While the European Union’s Javier Solana and Iran’s Ali Lanjani were making “good progress” towards an agreement that “will provide objective guarantees (to the EU) that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes” that “will equally provide firm guarantees (to Iran) on nuclear, technological and economic cooperation and firm commitments (by the EU to Iran) on security issues” – the U.S. House of Representatives perversely called up and passed by voice vote HR 6198, an onerous expansion of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996.

ILSA was a primary cause of Iran’s entering into talks with the EU in the first place.

In 1995, the Islamic Republic of Iran launched a major effort to open up its energy sector – including oil and natural gas exploration, development and production – to foreign Islamic-law compatible “investment.”

Well, that would never do. So the Likudniks in Congress enacted ILSA, which required the president to impose sanctions on foreign companies – including EU, Russian and Chinese – that make such “investments.”

The threat of such ILSA sanctions was enough to get Russia to cancel a contract to supply Iran a turn-key gas-centrifuge uranium-enrichment facility (but not enough to cancel the construction of a nuclear power plant at Bushehr).

Of course, under the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – to which Iran, Russia and the United States are signatories – a) Iran had an “inalienable right” to acquire both facilities and b) the International Atomic Energy Agency and all IAEA members (including the U.S.) were obligated to “facilitate” their acquisition and subsequent peaceful operation.

As the Iranians put it in their Note Verbale of Aug. 1, 2005, to all IAEA members:

While Iran’s rights under the NPT have continued to be grossly and systematically violated, and while major state parties to the Treaty have persisted in their non-compliance with many of their obligations under Articles I, IV and VI of the Treaty in general, and under paragraph 2 of Article IV vis-a-vis Iran in particular, Iran nevertheless continued diligently to comply with all its obligations under the Treaty.

In October 2003, Iran entered into an agreement with France, Germany and the United Kingdom with the explicit expectation to open a new chapter of full transparency, cooperation and access to nuclear and other advanced technologies.

Regrettably, Iran received very little, if anything, in return and instead has repeatedly expanded its voluntary “confidence building measures” only to be reciprocated by broken promises and expanded requests.

The October 2003 promises of the E3 on nuclear cooperation and regional security and non-proliferation have yet to be even addressed.

The Iranians have since made it clear on numerous occasions that attempts by “some members” of the IAEA Board and U.N. Security Council to transform such voluntary measures “into cessation or long-term suspension were incompatible with the letter and spirit of the Paris Agreement and therefore unacceptable to Iran.”

Such attempts are also incompatible with the IAEA Statute, the NPT and the U.N. Charter, itself.

So now come various Likudniks in the House to declare (Section 401 of HR 6198):

It should be the policy of the United States not to bring into force an agreement for cooperation with the government of any country that is assisting the nuclear program of Iran or transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles to Iran unless –

(1) the President has determined that Iran has suspended all enrichment-related and reprocessing related activity (including uranium conversion and research and development, manufacturing, testing, and assembly relating to enrichment and reprocessing), has committed to verifiably refrain permanently from such activity in the future (except potentially the conversion of uranium exclusively for export to foreign nuclear fuel production facilities pursuant to internationally agreed arrangements and subject to strict international safeguards), and is abiding by that commitment; or

(2) the government of that country?(A) has, either on its own initiative or pursuant to a binding decision of the United Nations Security Council, suspended all nuclear assistance to Iran and all transfers of advanced conventional weapons and missiles to Iran, pending a decision by Iran to implement measures that would permit the President to make the determination described in paragraph (1)

What does that mean?

Well, for one thing, if Russia doesn’t immediately cease its construction of the nuclear power plant at Bushehr, the U.S.-Russia Nuclear Cooperation Agreement is dead on arrival.

But beyond that, the Likudniks – who also unreservedly support the U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement – have just dealt another potentially fatal blow to the NPT, the IAEA and perhaps even the U.N. Security Council itself.

Special offer:

MOST DANGEROUS NATION ON EARTH: Why America must wake up now and deal with Iran’s imminent threat

By September of 2002 every would-be mover and shaker in our nation’s capital knew that Gulf War II would begin shortly after President Bush could claim, however implausibly, that international “diplomacy” had failed to get Saddam Hussein to give up his pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Many of them knew that Saddam had given up his pursuit of nukes a decade earlier.

Worse, many of them knew that Gulf War II had already secretly begun, months before, with Operation Southern Focus, a massive pre-emptive “suppressive” air assault against more than 400 “key” targets in Iraq, some of them military.

That massive air assault – a war crime, if unauthorized – began before Bush even sought the “fig leaf” protection of a congressional or Security Council authorization to use U.S. armed forces if necessary to “disarm” Saddam.

