• Text smaller
  • Text bigger

In 1961 KGB Major Anatoliy Golitsyn defected to America. He became
the most controversial Russian defector of the Cold War. He first ran
into difficulties when he said there were KGB agents within the CIA.
This sent chills through the slumbering bureaucrats. A controversy
bubbled within our own intelligence community. Some disliked Golitsyn,
having strong feelings against the idea of traitors and moles in their
midst.

The chief of CIA counterintelligence, James Angleton, took Golitsyn
seriously and did a number of tests (by leaking information to groups of
CIA officers to see if this information reached the Russians).
According to Edward Jay Epstein, in his book entitled, “Deception: the
Invisible War Between the KGB and CIA,” these tests proved there were
moles and traitors at the CIA. Deeply entrenched within our own
intelligence community, these Russian agents were trained to avoid
detection. Information was not passed to the Russians whenever Angleton
was about to narrow the list of suspects.

Like most bureaucratic organizations, the CIA could not face the
truth. Angleton’s views were resented. In 1974 the CIA’s new boss,
William Colby, began to zero in on Angleton. Colby later admitted to
journalist David Wise: “Yeah, I was trying to ease … (Angleton) out.”
In order to accomplish this, Colby began to reorganize the CIA. This
reorganization weakened CIA counterintelligence, destroying Angleton’s
effectiveness.

Colby then engaged in a further intrigue. In December 1974 he met
with reporter Seymour Hersh of the New York Times. Colby confirmed a
story Hersh was working on about CIA domestic spying. Such spying is
against the rules and Angleton was implicated. Hersh left Colby’s
office and rushed to telephone Abe Rosenthal, his boss at the Times.
“Abe, I got it,” said Hersh. The story led to the resignation of
Angleton. America’s secret war was lost.

Director of Central Intelligence William Colby, who met his fate 21
years later in a suspicious canoeing accident, came under counterattack
after Angleton left the agency. According to David Wise’s account: “It
began to be whispered around Washington that Colby was the mole
(Angleton had been looking for). But somehow the rumors could never be
tied to Angleton directly.”

With the fall of Angleton, Golitsyn’s warnings about Russian
deception strategy were officially and finally discredited. A few years
later, Angleton and Golitsyn went to William F. Buckley, a former CIA
officer and editor of National Review. Angleton wanted Buckley’s help
in putting together a book — “New Lies for Old” — which would detail
the mechanisms of Russian deception and warn the West of the dangers.
Buckley later satirized his meeting with Angleton and Golitsyn in a
National Review column. Buckley would have nothing to do with “New Lies
for Old.” In his view Angleton and Golitsyn were demented.

Even from the vantage point of the early 1990s Buckley did not
appreciate Golitsyn’s incredible accuracy as an analyst. Like many
former CIA officers, Buckley assumed — without checking — that
Angleton was wrong. The germ of anti-paranoia ravaged the CIA after
Angleton. It infected nearly everyone. Think about this for a moment;
anti-paranoia is harmful to the very mission of America’s intelligence
community.

Last week I had a long talk with a former CIA official. The subject
of Angleton and Golitsyn came up. Here again the blindness of our
people emerged. This former CIA official predictably described Angleton
as “paranoid.” Such a label discredits a person without appeal.

In this context we ought to remember that a CIA counterintelligence
chief must — like Sherlock Holmes — hold to his suspicions. The
easiest smear against such a person, therefore, is the word “paranoia.”
The British writer Tom Mangold, who wrote a book on Angleton entitled,
“Cold Warrior,” used paranoia as a theme and a battering ram to destroy
Angleton’s reputation. By blurring the distinction between the
professional suspicions of a spy-catcher and the inner demons of a crazy
person, Mangold painted a vivid portrait of madness and
self-destruction. But the greatest lie that Mangold told in his book,
and the most unforgivable, was the lie that Golitsyn was a false
prophet. “As a crystal-ball gazer,” wrote Mangold, “Golistyn has been
unimpressive.” Mangold listed six predictions by Golitsyn that failed
to come true. Six failed predictions out of 145. Mangold forgot to
mention the 139 predictions that proved correct.

Without William F. Buckley’s literary assistance, Golitsyn wrote his
predictions down in “New Lies for Old.” The book was published by Dodd,
Mead & Company in 1984 under the subtitle, “The Communist Strategy of
Deception and Disinformation.” In 366 pages Golitsyn described how the
KGB had developed a machinery of deception in the late 1950s. The
purpose of this KGB machinery was to eventually erect a false democracy
and a false market economy in Russia. Through secret agents and
KGB-controlled anti-Soviet fronts, the Communist Party Soviet Union
would continue to rule the former Soviet empire from behind the scenes.

