The Clinton-Gore administration has finally been forced to admit,
officially, a secret it has kept from Congress – if not the outside
world —
for more than seven years. The dirty little secret — revealed at the
Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference early last month – is that the

Clinton-Gore objective since taking office has been “irrevocable” U.S.

When Clinton and Gore came to power, there was already a consensus
that the
No. 1 threat to U.S. national security was Russian “loose nukes” — the
potential international proliferation of a “few” of the tens of
thousands of
inadequately safeguarded Soviet nuclear weapons and their associated
materials, nuke technologies and nuke technologists. But, by all
the danger of a loose nuke “incident” in the United States is greater
than it was eight years ago. It is greater, today, largely because
Clinton-Gore subverted the congressional mandate to assist the Russians in
effectively safeguarding and securing their loose nukes.

For Clinton-Gore, whose eyes were turned on “global” security, the
No. 1
threat was not a few loose nukes; it was the mere existence of the nuke
stockpiles of the United States, Russia, China, United Kingdom and
Since coming to power, Clinton-Gore — in the name of global security —
done their best to irrevocably get rid of ours, unilaterally, and to
persuade Russia to get rid of its nuke stockpile.

The stealth vehicle chosen by Clinton-Gore to sneak its nuke
program past Congress was the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The CTBT,
which has been once rejected by the U.S. Senate, is not, in and of
itself, a
nuke-disarmament treaty. The CTBT is — on its face — merely a
by signatory nations to never again test nukes for any reason. But the

Clinton administration has sold the CTBT to the nuke have-nots of the
to be an effective — if unwitting — U.S. commitment to
implement Article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty. In Article VI, the

five nuke powers promised way back in 1970 to eventually engage
serious disarmament talks amongst themselves. Clinton has now
transformed this intentionally vague offer made 30 years ago into a
U.S. unequivocal commitment to disarm.

But, in so doing, Clinton-Gore spoke with forked tongue. The
tried to sell the CTBT to the U.S. Senate as a heaven-sent opportunity
the U.S. to forever prevent any other country from ever joining the nuke

“club.” Never once letting on to the Senate about the promises made to
have-nots that U.S. compliance with the CTBT would result in effective
nuke disarmament, Clinton-Gore contrarily argued to the Senate that
ratifying the CTBT would lock-in U.S. nuke superiority — in both
numbers of
nukes and technological sophistication — for all time to come

Clinton-Gore certified to Congress that the United States could
lock-in U.S.
nuke superiority through a

Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship
which would rely entirely on laboratory and computer “simulation” of nuclear tests. There are credible reports that the Clinton administration also secretly offered to assist the other nuke powers — Russia and China for sure, and perhaps even India and Pakistan — establish their own stewardship programs. The defeat of the CTBT by the Senate in the fall of 1999 appears to have been based not on a recognition of the true Clinton-Gore purposes, but primarily on a belief by some senators that the U.S. stewardship program had not yet proved itself.

There is, as yet, no evidence that Congress was or is aware that the Clinton administration sold the CTBT to the nuke have-nots as a disarmament treaty at the same time it tried to sell the CTBT to the Senate as a U.S. nuke-superiority treaty. But the disarmament crowd, extremely active and well organized globally, is well aware of the Clinton-Gore forked tongue approach to international nuke disarmament. With the active assistance of the disarmament crowd, Clinton-Gore succeeded with its CTBT stealth vehicle and in 1995 got all Nonproliferation Treaty signatories — the five nuke powers and about 175 have-nots — to agree to extend the life of NPT indefinitely.

As a byproduct of that indefinite NPT extension there are now NPT Review Conferences held every five years wherein the signatories assess effectiveness of the United Nations’ NPT regime. The 2000 conference just took place last month in New York City at the United Nations. In spite of the fact that since 1995 both India and Pakistan — neither country a NPT signatory — have detonated their homegrown nukes for the first time, and despite the fact that the U.S. Senate had refused to ratify only six months earlier the Clinton-Gore “commitment” to nuke have-nots (the CTBT) that the U.S. would disarm, the NPT confab was considered by the disarmament crowd to be a big success.

That is principally because at the conference the Clinton administration committed the United States to — and somehow got China, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom to go along with — “an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all states parties are committed.”

Most recent visitors to Russia, noting the effect of political and civil unrest and the deteriorating economy on the Russian nuke infrastructure, believe that the danger of a loose nuke “incident” — with a non-national terrorist group being the most likely “perp” and a ballistic missile being the least likely delivery vehicle — is greater now than it was at the beginning of the Clinton Era.

There was a window of opportunity when we could have helped the Russians make loose nukes a lot less “loose,” when we could have prevented a nuke incident in the United States or in Russia or in Europe. But, instead of doing what we could to safeguard the Russian arsenal, instead of preventing what could have been prevented, Clinton-Gore has concentrated its efforts on persuading the five nuke states — most especially the Russians — to eliminate their nuke arsenals altogether, and, no matter what pieces of paper they have signed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference or elsewhere, surely the Russians are not about to do that, even if we do.

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