Ever since the Oslo Agreement was signed on September 13, 1993, both the Israelis and the Palestinians have enjoyed a more or less 'open door' policy with the White House. Because of the constant involvement of the Clinton administration, the Oslo Agreement morphed from a document of liberty into a millstone around the necks of all concerned.
If Arafat had a problem with Israel, he'd run to the White House to tell big brother Bill, who'd twist Prime Minister Barak's arm for him. Barak was forced into the position of always having to follow Arafat to the White House. He was forced into the role dealing with one proposed compromise after another from Arafat with Bill Clinton's backing. In this format, it seemed the problem was always Israel's unwillingness to compromise.
Clinton poked and prodded; took sides, then reversed himself as needed. Oslo began as a simple agreement to test the ability of Palestinians to govern themselves under a policy of limited autonomy. Clinton's quixotic pursuit of his own Nobel Peace Prize turned it into his personal vehicle to greatness. Until the tires went flat after he left office.
Does anyone remember the original?
The original agreement forbade any mention of Jerusalem as a possible capital of a Palestinian State, indeed, it forbade a Palestinian State of any kind. Under 1993 Oslo, Arafat was forbidden to even assume the title president to disabuse any notion of Palestinian nationality.
Palestinian officials were forbidden to conduct official business in Jerusalem. Arafat foreswore ambitions of statehood until it was at least established that he could oversee the limited autonomy he was granted over the city of Jericho, and Palestinian educational and municipal services. Oslo called for a five-year test period first.
How Oslo was repeatedly broken
Within days, Arafat stood on the road from Jericho to Jerusalem and declared it for his intended Palestinian state on the grounds it was the road to his capital city. Instead of promptly backing Israel's indignant objection, Clinton chose to side with Arafat, at least tacitly, beginning the slide from Oslo to Camp David to chaos.
Arafat kept up his rhetoric, as Clinton urged Israeli restraint. The White House chose to ignore Israeli complaints of Palestinian Authority propaganda that permeated the PA controlled television and radio programs. When Arafat introduced anti-Semitic hate literature into the educational system from kindergarten on up, the White House put its pressure on the Israelis to compromise in the interests of a 'just and lasting peace.'
The road to disaster
The Clinton White House, despite the appearance of being an intensely involved mediator, actually took on the role of peacemaker in a region they never fully understood.
Since compromise was second nature to Bill Clinton, he couldn't see why the Israelis couldn't 'bend a little' in the face of some of Arafat's demands. He never grasped the long-term danger to Israel posed by each compromise. The greatest danger was the building of impossible expectations in the Palestinians. Through various summits and Israeli administrations, Bill Clinton deftly charted the course to a peace he saw as his personal mission; the one he began in the Rose Garden in 1993 and the one he intended to see blossom into his vision of utopia by the time he left office.
Like in the 'miracle' economy of the 1990's, Clinton's efforts seemed to work like magic – because that's what they were, in a sense. It was diplomatic prestidigitation that kept the Middle East peace afloat – illusions without substance based on promises of impossible future concessions that were forever postponed.
The boom of the 90's was based on the same thing – prestidigitation, what Greenspan called an "irrational exuberence." The problem is, once somebody stops pulling rabbits out of a hat, somebody is bound to look inside the hat to see how he did it, and it all falls apart.
For the economy, it was when somebody asked the question, "How could a company with no earnings be worth billions?" and nobody could come up with a believable answer anymore.
For the Middle East, it was when Arafat realized he got all he could get by compromise. Israel offered him 95 percent, Arafat still said no and, suddenly, the doors to the White House slammed shut. The unrealistic expectations built up under Clinton emboldened him to gamble for it all and he lost. And now, Arafat faces Ariel Sharon in Israel and George W. Bush in the White House – a whole new ball game.
The Bush administration has disengaged the United States from the Middle East peace process. Arafat found his welcome mat jerked from the door of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue until he proved he was serious about peace. Arafat had grown used to making some offhand concession like "Israel has a right to exist, but …" and expecting to be received as Nobel prize-winner and statesman again. Actually being called upon by Washington to turn words into deeds was disconcerting enough. But finding out Washington was serious was something even more confusing.
Arafat expected he could push Israel to the brink, and then count on Washington to step in to prevent an explosion, as happened countless times during the Clinton era. And each time Arafat agreed to step back, his position was that much stronger, his demands that much larger, while Israel's interests seemed to fade into the wallpaper.
The monster Oslo morphed to
Thus, Oslo morphed from limited autonomy in Jericho and Gaza to "president" Yasser Arafat's vision of the Palestinian flag of statehood flying over 'every minaret and over every church' in Jerusalem without anyone ever calling his attention to the provisions Arafat agreed to in writing in 1993. The peace process died the "death of a thousand cuts" administered during the countless Middle East peace summits convened by Bill Clinton to move forward despite the total absence of progress.
Arafat was shocked when the Bush administration failed to intervene as Israeli military responses intensified. He evidently decided to force Bush to notice him when he ordered the Sabbath attack in Tel Aviv. That failing, Arafat is realizing to his evident horror that Washington just may sit idly by while Israel makes good on its threat to "wipe out the Palestinian Authority."
Arafat immediately called for a cease-fire of his own. The next day, the PA's pollsters reported that three out of four Palestinian civilians support the suicide bombing campaign. Mortars continue to rain on Jewish settlements as I write this column.
Why doesn't the United States intervene, some ask? Intervention has so far only made things worse.
The White House is holding Arafat responsible for the monstrous situation he has created, and it appears even Arafat can no longer control it. White House strategy is to wait until Arafat (or his successor) has a real hunger for peace rather than engaging itself in another futile round of empty promises and veiled threats.
And one way to sharpen Arafat's hunger for peace is to allow him a big taste of war. It's a risky strategy at best. But it appears to be the only alternative left to us. Clinton played all the trumps early in the game to feed the illusion of peace. He left us with no more compromises to explore.