The neocons have got us into a terrible mess in Iraq – and may be about to get us in an even worse mess in Iran – because they are convinced that Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, wouldn't know a nuke if he saw one.

Last year, ElBaradei assured the U.N. Security Council that IAEA inspectors had exhaustively searched Iraq – investigating every tip our "intelligence" provided them – and could find no "indication" of a nuke program or even an attempt to reconstruct a uranium-enrichment program.

Had the IAEA found some evidence of a reconstituted uranium-enrichment program, it is conceivable that the Security Council might have applied some additional sanctions on Iraq.

But they wouldn't have authorized Operation Iraqi Freedom.

However, the neocons hope you jumped to the conclusion that anytime we find – in a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signatory – evidence of a previously unreported uranium-enrichment program, we get to bomb the gee-whiz out of them.

But what about the Democratic People's Republic of Korea? The DPRK withdrew from the NPT last year in anticipation of our ignoring ElBaradei and invading Iraq, anyway.

Last week, Sig Hecker – former director of Los Alamos National Laboratory – was a member of a U.S. delegation that visited the "nuclear complex" at Yongbyon and was shown what the Koreans have been referring to as their "nuclear deterrent."

Almost without exception, the neocons and their media sycophants have interpreted "nuclear deterrent" to mean that the DPRK has a nuke stockpile, ready to launch via ballistic missile against us or to give to terrorists.

Now, if anyone knows a nuke when he sees one, it's Sig. So, here are excerpts from Sig's report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

During follow-up discussions with Ambassador Li and Vice Minister Kim in Pyongyang, they stressed that the DPRK now has a "nuclear deterrent" and that U.S. actions have caused them to strengthen their deterrent – both in quality and in quantity. Ambassador Li inquired if what I had seen at Yongbyon convinced me that they had this deterrent.

I explained to both of them that there is nothing that we saw at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center that would allow me to assess whether or not the DPRK possessed a nuclear deterrent if that meant a nuclear device or nuclear weapon.

I explained that I view a "deterrent" to have at least three components: 1) the ability to make plutonium metal, 2) the ability to design and build a nuclear device, and 3) the ability to integrate the nuclear device into a delivery system.

What we saw at Yongbyon was that they apparently have the capability to do the first. However, I saw nothing and talked to no one that allowed me to assess whether or not they have the ability to design a nuclear device.

So much for the DPRK "nuke stockpile." Well, how about the DPRK "uranium enrichment" program?

In the Foreign Ministry, we discussed the contentious issue of DPRK's supposed admission on Oct. 4, 2002, to having a clandestine highly enriched uranium (HEU) program in violation of the letter and spirit of the 1994 Agreed Framework.

According to Sig, U.S. delegation member Jack Pritchard, formerly the U.S. special envoy for DPRK negotiations, made this statement:

The key issue is the intelligence that makes the United States believe that the DPRK has an HEU program. In the U.S., there is the widespread view that the complete, verifiable resolution of this HEU issue is now mandatory. This is a practical issue, and there must be a multilateral discussion to resolve it.

Now, you're probably wondering what "intelligence" Pritchard is talking about, since the CIA admits it hasn't got the foggiest notion where the HEU facilities might be.

Vice Minister Kim Gye Gwan immediately responded that the DPRK has no HEU program; no facilities, no equipment or any scientists dedicated to it, and has never claimed to have one, stating that there must have been a misunderstanding of what the Koreans had said at that meeting.

Their 5 Mwe Plutonium-producing reactor had been restarted and the 8,000 "spent" fuel elements have been removed from their storage pool. The plutonium contained therein has probably been recovered, some of it having been transformed into metal.

But, no "nukes" and no "HEU."

So what?

Well, it appears the Koreans have not deliberately lied about what they have done or what they haven't done, and that our "intelligence" for DPRK is no better than it was for Iraq.