Missile failures software related?

The months-long record of U.S. military missile defense test failures
could be related to software glitches inserted by espionage agents,
according to a former top systems engineer who served as test director
for the B-1 bomber and B-2 flight test operational analyst.

Ken Russell, a retired aerospace engineer, told WorldNetDaily that in
light of so much espionage by potential enemies like China, it is
“extremely plausible” to have had many of the most sophisticated
software programs developed for U.S. weapons systems intentionally
corrupted.

“I know how software changes and upgrades are made in the aerospace
industry,” Russell said. “I was involved in software changes, upgrading
and approval on B-2s.”

He said software changes are made by either the prime contractor or a
subcontractor, then tested, changed, and approved, before they are then
placed in the classified chain of custody, before going to the customer.

“In my case, the U.S. Air Force was the customer,” said Russell, adding
that “software has glitches and fails all the time.” Many times, he
said, “the bugs don’t show up until a specific condition is met. Even
when the aircraft is fooled into believing it is flying, the software
can work perfectly.”

Not until an airborne system is actually flying, however, do many of the
software glitches emerge. “I saw this time and time again on the B-1 and
B-2. It happens,” he said. “Software writers miss something along with
design engineers.”

Russell said the recent string of U.S. Army anti-missile failures, all
different missiles, was an example of “a software change or upgrade that
got into the classified chain of custody and made it onto the missiles.”

“I guarantee that software was tested in a lab at the sub or prime
contractors before it was sold and placed in the missiles. However, the
problem wasn’t discovered until actual launches were attempted. Six
failures in a row on different missiles is a classic software glitch,”
he said.

Russell added that finding the bad lines of computer code among the
millions used to write such complex programs like those found in
anti-missile software is an extremely difficult task. One method —
placing telemetry equipment on test missiles, then recording the data
during a missile launch and test — lessens the odds somewhat, “but it’s
still very difficult to find the flaw.”

Russell said the access the Chinese had to all kinds of guidance
software, including the specific sequencing software for the warheads
“is beyond staggering.”

“Forget the fact that they can duplicate our own missiles — that’s
horrific enough,” he said. “If they can render even some of our 6,000
missiles useless through sabotage, they really aren’t going to need any
more than a few missiles themselves.”

Russell said there was a section of the Cox report on Chinese espionage
that substantiated his fears and seemed to indicate that others were
also concerned about the alleged theft of U.S. weapons codes.

“The PRC (People’s Republic of China) may have also acquired classified
U.S. nuclear weapons computer codes from U.S. national weapons
laboratories. The select committee believes that nuclear weapons
computer codes remain a key target for PRC espionage. Nuclear weapons
codes are important for understanding the workings of nuclear weapons
and can assist in weapon design, maintenance, and adaptation. The PRC
could make use of this information, for example, to adapt stolen U.S.
thermonuclear design information to meet the PRC’s particular needs and
capabilities,” the report said.

“They could also make use of this information to adapt stolen U.S.
thermonuclear design information to sabotage our own missiles,” he
added. “Why in God’s name wouldn’t they?”

Russell also said he had no confidence in U.S. security. “My question is
what is in place or was in place to make absolute sure they couldn’t
take the information upstream and get it into our missiles? A poster of
Hazel O’Leary in a cop’s uniform? Sandy Berger or Bill Richardson?”

“At this point,” he said, “I don’t think it’s a matter of trying to
prove it did happen. I think, based on what we do know, Congress and the
president ought to be going out of their way to prove to the American
people that it didn’t happen, given the access the Chinese had” to
sensitive weapons information and code data.

“We need to be asking Congress, ‘Hey guys, since the ChiComs had free
access to our nuke data, including the computers containing top secret
data, including access to the two companies along with their top secret
data who are prime contractors for our nuke missiles, how do you know
they haven’t sabotaged our own missiles?” Russell said. “And we need to
know that while they had access to our missile guidance software, that
they didn’t sabotage the software that goes into our own missiles.
Finally, we should ask how can we trust them, our leaders who were
responsible to make sure no one had free access to the secrets, if they
tell us it couldn’t and didn’t happen?”

Al Santoli, a military analyst and policy expert for Rep. Dana
Rohrabacher, R-Calif., told WorldNetDaily that while nothing has been
substantiated yet, the issue raised by Russell “is certainly worth
looking into.”

In fact, added Santoli, that is precisely what Congress intends to do.

“Within the next few months, perhaps after September, an oversight
committee, which will be congressionally appointed, is going to be
formed to look into a number of things” surrounding continuing
revelations about alleged Chinese espionage, Santoli said. “One of the
things we’ll do when that committee is formed is send over to them a
list of requests for them to look in to. One of the items we’ll have
them examine is the software systems in our missiles, to make sure
they’re properly tested.”

Santoli said at this point there is nothing to prove that sensitive U.S.
weapons guidance codes, for example, have been compromised or
intentionally damaged.

“It might just be there has been some deterioration across the board,”
he said. “Look at all our SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) tests that
have failed as well.” Santoli said that a large aerospace corporation
recently told congressional sources during a briefing that “one of the
reasons why they’re falling so far behind (in research) is because they
are having trouble attracting good quality software people.” He added,
“I don’t buy that excuse, but that’s what they’re telling us.” He added
that he believes it is because “there is no national priority” being
placed on such research, “like there was during the Reagan years.”

Santoli said, “The tone in the administration is not really supportive
of SDI research.” That assessment matches that of Washington Times
defense correspondent Bill Gertz, who recently published a book stating
that the Clinton administration is not serious about national missile
defense.