Now, September of 2006, every would-be mover and shaker in our nation’s capital knows that Gulf War III will begin shortly after President Bush can claim, however implausibly, that international “diplomacy” has failed to get the Iranian mullahs to give up their pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Many of them know that there is no “indication” that the mullahs have ever had a nuclear weapons program.

Worse, many – perhaps all – of them, know that Gulf War II was never about nukes.

Gulf War II was, and Gulf War III will be, about “regime change.”

But, the Cheney Cabal discovered early on that the only rationale acceptable to you soccer moms for invading Iran, Iraq, Syria, North Korea et al. would be a) their developing nukes and b) giving them to terrorists.

So, the Cheney Cabal and their media sycophants launched an unrelenting propaganda campaign, falsely claiming that Iran, Iraq, Syria, and North Korea had illicit nuke-development programs.

Unfortunately, at the time, according to inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, there was no “indication” that any of them did.

So, the Cheney Cabal and their media sycophants launched another unrelenting propaganda campaign, attacking the competency and honesty of IAEA officials.

In the process, the Cheney Cabal corrupted the IAEA Board of Governors, resulting in the passage of several resolutions by the Board that violated the IAEA Statute, the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the U.N. Charter, itself.

Next, the Cheney Cabal corrupted the Security Council, resulting in at least one resolution that also violated the U.N. Charter.

Now comes Iran’s President Ahmadinejad to address the U.N. General Assembly for the second time.

Well, it’s barely possible that Ahmadinejad’s televised performance before the U.N. General Assembly Tuesday (excerpted below) – in conjunction with his half-dozen televised interviews – may put a hitch in the Cheney Cabal’s gitalong.

You see, although the movers and shakers in our nation’s capital claim to have viewed Ahmadinejad’s address as very helpful to the Cheney Cabal, and disastrous to Iran’s cause, that does not seem to be the view of the rest of the world.

Excellencies,

Apparently, the Security Council can only be used to ensure the security and the rights of some big powers.

When the oppressed [Lebanese, Palestinians] are crushed by bombardment, the Security Council must remain aloof and not even call for a cease-fire. Is this not a tragedy of historic proportions for the Security Council, which is charged with maintaining security for all countries?

The question needs to be asked: If the governments of the United States or the United Kingdom, who are permanent members of the Security Council, commit aggression, occupation and violation of international law, which of the organs of the U.N. can take them to account?

Can a Council in which they are privileged members address their violations? Has this ever happened?

In fact, we have repeatedly seen the reverse. If they have differences with a nation or state, they drag it [Iran] to the Security Council and as claimants arrogate to themselves simultaneously the roles of prosecutor, judge and executioner. Is this a just order?

Can there be a more vivid case of discrimination and more clear evidence of injustice?

How long can such a situation last in the world? It is evident that the behavior of some powers constitutes the greatest challenge before the Security Council, the entire organization and its affiliated agencies.

Today, it is undeniable that the Security Council, most critically and urgently, needs legitimacy and effectiveness. It must be acknowledged that as long as the Council is unable to act on behalf of the entire international community in a transparent, just and democratic manner, it will neither be legitimate nor effective.

Last year our intelligence community produced – at the request of Congress – a National Intelligence Estimate which, inter allia, addressed Iran’s nuclear programs. Although that 2005 NIE was highly classified, Dafna Linzer reported:

A major U.S. intelligence review has projected that Iran is about a decade away from manufacturing the key ingredient for a nuclear weapon, roughly doubling the previous estimate of five years, according to government sources with firsthand knowledge of the new analysis.

The carefully hedged assessments, which represent consensus among U.S. intelligence agencies, contrast with forceful public statements by the White House.

Administration officials have asserted, but have not offered proof, that Tehran is moving determinedly toward a nuclear arsenal.

Linzer didn’t say whether the 2005 NIE on Iran’s nuclear programs was based – as it should have been – on the quarterly reports the International Atomic Energy Agency had been making to the IAEA Board of Governors and to the U.N. Security Council.

Notwithstanding Linzer’s devastating report of the 2005 NIE “assessments,” coupled with the “null” findings included in IAEA quarterly reports, members of the Cheney Cabal have continued to forcefully assert – without offering any proof whatsoever – that Iran has a nuclear weapons program that has already “reached a point of no return.”

Then, last month, Linzer told us:

A key House committee issued a stinging critique of U.S. intelligence on Iran yesterday, charging that the CIA and other agencies lack “the ability to acquire essential information necessary to make judgments” on Tehran’s nuclear program, its intentions or even its ties to terrorism.

The 29-page report, principally written by a Republican staff member on the House intelligence committee who holds a hard-line view on Iran, fully backs the White House position that the Islamic republic is moving forward with a nuclear weapons program and that it poses a significant danger to the United States. But it chides the intelligence community for not providing enough direct evidence to support that assertion.

That “critique” was soon made public.

