Wang Xi, an 11th century scholar in the Sung Dynasty Hanlin, or
Imperial Academy, wrote commentary on the “Use of Spies.” According to
Wang Xi, “Dead spies are those who are fooled by
their own leaders into passing on false information to the enemy; when
the facts are determined, they are inevitably killed.”

In 1999, according to the official Chinese news service, Chinese
defector and missile scientist, Hua Di was sentenced in a People’s court
to 15 years for passing state secrets to the United States.

State Department spokesman James Foley said, “Based on what we know
of his activities as an academic researcher in the U.S., we are aware of
no reason to justify his detention and sentencing.
We remain deeply concerned about Mr. Hua’s reported health problems and
need for medical treatment. We’re concerned that his detention may have
a chilling effect on academic exchanges
between the U.S. and China.”

Why all the concern over a foolish missile scientist? In 1989, Hua Di
defected from China, leaving after the Tiananmen Square crackdown on
student democracy demonstrators. Hua Di went to work
as a researcher at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Arms
Control, whose co-directors are former Secretary of Defense William
Perry and Stanford Political Science Professor John Lewis.

In late October 1998, it was announced that Hua Di had returned to
China. He met with Chinese security officials in late 1997 and was
assured that he would not be prosecuted. On Dec. 31, 1997, Hua Di
returned to China; on Jan. 6, 1998, he was arrested and charged with
passing state secrets to U.S. officials.

Stanford University officials and Dr. John Lewis have written to the
Chinese government appealing for Hua Di’s release. In 1998, then
Stanford Provost Condoleezza Rice said Professor John Lewis
“had provided evidence to the fact that the source materials for
publications written by him and Mr. Hua were provided by approved
Chinese authorities or already were available through the Stanford
University library.”

However, Stanford officials have refused all requests for a comment
or interview on Hua Di. Former Stanford Provost Condoleezza Rice, now
serving as a foreign policy advisor to presidential candidate George W.
Bush, has refused to comment. In addition, Perry has likewise refused
all requests for an interview on Hua Di.

Why the silence from the very people who have made open statements to
defend Hua Di? Perhaps it is because the other Hua Di, agent of the
Chinese army, fooled Stanford University and the Clinton administration.

Hua Di was born into a family of prominent Communist officials. He
studied missiles in Russia and worked in China’s missile program for 24
years. In 1984, Hua Di went to work for the China International Trust
and Investment Company (CITIC), a firm part owned by the Chinese army.

In 1989, after defecting to America, Hua Di arranged for the Chinese
army to obtain a secure fiber-optic communication system. Hua Di
participated in the “Hua Mei” scandal documented by the General
Accounting Office (GAO report GAO/NSIAD-97-5).

According to Hua Di’s statements to the Far Eastern Economic Review,
Dr. Lewis and he worked together on the Hua Mei project through an
American contracting firm called
SCM/Brooks. SCM/Brooks formed a joint venture with Galaxy New
Technology, a newly formed Chinese company, to arrange the purchase of
the fiber-optic system for “civilian” use.

However, Galaxy New Technology was actually owned by the Chinese
army. In 1994, Hua Di contacted an old friend in the Chinese army, Lt.
Gen. Huai Guomo. Huai arranged for a Madam Nie Li to run the project as
the Chinese co-chair. Dr. Lewis, himself a board member of the project,
located Adlai Stevenson III, the former Democratic Senator from Ohio, to
lead the American side.

Yet, Galaxy New Technology head Madam Nie Lie was also the wife of
Chinese army Gen. Ding Henggao. In fact, according to a 1997 report from
the Congressional Reporting Service, Madam Nie Lie was actually Lt. Gen.
Nie Lie of the Chinese army. In 1994, Gen. Ding was also the boss of
Lt. Gen. Huai, the Chinese military contact for Hua Di. Ding also
commanded the Chinese army unit COSTIND, the Commission on Science
Technology and Industry for National Defense.

COSTIND, according to the General Accounting Office “oversees
development of China’s weapon systems and is responsible for identifying
and acquiring telecommunications technology applicable for military
use.”

The U.S. firm, SCM/Brooks contracted AT&T to ship advanced, secure
communication systems directly to the Chinese army using Galaxy New
Technology as a front. AT&T officials who sold most of the equipment and
software to SCM/Brooks were adamant that there was no need to check the
Chinese firm since it was led by the “civilian” Madam Nie Lie.

