Wang Xi, an 11th century scholar in the Sung Dynasty Hanlin, or Imperial Academy, wrote commentary on the "Use of Spies." According to Wang Xi, "Dead spies are those who are fooled by their own leaders into passing on false information to the enemy; when the facts are determined, they are inevitably killed."

In 1999, according to the official Chinese news service, Chinese defector and missile scientist, Hua Di was sentenced in a People's court to 15 years for passing state secrets to the United States.

State Department spokesman James Foley said, "Based on what we know of his activities as an academic researcher in the U.S., we are aware of no reason to justify his detention and sentencing. We remain deeply concerned about Mr. Hua's reported health problems and need for medical treatment. We're concerned that his detention may have a chilling effect on academic exchanges between the U.S. and China."

Why all the concern over a foolish missile scientist? In 1989, Hua Di defected from China, leaving after the Tiananmen Square crackdown on student democracy demonstrators. Hua Di went to work as a researcher at Stanford's Center for International Security and Arms Control, whose co-directors are former Secretary of Defense William Perry and Stanford Political Science Professor John Lewis.

In late October 1998, it was announced that Hua Di had returned to China. He met with Chinese security officials in late 1997 and was assured that he would not be prosecuted. On Dec. 31, 1997, Hua Di returned to China; on Jan. 6, 1998, he was arrested and charged with passing state secrets to U.S. officials.

Stanford University officials and Dr. John Lewis have written to the Chinese government appealing for Hua Di's release. In 1998, then Stanford Provost Condoleezza Rice said Professor John Lewis "had provided evidence to the fact that the source materials for publications written by him and Mr. Hua were provided by approved Chinese authorities or already were available through the Stanford University library."

However, Stanford officials have refused all requests for a comment or interview on Hua Di. Former Stanford Provost Condoleezza Rice, now serving as a foreign policy advisor to presidential candidate George W. Bush, has refused to comment. In addition, Perry has likewise refused all requests for an interview on Hua Di.

Why the silence from the very people who have made open statements to defend Hua Di? Perhaps it is because the other Hua Di, agent of the Chinese army, fooled Stanford University and the Clinton administration.

Hua Di was born into a family of prominent Communist officials. He studied missiles in Russia and worked in China's missile program for 24 years. In 1984, Hua Di went to work for the China International Trust and Investment Company (CITIC), a firm part owned by the Chinese army.

In 1989, after defecting to America, Hua Di arranged for the Chinese army to obtain a secure fiber-optic communication system. Hua Di participated in the "Hua Mei" scandal documented by the General Accounting Office (GAO report GAO/NSIAD-97-5).

According to Hua Di's statements to the Far Eastern Economic Review, Dr. Lewis and he worked together on the Hua Mei project through an American contracting firm called SCM/Brooks. SCM/Brooks formed a joint venture with Galaxy New Technology, a newly formed Chinese company, to arrange the purchase of the fiber-optic system for "civilian" use.

However, Galaxy New Technology was actually owned by the Chinese army. In 1994, Hua Di contacted an old friend in the Chinese army, Lt. Gen. Huai Guomo. Huai arranged for a Madam Nie Li to run the project as the Chinese co-chair. Dr. Lewis, himself a board member of the project, located Adlai Stevenson III, the former Democratic Senator from Ohio, to lead the American side.

Yet, Galaxy New Technology head Madam Nie Lie was also the wife of Chinese army Gen. Ding Henggao. In fact, according to a 1997 report from the Congressional Reporting Service, Madam Nie Lie was actually Lt. Gen. Nie Lie of the Chinese army. In 1994, Gen. Ding was also the boss of Lt. Gen. Huai, the Chinese military contact for Hua Di. Ding also commanded the Chinese army unit COSTIND, the Commission on Science Technology and Industry for National Defense.

COSTIND, according to the General Accounting Office "oversees development of China's weapon systems and is responsible for identifying and acquiring telecommunications technology applicable for military use."

The U.S. firm, SCM/Brooks contracted AT&T to ship advanced, secure communication systems directly to the Chinese army using Galaxy New Technology as a front. AT&T officials who sold most of the equipment and software to SCM/Brooks were adamant that there was no need to check the Chinese firm since it was led by the "civilian" Madam Nie Lie.