In his cover letter, Subcommittee on Intelligence Policy Chairman Mike Rogers noted that “the authors could not discuss in an unclassified document the specifics of the significant gaps in our knowledge and understanding of the various areas of concern about Iran,” but assured us that the report reflected “committee staff” reviews of “classified and unclassified material” and consultations “with experts both in the United States and abroad.”

If that is the case, how could the committee staff have possibly led off with a statement that “America’s intelligence agencies” have “assessed” that “Iran has conducted a clandestine uranium enrichment program for nearly two decades in violation of its IAEA safeguards agreement” and that “despite its claims to the contrary, Iran is seeking nuclear weapons”?

If “America’s intelligence agencies” have actually made such assessments in highly classified reports to which committee staff had access, then America and its intelligence community really are in a heap of trouble.

In the first place, it is not up to America to assess whether Iran’s safeguarded programs are being conducted in consonance with Iran’s Safeguards Agreement. That is up to the IAEA Secretariat, and some disputes between the Iranians and IAEA inspectors about the conduct of such programs have been decided in Iran’s favor.

In any case, the American assessment is wrong, because the Iranians were under no obligation to inform the IAEA of its attempt to achieve a uranium-enrichment capability – including the acquisition, however clandestinely, of gas-centrifuges – until six months before actually introducing “special nuclear materials” into those centrifuges.

As the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons makes clear, a “violation” of the NPT-IAEA Safeguards Agreement could only occur if the IAEA verifies the “diversion” of “source or special nuclear materials” to the “furtherance of a military purpose.” For years, now, the IAEA has been reporting there is not even an “indication” that Iran has ever done that.

Now comes Linzer to report:

U.N. inspectors investigating Iran’s nuclear program angrily complained to the Bush administration and to a Republican congressman yesterday about a recent House committee report on Iran’s capabilities, calling parts of the document “outrageous and dishonest” and offering evidence to refute its central claims.

In particular, the IAEA formal complaint refutes the report’s assertion that Iran is producing “weapons-grade” enriched uranium.

The IAEA also charges the report’s description of certain of Iran’s activities – in particular, the reported “covert” production of polonium-210 – are misleading since Iran was under no obligation under its Safeguards Agreement to report such activities.

“Outrageous and dishonest”?

You bet!

Ever since the Soviet Union disintegrated, the United Nations and its enforcement agency – the Security Council – has more often than not thwarted what the neo-crazies wanted to do.

In particular, in 2002 the Security Council refused to “sanction” Bush’s pre-emptive invasion of Iraq.

The Security Council had been told Bush had “intelligence” that Saddam Hussein had renewed his attempt to achieve a uranium-enrichment capability for producing nuclear weapons with which to nuke us and “our allies.”

But, the Council knew that intrusive go-anywhere see-anything inspections in Iraq by its International Atomic Energy Agency had failed to find any “indication” of such a renewal.

Well, Bush defied the Security Council and invaded Iraq anyway. Then Bush had Undersecretary of State John Bolton announce the establishment of the Proliferation Security Initiative, a “coalition of the willing,” willing to act – as in Iraq – even in defiance of the Security Council, the U.N. Charter and international law generally.

According to Bolton, the PSI posse had to be established because “proliferators and those facilitating the procurement of deadly capabilities are circumventing existing laws, treaties and controls against WMD proliferation.”

Here are excerpts from Bolton’s explication – made about the time Bush had been proven wrong about Iraq – of the PSI’s necessity before the House International Relations Committee.

We aim ultimately not just to prevent the spread of WMD, but also to eliminate or “roll back” such weapons from rogue states and terrorist groups that already possess them or are close to doing so. While we stress peaceful and diplomatic solutions to the proliferation threat, as President Bush has said repeatedly, we rule out no options.

While we pursue diplomatic dialogue wherever possible, the United States and its allies must be willing to employ more robust techniques, such as 1) economic sanctions; 2) interdiction and seizure; and 3) as the case of Iraq demonstrates, pre-emptive military force where required.

The hard lessons learned by Iraq must resonate with other proliferating countries. Those countries should heed that thwarting international obligations and standards – by seeking weapons of mass destruction – is not in their national interests and will not be tolerated by the international community.

What “proliferating countries” does Bolton have in mind?

We now know that Iran is developing a uranium mine, a uranium conversion facility, a massive uranium-enrichment facility designed to house tens of thousands of centrifuges, and a heavy-water production plant.

All of them subject – of course – to Iran’s IAEA Safeguards Agreement.

This costly infrastructure would support the production of both highly enriched uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons.

Notice that Bolton said “would” – not “could.”

