William C. Patrick III, an expert on biological warfare, demonstrated a few months ago how porous our defenses against terrorist attacks are by smuggling seven-and-a-half grams of powdered anthrax through security and into a House Select Committee on Intelligence hearing. Displaying the deadly sample, he declared, "I've been through all the major airports, and the security systems of the State Department, the Pentagon, even the CIA, and nobody has stopped me. Seven-and-a-half grams would take care of the Rayburn Building and all the people in it."

The potential for a terrorist attack was further demonstrated by recent reports of a dangerous lack of security at the Reagan Building here in Washington. The assessment of a consultant to the General Services Administration cites the building's public parking garage and unrestricted access as potential hazards.

Rapid advances in biotechnology, as well as the theft of information from Los Alamos that could lead to miniaturization of nuclear weapons, highlight both the enormity and the immediacy of the problem. While the danger posed by a single terrorist may not have more than limited short-term effects, our borders are in effect open to weapons capable of delivering massive devastation to whole cities and, perhaps, whole regions.

The China Overseas Shipping Company (COSCO) and other international firms have hundreds of ships en route to, moored in, and departing from major U.S. ports every day. Some of these ships carry more than 5,000 truck-sized containers. The small physical size of modern nuclear weapons makes concealment in such a container relatively easy. The container could then be shipped and transshipped around the world -- confounding tracking procedures -- before arriving at a U.S. port.

Recent policy revisions exacerbate this threat. Changed regulations now allow foreign ships to enter sensitive U.S. ports with only 24 hours notice. Before, 72 hours advance notification was required. This change and budget-related resource cuts have reduced the ability of the U.S. Coast Guard and the Customs Service to monitor these ships or screen even a small percentage of the containers or cargo carried therein.

Seaports close to major population centers are attractive targets but are not the only points of vulnerability. More than a million trucks enter this country from Mexico every year, only 5 percent of which are inspected. The sheer volume makes it neither practical nor possible to check them all. Added to this is the fact that Immigration and Naturalization Service, Customs, and border patrol resources are woefully insufficient. Significantly, in the name of developing relations with our southern neighbor and expanding free trade under NAFTA, this administration considers it politically incorrect to constrain trade with Mexico in any way.

Uninspected trucks travel to virtually every major city in the United States on a daily basis. It is estimated that from 50 to 80 percent of the drugs entering this country arrive undetected by way of Mexico. How hard would it be to smuggle a nuclear, biological or chemical device into a major American city using the same route?

Detecting and interdicting such threats, however, requires substantial and effective on-the-ground human intelligence (HUMINT) both at home and abroad. Unfortunately, HUMINT has been severely downgraded over the years. Many politicians have concluded that such intelligence gathering (spying) is beneath us and that ELINT (electronic intelligence) and space-based surveillance are adequate to ensure our national security.

Consider a hypothetical scenario: China decides to take Taiwan by force but fears U.S. intervention. A diplomatic call is placed to the White House to advise the president that a nuclear device is hidden aboard a freighter anchored in an undisclosed port of entry: Seattle, New York, Norfolk, Los Angeles, San Diego, Fort Lauderdale, San Francisco -- you pick it. The device will be remotely triggered if we intervene in the Taiwan crisis. How do we respond?

In another scenario, terrorists place a nuclear, biological, or chemical device -- perhaps purchased from the Russians -- in a container that is then shipped and transshipped from country to country and port to port to disguise its point of origin. The Mexican border could be a conduit for such a shipment into the United States. The device is then activated, devastating a major U.S. population center. The tragic bombing of the Walter P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City would pale by comparison. Against whom do we retaliate?

The hundreds of ships and thousands of trucks that gain access to major U.S. population centers every day are not a trivial circumstance. We must not be blind to these serious dangers.

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Karl Day is senior editor for the Family Research Council's newsletter, Washington Watch, and a member of the board of FRC's Military Readiness Project.