Baghdad, Iraq. On the streets of Sadr City, merchants' goods cover the sidewalks, open-air markets peddle meat and produce, and civilians go about their business much as elsewhere. The alleyways, sidewalks and fields are filled with children and their presence outdoors testifies to the residents' feeling of security. In short, by the usual measures, there is no overt civil war in this neighborhood.
In the last generation the world has seen genuine civil wars in Rwanda and Bosnia, where five- and six-figure death tolls were the norm. By contrast, in Baghdad, bodies are counted "only" in tens and twenties – when episodes of violence occur. The notion that civil war is "imminent" is a fiction retailed by those cheerleading for a U.S. failure in Iraq – a group which includes, among others, hard-left Democrats, jihadis and the Syrian and Iranian regimes.
Whether one hopes for U.S. failure, believes that we are failing or insists that all has gone well, the truth about Iraq is probably better expressed in words of the late Sen. Everett Dirksen: Things are never as good as they look or as bad as they seem. In Iraq, this truth can be found on the same streets of Sadr City. The red-bereted Iraqi Security Forces are present, as are the blue-shirted Iraqi police.
But lurking in alleyways just behind them are black-robed Sadr militia, standing in Japanese-made pickup trucks with rear-mounted machine guns. Likewise, prominent among the street goods for sale are electric generators and tons of potable water in huge plastic containers. These bespeak the lack of electricity and drinkable water. The rest of Sadr City – a miserable slum – bespeaks other, more intractable problems.
Still, even this dire picture is mixed. Suppliers of building materials seem to be flourishing and the prices of tile, bricks, wood and cement mix has risen to reflect demand. And the reason for our journey through Sadr City – to witness the transfer of command of Forward Operating Base Hope from the U.S. 506th Regiment to the 2nd Brigade, 6th Iraqi Army Division – is a sign of progress.
However, to arrive at the ceremony we convoyed through Sadr City on an armored bus protected front and back by Bradley Armored Vehicles. Americans may make good conquerors, but we are poor viceroys. Three years after the invasion of Iraq, we move through the city by the same means we used for its capture.
Americans and Iraqis may well muddle through. A list of states with active insurgencies – Russia, Algeria, Israel, Spain, the Philippines, to name a few – suggests that rebellions by themselves will not negate a state's legitimacy. The only question about Iraq – and it has been raised before – is whether or not it can exist without a strong Tito-like figure to hold its ethnically disparate regions together. After all, while Iraqis are justifiably proud of their ancient civilization, the fact remains that what we know as "Iraq" was an invention of the 1920s British Foreign Office, which literally bolted together provinces from the recently defeated Ottomans.
The ideas I'm about to express are not congenial with the traditions of U.S. foreign policy or the values of the American people. But history may inevitably move us in this direction, and it is always better to anticipate than react.
For many reasons, Iraq is not post-war Germany, Italy or Japan. If American policy, stripped of sentimentalism, boils down to ensuring that Iraq is stable, a regional ally, a reliable oil producer, and a prospective base for U.S. forces in an area where our diplomacy needs our military, then what this country must do is produce a Tito-type figure, but Iraq style.
As we rebuild the ISF, perhaps we should consider empowering a military junta (which can operate behind the facade of a nominal democracy). We can arm it, finance it, and do business with such an entity. In exchange, this junta – or strong man as the case may eventually turn out – will grant us the petroleum we seek, the bases we need, and will agree, if we (and the Iraqi people) are especially lucky, to govern with a kinder, gentler face than was the case with Saddam.
Such a junta would have to be deflected from external security issues, such as a repetition of the pointless war with Iran. This can be achieved by extending to the new Iraq a security agreement similar to what the United States has with other countries. The ISF would then be free to deal with the lawlessness, sectarianism and subversion from border states that now plague the country.
Whether we like it or not, our efforts in rebuilding the ISF may eventually make it Iraq's only reliable institution. America needs to grow up, face facts and start protecting our interests in a reality-based world – and that world has no room for dreams that Baghdad will become Kansas.
Richard Miller is military affairs correspondent for Talk Radio News Service.