While Iran claims that its nuclear program is peaceful and transparent, we are convinced it is otherwise. …

So when Bush made Bolton – by “recess-appointment” – our U.N. ambassador last year, Bolton (surprise, surprise!) immediately began to demand that the Security Council apply the “robust techniques” of the PSI to “proliferators” (such as Iran) and to those “facilitating the procurement of deadly capabilities” (such as Russia and China).

Then, this year, Bush-Rice-Bolton strong-armed the IAEA Board of Governors into “reporting” the “Iranian dossier” – which contained mostly IAEA reports certifying Iran to be in total compliance with its Safeguards Agreement – to the Security Council, with the expectation that the Security Council could somehow be strong-armed by Bolton into determining under Article 39 of the U.N. Charter that Iran’s safeguarded programs constituted a “threat to the peace.”

Quoth Bolton:

This is a real test for the Security Council. There’s just no doubt that for close to 20 years, the Iranians have been pursuing nuclear weapons through a clandestine program that we’ve uncovered.

If the U.N. Security Council can’t deal with the proliferation of nuclear weapons, can’t deal with the greatest threat we have with a country like Iran – that’s one of the leading state sponsors of terrorism – if the Security Council can’t deal with that, you have a real question of what it can deal with.

On Bolton’s first try, the Council essentially remanded the “Iranian dossier” to the IAEA Board. On his second, the Council was strong-armed into passing UNSC Resolution 1696, but, as of this writing the Council has yet to “determine” under Article 39 that Iran’s safeguarded activities constitute a” threat to the peace.”

No Article 39 determination; no U.N. sanctioned “robust techniques.”

So, what’s a poor neo-crazy “recess-appointee” – whose Senate confirmation hearing has just been postponed, indefinitely – to do?

Well, look for Bolton and his PSI posse to “saddle up” and ride.

This year, Bonkers Bolton and his Gang of Three – the British, French and Germans – have managed to get the other members of the Interna-tional Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council to commit ‘assisted’ suicide, seriously undermining – as intended – the authority and effectiveness of the United Nations itself.

First, the IAEA – whose primary mission is to “seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world.”

On Feb. 4, U.N. Ambassador John Bolton got the IAEA board to pass a resolution that begins by stipulating “that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable rights of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear en-ergy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,” but then perversely goes on not only to deny Iran its inalienable Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT, rights but presumes to make additional demands on Iran as an NPT signatory.

Bolton already had attempted, but failed, to drastically modify the NPT at the 2005 NPT Re-view Conference, removing the demands made on us and the rights bestowed on everyone else.

Now, the IAEA board “deemed it necessary” that Iran – inter alia – “ratify promptly and implement in full the Additional Protocol” to its NPT Safeguards Agreement.

Of course, the IAEA board has no authority to make any such demands. So, recess-appointee Bolton brought the IAEA resolution before the U.N. Security Council, which does.

But upon first referral, all Bolton got was a U.N. Security Council ‘non-binding’ Presidential Statement which begins:

The Security Council reaffirms its commitment to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and recalls the right of States Party, in conformity with articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.

Bummer.

Meanwhile, with Bush-Blair acquiescence – if not downright encouragement – the Israelis had launched a bona fide “act of aggression” against Lebanon.

Bolton soon had his hands full, preventing the Security Council from condemning Israel for it flagrant violations of the U.N. Charter, while strong-arming it into passing Resolution 1696. The resolution, “acting under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,” demands, in this context, that Iran shall suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAE. …”

What does that mean – acting under Article 40?

Well, Bolton previously had strong-armed the IAEA Board of Governors into asking the Security Council to “determine” that Iran’s refusal to re-suspend – as “required” by the U.N. Security Council Presidential Statement – certain IAEA Safeguarded activities constituted under Article 39 as a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”

Article 40 says:

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Now, the Security Council has yet “to deter-mine” under Article 39 that Iran’s safeguarded activities constitute a threat to the peace, much less an act of aggression. So, technically, the council shouldn’t yet be “acting” under Article 40.

Nor should the council “call” upon Iran to take without further delay the steps “required” by the IAEA board in its resolution of Feb. 4, which in-cluded requiring Iran to “ratify promptly and im-plement in full the Additional Protocol” to its NPT Safeguards Agreement.

An Additional Protocol – once ratified – can hardly be considered a “provisional measure.”

The Security Council shouldn’t be “demanding” that Iran suspend safeguarded uranium enrichment activities. After all, Bolton and his Gang of Three have made it clear such suspensions will hardly be temporary “provisional measures,” taken “without prejudice” to the exercise of Iran’s “inalienable rights” under the NPT.

As Iran’s U.N. representative, Javad Zarif, put it, upon passage of Security Council Resolution 1696:

Today we are witness to an extremely dangerous trend; while members of the NPT are denied their rights and are punished, those who defy the NPT, particularly the perpetrators of [the] current carnage in Lebanon and Palestine, are rewarded by generous nuclear cooperation agree-ments.

