Read Part 1 of this two-part column, “America at risk: The emerging threat from within.”

In the article “Threat Assessments – Joint Strike Force Combat Operations,” Paul Vallely, retired U.S. Army major general, concluded that “our military must be very creative and be able to adapt, improvise, and be ahead of the curve of future thinking in regards to threats to our national security.” Also, in his recent testimony before the Committee of Science, Space, and Technology at the United States House of Representatives, James Carafano, Ph.D., noted that the DHS Science and Technology Directorate had “limited success in partnering with other federal agencies and international partners” and also demonstrated “the inability to manage complex programs.”

Finally, the DHS Science and Technology Directorate also demonstrated a “lack of response to customer needs,” and “the Directorate’s portfolios do not adequately reflect their requirements and are not sufficiently responsive to operational needs.” In addition to the above conclusions by both parties, the situational environment has dramatically changed since the War on Terror began when the American Embassy, United States soil, in Iran was invaded and taken over. This initial act, which may be distant in our minds, was a clear message by our enemies, Muslim extremists, that there will be no borders.

To further understand this, one only needs to see where Shiite and Sunni populations reside and you can see how borders literally bleed away. Also, the historical timeline of critical events have clearly proven that our enemies are consistently maintaining their operational plan. We must now also accept the fact that the enemy is not only at the gate, but, thanks to the current administration’s lack of enforcement of existing laws to protect American citizens, there is no gate.

Based on my own personal experience, our national telecommunications infrastructure, our telecommunications and information technology, the intellectual property of businesses and the Defense Industrial Base have actually been “successfully converted,” mirrored, imprinted and stolen by non-federal customers: our “good trading partner” China and the People’s Liberations Army military–industrial apparatus .

This was achieved by the lack of compliance, enforcement and accountability to laws of the United States in regard to protecting our citizens, strategic assets and our critical infrastructure. The current situation: “Welcome to the great wide open,” both in public cyber, net centric, “cloud” operations and our physical national identity.

So, what do we do from here? Revise the U.S. Military Security Strategy to Joint Strike Force Operations using Gen. Vallely’s “Lily Pad” strategy:

  • Special Operations personnel or retired military personnel and professional emergency operations specialists will train state National Guard, State Defense Forces and law enforcement in coordinated operations.

  • Implement State Virtual Command and Control and Emergency Operations Centers that are securely linked to military Virtual Command and Control Operation Centers (Lily Pads)
  • Coordinate Special Operations Resources and Virtual Command and Control to prevent , mitigate and respond to a critical event and also to coordinate a law-enforcement strike against criminal and terrorist activities within each state’s borders.
  • For the dual Lily Pad implementation to be effective in either a reactive response or criminal law enforcement action, a trusted resource should be utilized to effectively communicate updated intelligence data and incidence response information from the dynamic, ever-changing operating environment of critical event management and planning. We should look to history to identify and utilize an effective “hopper.” In World War II, the United States Navy and the United States Coast Guard were successfully utilized to protect our homeland as the rest of our military went overseas. The combined effort of these joint forces successfully achieved our nation’s goals for homeland defense by effectively communicating intelligence data and incident reports to the military, law enforcement and to international intelligence directorates. Based on the gaps in coordination and communication both in the working operational environment and technological environment, we should implement a similar methodology.
  • The U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard already successfully operate in their environments.
  • Port Security and Drug Interdiction functions mirror law enforcement.
  • There is an established level of trust.
  • The Navy and Coast Guard’s image throughout our history from a civilians perspective, whether it is correct or not, is one that operates outside the parameters of those established in the basement of The DoD establishment at the Pentagon.

This is the type of forward strategic planning and operations that our national-security leaders should be implementing.

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