The China-Pakistan missile cover-up

In August, 1994, Ron Brown wrote a briefing document for Bernard
Schwartz. That document is one of many from the withheld files of Ron
Brown obtained by this author using the Freedom of Information Act. The
document is a pre-China briefing report prepared for Loral CEO Bernard
Schwartz in August of 1994 by Commerce and is titled “Background
Information.” Part of that document states:

“EXPORT CONTROLS. Last August (1993), the U.S. imposed sanctions on
China for an M-11 missile-related transfer to Pakistan. On January 7,
1994 it was decided that although communications satellites licensed by
the State Department are covered by the sanctions law, export licenses
for communications satellites licensed by the Department of Commerce may
be approved. Two such export licenses for communications satellites
were recently approved by the Department of Commerce.”

Yet, U.S. intelligence officials disclosed publicly last week that
Pakistan has M-11 missiles from China and may have nuclear warheads for
the missiles. This is the first time the Clinton administration has
admitted the Chinese export of the M-11. Earlier, the State Department
said there was not enough evidence. Under U.S. anti-proliferation laws,
the deployments require that sanctions be imposed on both China and
Pakistan.

“There’s no question in my mind” that China sold 34 M-11 missiles to
Pakistan in November 1992, Gordon Oehler, former director of the CIA’s
Nonproliferation Center, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
last week. The missile in question, the Chinese M-11 or “Dong Feng”
(DF-11) is a short range missile designed for battlefield use. Dong
Feng is a Maoist slogan that translates into “East Wind”.

The DF-11 is about the same size and configuration as the SCUD
missile from the gulf war. In fact, it is designed to fit on the same
eight-wheeled truck, called a mobile launcher-erector. There are,
however, some significant differences other than the atomic cargo.

The M-11 is a solid-fuel missile, unlike the SCUD, which uses liquid
fuel and can take hours to load before launch. The solid- fuel motor is
much like the boosters on the U.S. space shuttle or a 4th of July
rocket.

The M-11 also has a warhead that separates from the main missile body
after the motor burns out. This warhead is then guided to its intended
target by miniature thrusters using an inertial guidance system. The
smaller warhead, followed by the remaining space junk of the booster, is
hard to track for defense missiles such as the Patriot because of the
background “clutter.”

All these features combine to allow M-11 crews to simply stop the
truck, raise the missile, enter the target into the missile’s onboard
computer, light the fuse and run. The M-11 can be deployed and fired in
less than 15 minutes. The launch truck and crew can escape the scene in
less than two minutes to reload and fire another M-11 in under an hour.

SCUD-equipped dictator states such as Iran and Iraq view the M-11 as
a super SCUD, fast firing, highly accurate and designed to defeat the
Patriot — perfect for tactical, nuclear combat. In fact, China offered
an upgraded M-11 system to Syria in 1995, called the M-9 or “Dong Feng”
(DF-15). The M-9 sale to Syria fell through under Israeli diplomatic
pressure.

However, the M-9 missile currently operates with the People’s
Liberation Army Second Artillery Corp. as the domestic DF-15. America
was introduced to the DF-15 in November 1995 when China dropped dummy
warheads 100 miles off the Taiwan coast. It was not until February 1996
that the U.S. public took note of the DF-15 when China used a new,
upgraded version. This time the dummy warheads dropped only 20 miles
off Taiwan’s two largest cities.

The U.S. Navy also took note of the missile firings and placed an
Aegis cruiser nearby to watch with its powerful radar. To the shock of
U.S. officials the DF-15 warheads fired at Taiwan displayed MARV
(Maneuverable Re-entry Vehicle) characteristics and the accuracy had
improved to less than a quarter mile.

The previously monitored Chinese launches of the DF-15 in November
noted the warheads were basically unguided during the terminal phase of
flight (e.g., last few seconds before impact). The warheads used
during the 1996 Taiwan crisis were changing directions and speed
rapidly, as if practicing to avoid anti-missiles such as the Army
Patriot and the U.S. Navy Standard.

Of course, just by coincidence, almost a year before the Taiwan
crisis, the U.S. Commerce Department allowed Loral competitor, Martin
Marietta, to perform coupled load analysis on kick motors for the
Chinese Long March satellite rocket. Kick motors are designed to place
satellites into their final orbit. The Chinese kick motor had a
previous history of failure, resulting in the defective launch of a
Pakistani satellite.

The military version of a kick motor is a solid rocket MARV unit,
designed to help defeat possible missile defenses by blasting the
warhead payload off its predictable course down through space and the
atmosphere.

U.S. contractors and other foreigners were allowed to witness Chinese
solid rocket satellite kick motor tests. Although U.S. citizens were
told not to discuss what they saw with the Chinese, it is unclear
whether or not foreign staff associated with AsiaSat, who were not bound
by U.S. law, were briefed by the contractor or spoke with the Chinese so
as to convey solid rocket propulsion know-how.

The best measure of whether U.S. technology was passed to China comes
not from human testimony but from the actual performance improvements of
the vehicles in question. After the U.S. help, the Chinese kick motor
performed perfectly and put AsiaSat II into orbit in May, 1995. Less
than a year later, in February 1996, the same military technology
appeared on the DF-15 warheads that splashed into the waters off Taiwan.

The Long March kick motor’s development helped China perfect MARV
warheads for the DF-15.

U.S. MARV technology will soon arm China’s newest long-range missile
capable of delivering thermonuclear warheads on the U.S. Russia’s Moscow
Institute of Thermal Technology is providing its SS-27 TOPOL-M, mobile,
ICBM design to China. China intends to produce the TOPOL-M missile
under the designation “Dong Feng” DF-41. The DF-41 is expected to be
deployed with Chinese manufactured nuclear MARV warheads, designed with
the aid of U.S. supercomputers.

Today, mobile DF-15s are facing Taiwan, Russia and are inside
occupied Tibet pointed at India. The DF-11s in Pakistani hands are
clearly targeted at India. The “East Wind” series of mobile missiles
rival the destructive power of Hiroshima with the accuracy of a smart
bomb. The “East Wind” can deliver a 10 to 20-kiloton warhead on its
target in less than four minutes. New Dehli and Taipei, cities with a
combined population of over 4 million, are four minutes from total
destruction.

Yet, as displayed above, Bernard Schwartz and Ron Brown knew all too
well of the “East Wind” missiles in Pakistan. The Clinton
administration knew all too well that M-11s in Pakistan meant automatic
sanctions on China. If such news had been made public in 1994, then
Loral would not have been able to sell satellites to China’s Army and
Martin would not have given MARV technology to launch AsiaSat.

There is no question that President Clinton and Ron Brown worked hard
to help Loral and others obtain sales access to China. That work
included covering up the “East Wind” in Pakistan and in the White House.