Having successfully established such a “trend,” it may not matter to recess-appointee Bolton whether or not he becomes permanent ambassador to the United Nations.

Four years ago, President Bush ordered Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet to prepare a National Intelligence Estimate to be used to “justify” to Congress the pre-emptive war against Iraq we now know he had already decided to launch.

Two years later, the Senate Intelligence Committee concluded that:

Most of the major key judgments in the Intelligence Community’s October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate – “Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction” – either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting.

In particular, the assessment that Iraq “is reconstituting its nuclear program” was “not supported by the intelligence provided to the committee.”

The committee noted that prior to 1999 our intelligence community had been heavily dependent upon information obtained from United Nations inspectors.

True, in December 1998, President Clinton had warned all U.N. inspectors to get out of Iraq or risk getting killed during Operation Desert Fox.

However, after Clinton quit bombing, International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors had been allowed back into Iraq (in 2000, 2001 and 2002) to inspect all the surviving nuclear-related sites in Iraq – including Kuwaitha, where our “intelligence” had suggested the Iraqis might be doing something untoward – and found nothing untoward.

But Tenet’s 2002 NIE didn’t even mention those IAEA inspections, much less the subsequent “null” reports made to the UN Security Council.

Why not?

Well, obviously the Cheney Cabal didn’t want Congress to know – at least officially – that by 1994 all Saddam’s nuclear programs had been verifiably destroyed and that he had made no attempt whatsoever to reconstitute them.

Inexplicably, the Senate Intelligence Committee did not even mention – much less decry – the failure of the intelligence community to base the 2002 NIE “assessments” of Saddam’s nuclear program on those IAEA “null” reports.

There were, however, cries of anguish from those sent to Iraq on a fool’s errand by Tenet. Never again produce an NIE that completely ignores the “best intelligence,” that of on-the-ground inspectors!

Last year the Washington Post’s Dafna Linzer reported that the intelligence community had produced an NIE – still highly classified – about Iran:

A major U.S. intelligence review has projected that Iran is about a decade away from manufacturing the key ingredient for a nuclear weapon, roughly doubling the previous estimate of five years, according to government sources with firsthand knowledge of the new analysis.

The carefully hedged assessments, which represent consensus among U.S. intelligence agencies, contrast with forceful public statements by the White House. Administration officials have asserted, but have not offered proof, that Tehran is moving determinedly toward a nuclear arsenal.

The new estimate could provide more time for diplomacy with Iran over its nuclear ambitions. President Bush has said that he wants the crisis resolved diplomatically but that “all options are on the table.”

Linzer doesn’t say whether the 2005 NIE on Iran’s nuclear programs took into account at all – much less was largely based upon – the quarterly reports the on-the-ground IAEA inspectors had been making to the IAEA Board and to the Security Council.

And a year later, IAEA inspectors have yet to see any “indication” – much less evidence – that Iran has engaged in any activity involving the use of any amount of proscribed nuclear materials in furtherance of a military purpose.

Furthermore, if IAEA inspectors are allowed to continue “safeguarding” Iran’s nuclear facilities, the Iranians will never succeed in producing any amount of weapons-grade enriched uranium, much less enough to make a nuclear weapon.

Nevertheless, the members of the Cheney Cabal continue to forcefully assert – without offering any proof whatsoever – that Iran has a nuclear weapons program that has already “reached a point of no return.”

Why?

Apparently because we have pledged not to use nuclear weapons against those signatories to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons who don’t already have nukes.

So, when Bush says “all options are on the table,” he’s telling the Iranians that our no-nuking pledge won’t keep him from nuking them because he has it on authority – God Almighty, apparently – that the Iranians have nukes.

Now comes Linzer to tell us the House Intelligence Committee has just issued a staff report – authored principally by Frederick Fleitz – that uses information contained in the IAEA “null” reports to come to conclusions diametrically opposed to those of the IAEA.

You may recall that Undersecretary Bolton and his chief of staff, Fleitz, were point men in the largely successful attempts by the Cheney Cabal to “cook” the intelligence in the run-up to the pre-emptive attack on Iraq.

Looks like they’re at it again.

According to a poll conducted a week after the arrest of 24 Brits (of Pakistani origin) suspected of being involved in an alleged plot to blow-up American airliners in-flight, by a margin of more than 5 to 1 the Brits want Prime Minister Tony Blair to “split” with President Bush over his conduct of his war on terror.

Even though Bush made it clear in his declaration of war on terror – at which Blair was present – that:

Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.

Why split?

Apparently because, since making his “declaration of war” and anointing himself commander in chief of the world, Bush has used – or, more accurately, misused – every “resource” at his command, and by any measure the terrorist threat to us and to those “with us” is greater now than ever.

Bush and Blair first launched – after trying and failing to get authorization from the U.N. Security Council – a war of aggression against Iraq.

