant that he didn't want to be
directly involved in it, and did not want to be dragged into it. Delta Force
operators, AND Task Force 160 operators continually cautioned the FBI against
attempting an 'Open Air Assault' on the target, and continually stated they
did not want to be involved in firing on or assault American civilians. These
official and unofficial comments went ignored and, in fact, one Special Operations
Officer was threatened with court-martial if he continued to protest.
The other points that surfaced during the discussion were size of the
HRT (Hostage Rescue Team) in Waco (34 personnel) and the availability of
similar units. It was explained that the HRT (Hostage Rescue Team) was unique
and that only the military had a similiar capability. There was no discussion
on the use of the military
It is also important to note [redacted] was involved in Waco in a supporting
role. [redacted] was offered an opportunity to observe the incident. With
JCS approval, an observer deployed to the scene on 21 March 1993. The HRT
(Hostage Rescue Team) subsequently asked for and received technical support
on 19 March 19993, in the form of [redacted]. Two technicians took the equipment
to Waco and remained there throughout the 51-day standoff. They maintained
the equipment and advised the FBI on tactical employment. There was no tactical
advice requested and none given at any time. The FBI was very understanding
about the rules under which the [redacted] were operating. During the assault,
the three [redacted] observed from the HRT (Hostage Rescue Team) forward
command post and were cautioned not to video the operation. Prior to deployment
all [redacted] were advised as to the legal restrictions on the nature and
scope of assistance they could provide to the FBI and other law enforcement
agencies. Their activities fell well within these boundaries. All support
to the HRT (Hostage Rescue Team) was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Finally, the plan which was executed at Waco was an FBI plan which neither
[redacted] nor I helped prepare. At the same time, I did believe that they
had a reasonable chance of accomplishing their objective of forcing the
occupants out of the building. Their approach was substantially different
than anything that I have encountered. They were not assaulting the compound
and they were not there to rescue anyone This was surprising to me, but
certainly not something of which I am critical. It is simply a different
way of looking at the situation. I did not believe that the FBI and the
Attorney General were trying to force us to support or defend the plan.
It was my belief that they simply wanted any observations that we felt comfortable
[WND's source says that it is signed by Colonel William Boykin, Delta Force,
now General Boykin ]