Yet, the so-called “civilian” firm was actually packed with Chinese
army officers and experts. One member of Galaxy New Technology
management, according to a Defense Department document, was Director and
President “Mr. Deng Changru.” Mr. Deng Changru was also Lt. Col. Deng
Changru of the People’s Liberation Army, head of the PLA communications
corps. Another
Chinese army officer in the Galaxy New Technology staff is co-General
Manager “Mr. Xie Zhichao” who is really Lt. Col. Xie Zhichao, director
of the Chinese army Electronics Design Bureau.

Documents obtained from the Department of Defense using the Freedom
of Information Act show that Dr. Lewis was being paid by the Chinese
army while working for Secretary of Defense William Perry as a civilian
“consultant.”

In August 1994, Lewis and Perry traveled to Beijing to meet with
Chinese army generals. Included in the meeting were Lewis’ Chinese army
business partners, Gens. Huai and Ding. According to the official list
of attendees, Lewis accompanied Perry as his personal consultant.

In 1997, Lewis was charged with using Stanford University funding to
set up the profitable Hua Mei deal. Lewis faced an investigation from
Stanford Provost Ms. Rice because he had used University stationery for
his Hua Mei business. No formal charges were filed. Ms. Rice dropped the
investigation and left Stanford for the Bush presidential campaign.

The Galaxy New Technology deal went public in 1996, drawing a General
Accounting Office report and the Department of Defense documents cited
here. It also drew far too much public attention to Hua Di. Thus, Hua Di
returned home to China.

While he served at Stanford, Hua Di passed incorrect and misleading
information about Red army missile developments. In 1992, Hua Di and
Lewis published “China’s Ballistic Missile Program,”
in which Hua Di claimed a newly developed missile, called the DF-25, was
not a success. Hua Di’s work is cited by Stanford and Clinton
administration officials as “gospel” in an effort to minimize the PLA’s
recent advances.

According to the co-author of the new book, “Red Dragon Rising,”
William Triplett, in August 1999, the Clinton administration was shocked
by Chinese communist press announcements declaring the DF-25 to be fully
operational and tipped with multiple nuclear warheads.

Despite the disinformation, Stanford continues to publish information
based on the twisted and false tales spun by Hua Di. Stanford’s latest
report, “The Cox Committee Report: An Assessment,” asserts that China’s
latest long range nuclear missile, the DF-31, is “less likely to be used
first.”

According to the Stanford report, “A mobile ICBM, the DF-31, was
initially tested this year. If deployed, it could increase the
survivability of Chinese land-based missile forces. … How U.S.
interests are affect by survivability of Chinese nuclear forces is a
complex question, however. Survivable weapons are less likely to be used
first.”

The Stanford conclusion that the mobile Chinese DF-31 can survive a
U.S. first strike is correct and misleading. Of all the weapons at the
disposal of the Chinese 2nd Artillery Corps, the DF-31 is the most
likely to be used in a first strike against the United States.

The mobile DF-31 is also very accurate, thanks to the Chinese
espionage documented in the Cox Report. The DF-31 can put three nuclear
warheads anywhere inside America. In fact, the “mobile”
DF-31 is so accurate that, unlike other Chinese nuclear weapons, it can
destroy our “fixed” silo-based U.S. missile force in a first-strike
attack. A Chinese first strike with a limited number of DF-31 missiles
could destroy our land-based missile force, and in the process, kill
millions of Americans.

I am certain that Stanford officials will continue to comment on the
military and political relationships between the United States and
China. However, also expect Stanford officials to
remain silent on questions about their former employee Hua Di. Do not be
surprised if they continue to refuse all comments on the so-called
“defector” in order to dodge questions of his espionage while at the
university.

Hua Di served the Chinese Communist party and the People’s Liberation
Army by doing their dirty work in America. He passed disinformation, he
was cozy with top Clinton defense officials and he was personally
responsible for upgrading the Chinese army communications network,
making them more “survivable” in case of nuclear war.

However, in accordance with the military theories of Wang Xi, the
eleventh century Chinese espionage scholar, Hua Di may have one more
service to perform. I anticipate that Hua Di will be
reported as “dead” in the red Chinese controlled press.

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