What a hornet’s nest Iraq turned out to be – for Bush and Blair.

Now, just as he did with Iraq, Bush has been claiming he has “intelligence” that Iran has a secret nuclear weapons program and has been trying to get the Security Council to pass a resolution that he can improperly use to “justify” a pre-emptive attack on Iran.

However, just as they did in Iraq, those pesky International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors keep reporting to the Security Council that they can find no “indication” – much less evidence – that Iran has a nuclear weapons program.

Enter Hezbollah.

Hezbollah is a powerful political party, as well as a spiritual-economic support group for the Islamic community in Lebanon.

Iran supports Hezbollah.

But Hezbollah also supports a militia, which the Israelis re-discovered to be a formidable foe in their recent long-planned re-invasion of southern Lebanon.

Both Bush and Blair secretly encouraged that re-invasion.

Bush, at least, reckoned the resistance by Hezbollah to the Israeli re-invasion would give him an excuse to launch a pre-emptive attack on Iran for supporting Hezbollah, which he claims is a terrorist organization.

So, Bush had his stooge – Bonkers Bolton – veto the Security Council resolution offered by Qatar calling for an immediate cease-fire in Israel’s war of aggression against Lebanon last month, while strong-arming Resolution 1696 though the Council, with only Qatar voting against it.

Once UNSCR 1696 passed, Bolton falsely claimed that:

Iran has consistently and brazenly defied the international community by continuing its pursuit of nuclear weapons, and the continued intransigence and defiance of the Iranian leadership demands a strong response from this Council.

Since all the evidence before the Security Council was that Iran’s nuclear programs had been verified by the IAEA to be for peaceful purposes and were, therefore, of no concern to the Council, the Iranian leadership can hardly be guilty of defiance.

But Bolton claimed UNSCR 1696

also calls upon member states to do what they can to prevent the transfer of resources to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, and Iran should understand that the United States and others will ensure that the financial transactions associated with its proliferant activities will be impeded as well.

The United States expects that Iran and all other U.N. member states will immediately act in accordance with the mandatory obligations of this resolution passed by the Security Council.

In other words, Bush expects everyone to impose immediately illegal economic sanctions on Iran and join his posse of international pirates (aka Proliferation Security Initiative).

Iran’s U.N. representative, Javad Zarif, had this, inter allia, to say in rebuttal:

Iran’s peaceful nuclear program poses no threat to international peace and security, and therefore dealing with this issue in the Security Council is unwarranted and void of any legal basis or practical utility.

Today we are witness to an extremely dangerous trend; While members of the NPT are denied their rights and are punished, those who defy the NPT, particularly the perpetrators of current carnage in Lebanon and Palestine, are rewarded by generous nuclear cooperation agreements.

This goes so far that, when it suits the U.S., even the acquisition of nuclear weapons for non-NPT members becomes “legitimate”– to quote the U.S. ambassador[Bolton].

Apparently, then, India’s nukes are “legitimate,” but Pakistan’s aren’t.

Next, Bush declared Jamaat-ud-Dawa, a Sunni Muslim organization active in Brit mosques and in relief of earthquake victims in Pakistan, a “terrorist” organization.

There are more than a million Brit Sunni Muslims of Pakistani origin.

No wonder the Brits want Blair to split with Bush.

Related special offer:

“Londonistan”: A gripping account of how Islamism is taking control of Britain’s culture and institutions

British authorities claimed to have thwarted this week a “homegrown” plot wherein suicide bombers were to “simultaneously” destroy 10 American airliners en route to the United States.

Although British residents, those arrested appeared to be “of Pakistani origin” and Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry spokesman claimed that “Pakistan played a very important role in uncovering and breaking this international terrorist network.”

President Bush immediately opined that the foiled plot was a “stark reminder that this nation [America] is at war with Islamic fascists.”

Islamic fascists?

Who are they?

Well, according to Bush they are terrorists who “try to spread their jihadist message; a message I call – it’s totalitarian in nature, Islamic radicalism – Islamic fascism; they try to spread it, as well, by taking the attack to those of us who love freedom.”

If the Pakistani-Brits had been successful, the surviving relatives of the victims could rest assured that Bush’s refusal to prevent or halt Israel’s war of aggression against Lebanon and the murder by the Israelis of a thousand or so Lebanese civilians with American-supplied weapons had absolutely nothing to do with the Pakistani-Brit plot.

Nor will the Israelis launching a war of aggression against Syria or “taking out” Iran’s nuclear programs (all verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency to be for peaceful purposes) and the murder of thousands of Syrian and Iranian civilians with American-supplied weapons have anything to do with any future attempts by “Islamic fascists” to retaliate against Americans.

Of course not.