Golitsyn’s description of controlled democratization and
liberalization in Russia was so close to the actual events, which
occurred from late 1989 through 1991, that researcher Mark Riebling,
author of “Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and CIA,” credited
Golitsyn with 94 percent accuracy. Since that time Golitsyn’s accuracy
has increased further. His prediction that Russia and China would unite
into “one clenched fist” at the end of the final phase of the long-range
strategy has come true. Now Golitsyn has proved correct in 140 out of
145 predictions.

In the last few months we have seen Russia engaged in a series of
military mobilizations under the cover of the crisis in Dagestan and
Chechnya. At the outset of this crisis Yeltsin appointed a new prime
minister — Vladimir Putin, chief of the Russian secret police. Putin
is a militaristic tough guy, allied to the Russia General Staff,
committed to mobilizing Russia’s military industrial complex.

Once again Anatoliy Golitsyn proves to be a prophet of incredible
accuracy. A fellow researcher sent me a note the other day, pointing to
page 229 of Golitsyn’s book, “The Perestroika Deception.” On this page
Golitsyn predicts how a war in Chechnya would be used by Kremlin
strategists to accomplish a leadership change. Golitsyn writes of “the
military/nationalist option as the third course upon which the Kremlin
strategists might embark in (the) future to adjust the style and
leadership of a new government if, for example, Yeltsin was considered
to have exhausted his usefulness in extracting concessions from the
West.”

Golitsyn adds that “the Chechen ‘crisis’ can be seen not as a
likely cause of a military coup, but as a possible planned prelude to a
change of government.”

But this nationalist government, says Golitsyn, would be Communist at
its core. Nationalism is simply a motivational device to jump-start the
old Soviet machinery. The Russian people are more energized by
nationalism than by Marxism-Leninism, so the trick is to use the slogans
and propaganda which most efficiently serve the cause of
militarization. That is the key to Putin’s policy. That is why “the
Bear” faction in the Duma has been given life — as the second strongest
political party after the Communists.

Golitsyn’s analysis goes further: “Since an outright military or
nationalist government might prejudice the flow of Western aid and the
continued ‘cooperation’ with the West … it is more likely that the
Kremlin strategists will opt for … a new President and
Commander-in-Chief with a military background and a ‘reformist’ Prime
Minister, in the context of overtly tighter KGB control.”

Although Putin is a paramilitary KGB careerist, he is perceived as an
ally of Russia’s General Staff. He therefore fits Golitsyn’s
description. Furthermore, we now find that the man emerging as
Putin’s chief lieutenant and future prime minister also fits Golitsyn’s
description. Finance Minister Mikhail Kasyanov has become Putin’s
deputy prime minister and — most probably — Russia’s future prime
minister.

Kasyanov is said to speak English, and he has extensive relations
with Western financiers. He is polished, likable and a good
negotiator. Who else could do a better job of keeping Western money
flowing into Russia?

According to a Jan. 11 Moscow Times story entitled, “Kasyanov Given
Chance to Prove His Mettle,” Western investors think that Kasyanov’s
rise is a green light to pouring further billions down Russia’s economic
rat-hole.

“The markets have reacted to his appointment positively,” said Arnab
Das, a market analyst with JP Morgan.

Those who continue to ignore Golitsyn’s accuracy do so at their own
risk. Such people are being slowly but surely discredited themselves,
however smug they now appear. Golitsyn was so prescient in his
predictions about a Chechen war leading to a change in the Russian
government, that he even got the details right. “The transition might
be brought about,” said Golitsyn, “by the resignation of Yeltsin. …”

Those who reject Golitsyn’s warnings about Russia object to his
statements about secret collusion between Russia and China. That
collusion is now happening in plain view. When are we going to wake
up? The man who predicted it all should be listened to. Golitsyn
understands how the Kremlin strategists think.

In our own private lives we discover that knowing a person enables us
to predict that person’s future actions. But if we are constantly wrong
in predicting those actions, maybe we don’t know the person after all.
With Golitysn it is clear. He knows the mind of the Kremlin. He can
therefore predict how the Kremlin will act in the future. Those in
Washington who have failed, time and time again, to predict Kremlin
actions have only proved that they do not understand Russia.

One of Golitsyn’s most basic statements about Russia and China goes
to the heart of the matter. It is the deeper truth we must never lose
sight of. “American military and intelligence analysts,” writes
Golitsyn, “having accepted democratic ‘reforms’ in Russia as genuine,
have lowered their guard with respect to disinformation and have failed
to detect its continuation.”

And what is the purpose of this disinformation?

Golitsyn’s explanation is basic: “The Russian and Chinese leaders
are still committed to their objective of world domination and believe
that, disguised as ‘democrats’ … they will be able to achieve it.”

Those who have written against Angleton and Golitsyn have missed the
bottom line. If Golitsyn’s predictions have been accurate, if his
analysis continues to withstand the test of time, then the critics must
eventually revise their criticism. There is no rational argument
against a man who has proven himself again and again.

  • Text smaller
  • Text bigger
Note: Read our discussion guidelines before commenting.