William C. Patrick III, an expert on biological warfare, demonstrated
a few months ago how porous our defenses against terrorist attacks are
by smuggling seven-and-a-half grams of powdered anthrax through security
and into a House Select Committee on Intelligence hearing. Displaying
the deadly sample, he declared, “I’ve been through all the major
airports, and the security systems of the State Department, the
Pentagon, even the CIA, and nobody has stopped me. Seven-and-a-half
grams would take care of the Rayburn Building and all the people in it.”
The potential for a terrorist attack was further demonstrated by
recent reports of a dangerous lack of security at the Reagan Building
here in Washington. The assessment of a consultant to the General
Services Administration cites the building’s public parking garage and
unrestricted access as potential hazards.
Rapid advances in biotechnology, as well as the theft of information
from Los Alamos that could lead to miniaturization of nuclear weapons,
highlight both the enormity and the immediacy of the problem. While the
danger posed by a single terrorist may not have more than limited
short-term effects, our borders are in effect open to weapons capable of
delivering massive devastation to whole cities and, perhaps, whole
regions.
The China Overseas Shipping Company (COSCO) and other international
firms have hundreds of ships en route to, moored in, and departing from
major U.S. ports every day. Some of these ships carry more than 5,000
truck-sized containers. The small physical size of modern nuclear
weapons makes concealment in such a container relatively easy. The
container could then be shipped and transshipped around the world —
confounding tracking procedures — before arriving at a U.S. port.
Recent policy revisions exacerbate this threat. Changed regulations
now allow foreign ships to enter sensitive U.S. ports with only 24 hours
notice. Before, 72 hours advance notification was required. This change
and budget-related resource cuts have reduced the ability of the U.S.
Coast Guard and the Customs Service to monitor these ships or screen
even a small percentage of the containers or cargo carried therein.
Seaports close to major population centers are attractive targets but
are not the only points of vulnerability. More than a million trucks
enter this country from Mexico every year, only 5 percent of which are
inspected. The sheer volume makes it neither practical nor possible to
check them all. Added to this is the fact that Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Customs, and border patrol resources are
woefully insufficient. Significantly, in the name of developing
relations with our southern neighbor and expanding free trade under
NAFTA, this administration considers it politically incorrect to
constrain trade with Mexico in any way.
Uninspected trucks travel to virtually every major city in the United
States on a daily basis. It is estimated that from 50 to 80 percent of
the drugs entering this country arrive undetected by way of Mexico. How
hard would it be to smuggle a nuclear, biological or chemical device
into a major American city using the same route?
Detecting and interdicting such threats, however, requires
substantial and effective on-the-ground human intelligence (HUMINT) both
at home and abroad. Unfortunately, HUMINT has been severely downgraded
over the years. Many politicians have concluded that such intelligence
gathering (spying) is beneath us and that ELINT (electronic
intelligence) and space-based surveillance are adequate to ensure our
national security.
Consider a hypothetical scenario: China decides to take Taiwan by
force but fears U.S. intervention. A diplomatic call is placed to the
White House to advise the president that a nuclear device is hidden
aboard a freighter anchored in an undisclosed port of entry: Seattle,
New York, Norfolk, Los Angeles, San Diego, Fort Lauderdale, San
Francisco — you pick it. The device will be remotely triggered if we
intervene in the Taiwan crisis. How do we respond?
In another scenario, terrorists place a nuclear, biological, or
chemical device — perhaps purchased from the Russians — in a container
that is then shipped and transshipped from country to country and port
to port to disguise its point of origin. The Mexican border could be a
conduit for such a shipment into the United States. The device is then
activated, devastating a major U.S. population center. The tragic
bombing of the Walter P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City would pale by
comparison. Against whom do we retaliate?
The hundreds of ships and thousands of trucks that gain access to
major U.S. population centers every day are not a trivial circumstance.
We must not be blind to these serious dangers.
Karl Day is senior editor for the Family Research Council’s
newsletter, Washington Watch, and a member of the board of FRC’s
Military Readiness Project.