You see, the Likudniks believe anyone “supporting” the Lebanese resisting Israel’s most recent war of aggression are also “Islamic fascists,” and therefore the Israelis would be entirely justified in destroying Lebanese, Syrian and Iranian infrastructure and murdering thousands of Lebanese, Syrian and Iranian civilians – all of them happy to die so that Americans can keep on loving freedom.

Of course.

But perhaps the Pakistani-Brits thought they might “shape the will” of a few members of Congress, get them to quit supporting American-Israeli wars of aggression against Islam, by at least threatening to blow American airliners out of the sky in retaliation.

However, despite the panic engendered on both sides of the Atlantic, this Pakistani-Brit “homegrown” plot appeared to be no better planned, funded or organized than other terrorist plots recently “thwarted” in Florida and in Britain.

According to the Associated Press, Michael Chertoff, head American terrorist plot thwarter, said the terrorists planned to use liquid explosives disguised as beverages and to set them off with “detonators” disguised as electronic devices, such as iPods.

To do that, the Pakistani-Brits would first have to “smuggle” the three components of an Improvised Explosive Device – the explosive materials, the detonator and the trigger – past the passenger gropers and their X-ray machines.

Most explosives – especially liquids – are relatively insensitive, and will not “detonate” themselves.

A typical IED detonator consists of a pellet of very sensitive high-explosive with an embedded highly resistive “bridge wire.”

The third IED component, the trigger, supplies on-command a high-voltage pulse to the bridge-wire, “blowing” it, causing the enclosing high-explosive pellet to detonate.

If the high-explosive liquid is well contained and in direct physical contact with the detonating pellet, the supersonic shock wave created by the detonator will propagate through the liquid, detonating it as well.

Of course, to get the three IED components past the gropers and X-ray screeners, the Pakistani-Brits need to have a) explosives that don’t look like explosives, b) a detonator that doesn’t look like a detonator and c) a trigger that doesn’t look like a trigger.

Acquiring or manufacturing dozens of small reliable detonators that don’t look like detonators might be difficult.

And once smuggled past, the principal problem for the self-immolating disciple of Mussolini is making sure the detonator that doesn’t look like a detonator is in intimate contact with the well-confined liquid explosive.

So, if the Pakistani-Brit plot was “real,” we should expect to learn, soon, that the Pakistani-Brits had an explosives test facility where each of the 10 potential self-immolators practiced assembling liquid-explosive IEDs and detonating them on command without accidentally killing themselves.

Real or not, henceforth, you will be allowed to take on-board the aircraft most of the clothes you’re wearing and your passport, but not much else.

Everything else – including any already assembled IEDs – will have to go in the cargo hold.

By the way, it’s more than possible that TWA Flight 800 was brought down by an already assembled liquid-explosive IED in its cargo hold.

Last week, thousands of angry demonstrators attacked the United Nations’ headquarters in Beirut in an outpouring of grief, anger and frustration at yet another Qana massacre.

Although not a demonstrator herself, refugee Sawsan Ali from Southern Lebanon said she wishes the U.N. would ”disappear because its presence is as useless as its nonpresence.”

“The U.N. never helped us. It always favors Israel with all its atrocities, and bows down in front of the U.S. and Israeli will. It is a U.N. for the strong nations, not small and peaceful countries like ours.”

Meanwhile, back at U.N. headquarters in N.Y., Bonkers John Bolton prevented the Security Council from condemning Israel for it atrocious actions, while strong-arming it into passing Resolution 1696 which –

1. Acting under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations –

2. Calls upon Iran without further delay to take the steps required by the
   IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear program and to resolve outstanding questions;

3. Demands, in this context, that Iran shall suspend all enrichment-related
   and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA.

What does that mean – acting under Article 40?

Well, in this case it means the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency has asked the Security Council to determine under Article 39 that Iran’s refusal to re-suspend certain IAEA safeguarded activities constitutes a ”threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”

Understandably, the Security Council has refused to make such a determination, and has, instead, invoked Article 40 –

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such pro-visional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

The Security Council went on to underline –

the necessity of the IAEA continuing its work to clarify all outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear program, and calls upon Iran to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol and to implement without delay all transparency measures as the IAEA may request in support of its ongoing investigations.

In other words, the Security Council has once again refused to make the determination that Bonkers Bolton has been demanding.

So, once again, Bonkers repeated the false allegations he previously made about Iran’s IAEA safeguarded programs and repeated the false claim that the Security Council had actually made the determination he had been demanding.

Four months have passed since the Security Council called upon Iran to fully and verifiably suspend its nuclear programs, and nearly two months have passed since the EU3-plus-three made its generous offer inviting Iran to enter into negotiations and avoid further Security Council action.

Let us not forget that this diplomatic activity was preceded by more than three years of Iranian noncompliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and its IAEA Safeguards Agreement.