Yet, the so-called "civilian" firm was actually packed with Chinese army officers and experts. One member of Galaxy New Technology management, according to a Defense Department document, was Director and President "Mr. Deng Changru." Mr. Deng Changru was also Lt. Col. Deng Changru of the People's Liberation Army, head of the PLA communications corps. Another Chinese army officer in the Galaxy New Technology staff is co-General Manager "Mr. Xie Zhichao" who is really Lt. Col. Xie Zhichao, director of the Chinese army Electronics Design Bureau.

Documents obtained from the Department of Defense using the Freedom of Information Act show that Dr. Lewis was being paid by the Chinese army while working for Secretary of Defense William Perry as a civilian "consultant."

In August 1994, Lewis and Perry traveled to Beijing to meet with Chinese army generals. Included in the meeting were Lewis' Chinese army business partners, Gens. Huai and Ding. According to the official list of attendees, Lewis accompanied Perry as his personal consultant.

In 1997, Lewis was charged with using Stanford University funding to set up the profitable Hua Mei deal. Lewis faced an investigation from Stanford Provost Ms. Rice because he had used University stationery for his Hua Mei business. No formal charges were filed. Ms. Rice dropped the investigation and left Stanford for the Bush presidential campaign.

The Galaxy New Technology deal went public in 1996, drawing a General Accounting Office report and the Department of Defense documents cited here. It also drew far too much public attention to Hua Di. Thus, Hua Di returned home to China.

While he served at Stanford, Hua Di passed incorrect and misleading information about Red army missile developments. In 1992, Hua Di and Lewis published "China's Ballistic Missile Program," in which Hua Di claimed a newly developed missile, called the DF-25, was not a success. Hua Di's work is cited by Stanford and Clinton administration officials as "gospel" in an effort to minimize the PLA's recent advances.

According to the co-author of the new book, "Red Dragon Rising," William Triplett, in August 1999, the Clinton administration was shocked by Chinese communist press announcements declaring the DF-25 to be fully operational and tipped with multiple nuclear warheads.

Despite the disinformation, Stanford continues to publish information based on the twisted and false tales spun by Hua Di. Stanford's latest report, "The Cox Committee Report: An Assessment," asserts that China's latest long range nuclear missile, the DF-31, is "less likely to be used first."

According to the Stanford report, "A mobile ICBM, the DF-31, was initially tested this year. If deployed, it could increase the survivability of Chinese land-based missile forces. ... How U.S. interests are affect by survivability of Chinese nuclear forces is a complex question, however. Survivable weapons are less likely to be used first."

The Stanford conclusion that the mobile Chinese DF-31 can survive a U.S. first strike is correct and misleading. Of all the weapons at the disposal of the Chinese 2nd Artillery Corps, the DF-31 is the most likely to be used in a first strike against the United States.

The mobile DF-31 is also very accurate, thanks to the Chinese espionage documented in the Cox Report. The DF-31 can put three nuclear warheads anywhere inside America. In fact, the "mobile" DF-31 is so accurate that, unlike other Chinese nuclear weapons, it can destroy our "fixed" silo-based U.S. missile force in a first-strike attack. A Chinese first strike with a limited number of DF-31 missiles could destroy our land-based missile force, and in the process, kill millions of Americans.

I am certain that Stanford officials will continue to comment on the military and political relationships between the United States and China. However, also expect Stanford officials to remain silent on questions about their former employee Hua Di. Do not be surprised if they continue to refuse all comments on the so-called "defector" in order to dodge questions of his espionage while at the university.

Hua Di served the Chinese Communist party and the People's Liberation Army by doing their dirty work in America. He passed disinformation, he was cozy with top Clinton defense officials and he was personally responsible for upgrading the Chinese army communications network, making them more "survivable" in case of nuclear war.

However, in accordance with the military theories of Wang Xi, the eleventh century Chinese espionage scholar, Hua Di may have one more service to perform. I anticipate that Hua Di will be reported as "dead" in the red Chinese controlled press.

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