Sadly, Iran has consistently and brazenly defied the international community by continuing its pursuit of nuclear weapons, and the continued intransigence and defiance of the Iranian leadership demands a strong response from this Council.

The Resolution before us today does just that.

Mr. President, we are pleased the Council has taken clear and firm action in passing this Resolution. The pursuit of nuclear weapons by Iran constitutes a direct threat to international peace and security and demands a clear statement from the Council in the form of a tough resolution.

What did the Iranians have to say about Bolton’s outrageous strong-arm tactics?

The sole reason for pushing the Council to take action, as highlighted in the proposed resolution, is that Iran decided, after over two years of negotiations, to resume the exercise of its inalienable right to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, by partially reopening its fully safeguarded facilities and ending a voluntary suspension.

Today’s proposed action by this Council – which is the culmination of those efforts aimed at making the suspension of uranium enrichment mandatory – violates the fundamental principles of international law, the Non-Proliferation Treaty and IAEA Board resolutions. It also runs counter to the views of the majority of U.N. member states, which the Security Council is obliged to represent.

Amen.

The U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act, just overwhelmingly passed by the House, perversely begins by declaring that “it is the sense of Congress” that “sustaining” the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or NPT, and “strengthening its implementation, particularly its verification and compliance” is the “keystone of United States non-proliferation policy.”

Furthermore, “the NPT has been a significant success in preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities.”

Of course, the NPT is not in the business of preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities.

If you don’t actually have tens of kilograms of weapons-grade fissile material you can’t make nukes, no matter what your “capabilities” are.

So, the key to preventing the international proliferation of nuclear weapons is the “safeguarding” of “source” or “special nuclear” material.

And it is not the NPT, itself, that has prevented the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

A principal function of the International Atomic Energy Agency is:

To establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.

Whenever IAEA inspectors detect “non-compliance” with a country’s Safeguards Agreement, the IAEA Board of Directors then determines whether or not the “non-compliance” furthers “any military purpose” and is to be reported to the U.N. Security Council for possible action.

The NPT took advantage of the already existing IAEA verification and reporting mechanism, requiring each no-nuke NPT-signatory to enter into a bilateral “safeguards” agreement with the IAEA “with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons.”

So, the IAEA verifies “non-proliferation” by “importers” of special nuclear materials, services, equipment, facilities and information.

What about “exporters”?

Enter the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Established in 1974, the 40-plus member NSG was created because the 1974 test by India – not then, or now, an NPT signatory – of a nuclear device demonstrated that “especially designed or prepared” nuclear technology as identified by the NPT, transferred for peaceful purposes to non-NPT signatories, could be misused.

NSG “Guidelines for Nuclear Transfer” have long required the acceptance by the recipient state – NPT signatory or not – of IAEA Safeguards on certain imported items.

But, since 1992, NSG guidelines have required a state seeking to acquire “special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment and facilities” – such as nuclear power plants or fuel – to subject all nuclear programs to a full-scope intrusive IAEA Safeguards Agreement.

Hence, the “enforcement mechanism” for preventing nuke proliferation by “importers” is provided by the IAEA statute and the enforcement mechanism for preventing nuke proliferation by “exporters” is provided by the coordinated export controls of NSG members, themselves.

Of course, as a NPT-signatory, Iran has all its nuclear programs subject to full-scope safeguards, and the IAEA has never seen any “indication” that Iranian “special nuclear materials, services, equipment, facilities and information” has been used in furtherance of a military purpose.

India, on the other hand, has never been an NPT signatory. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998 and has – understandably – refused to subject all its nuclear programs to the IAEA-NPT-NSG safeguards regime.

Last year, Bush startled NPT signatories by announcing that “as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states.”

Since current law specifically prohibited that, Bush said he would ask Congress to “adjust” those laws, repealing, among other things, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1994 and certain provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

Why would Congress “adjust” laws heretofore “sustaining” the NPT?

Well, to “induce” India to “give greater political and material support” to our non-proliferation objectives, “especially with respect to dissuading, isolating and, if necessary, sanctioning and containing states that sponsor terrorism and terrorist groups.”

In other words, to cancel the Iran-Pakistan-India “peace” pipeline.

The “waivers” of existing law provided by the Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act are conditional on Bush making, annually, a gaggle of “determinations” to Congress about India’s nuclear programs, both “civil” (subject to IAEA safeguards) and “military.”

Of course, a president who could “determine” on March 19, 2003, that Saddam’s non-existent nuclear programs posed an “immediate threat” to our national security is capable of telling Congress anything they want to hear.

But Bush also promised to “work” to get the NSG to “exempt” India from its guidelines.

That will be “hard work,” indeed. The Act requires Bush to certify that the NSG has decided to exempt India “by consensus.”