Nuke technology sent to Russia accidentally

By Charles Smith

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration “erroneously authorized
the export of radiation-hardened electronic parts to Russia” – components
vital for military satellites and nuclear weapons – according to the General
Accounting Office’s review of export controls over the multi-billion-dollar
joint U.S./Russia International Space Station.

“NASA was unaware of the error for about 18 months until the U.S. company
affiliated with the Russian company applied to State for an export license
for the same parts,” states the Government Accounting Office report.

The specialized electronics parts are designed to withstand the intense
radiation of space and global thermonuclear warfare. Such technology is
controlled by the U.S. State Department through the “U.S. Munitions list” —
and “therefore required an export license.”

“In 1998, the State Department requested NASA’s review and comment on a
license application involving a U.S. company affiliated with a Russian
company for radiation-hardened electronics parts,” states the report. “The
license application had also indicated that NASA had exported the parts to
Russia in the past.

“State referred the license application for NASA’s review in June 1998.
According to a State official, the request for the license in this instance
was to support activities associated with the Russian MIR space station.”

According to the report, “NASA had exported these parts without a license
after the parts were erroneously classified as the lowest level of
controlled technology. NASA did not follow its own policy, which is to
determine the classification of material proposed for export or to ensure
that its contractors have appropriately determined the materials
classification.”

“Instead,” charged the government review, “a NASA contractor’s supplier
determined that the export of parts to Russia did not require a license and
the contractor relied on that determination. NASA, in turn, relied on its
contractor’s classification of these parts.

Photo Credit – Brenda Smith



Russian SS-20 “SABER” mobile missile with three
250 kiloton nuclear warheads. Russian nuclear tipped
missiles could benefit from American radiation hardened
electronics, making them more reliable and accurate.

“NASA formally acknowledged the error,” states the report. “(NASA) stated
that it had reminded the Russian Space Agency and the Russian company that
the parts were solely for use in Russian-provided components of the ISS and
were not to be used for any other purpose or transferred without NASA’s
written approval. The Russian company responded that it had accounted for
each of the exported parts and indicated how they were being used and where
they were located. NASA accepted this response in good faith.”

According to a written response from the space agency’s Associate Deputy
Administrator J.R. Dailey, “While it is true that NASA accepted the Russian
response in good faith, it was also accepted within the context of the
Intergovernmental Agreement and the NASA/RSA Memorandum of Understanding on
the ISS program, which are legally binding international agreements to which
the United States and Russian governments are party.”

Congress, which has so far funded the joint U.S./Russian space station,
has refused to comment on the report. WorldNetDaily contacted the House
Committee on Science for this article, but a spokesman stated there would be
“no official statement” on the report until after a detailed review.

This is not the first time the Clinton administration has allowed the
export of advanced radiation-hardened microchip technology. On Jan. 13,
1999, the Commerce Department responded to a June 1998 Freedom of
Information Act request for information on “radiation-hardened” chip
technology transfers to China and Russia.

The Commerce response, a two-page letter, states “we issued two licenses
for Russia and three for China for the export of microprocessor technology.”
The Commerce Department response noted that the licenses issued not only
included the export of radiation-hardened chips to Russia and China, but
also included “non-U.S. citizens employed by U.S. firms in the U.S. to work
with controlled microprocessor technology.”

According to the Commerce Department’s reply, “BXA (Bureau of Export
Administration) is unable to provide you with any more detailed information
on these exports. Specific information on applications to export technology
for microprocessor or microchips to China or Russia is being withheld …
from public disclosure unless the release of such information is determined
by the secretary to be in the national interest.”

Yet, the Russian and Chinese military interests in U.S.
radiation-hardened electronics has also led to allegations of espionage,
sabotage, and murder.

In February 1996, a Chinese Long March rocket carrying a U.S.-made Loral
Intelsat satellite failed and crashed on lift-off, killing over 200
civilians. The Loral Intelsat payload was also heavily damaged.

The failure of the Long March allowed the U.S. to recover the damaged
satellite. According to the accident report, a vital computer control board
was missing from the recovered satellite. The missing Loral electronics
consisted of radiation-hardened, encrypted telemetry chips.

Similar hardened encryption chips monitor and control military satellites
and nuclear weapons. According to the testimony of the director of the
National Security Agency, in response to the possible threat posed by the
theft of the Loral encryption chips, the U.S. military changed all of its
satellite codes, costing taxpayers millions of dollars.

Space encryption technology also remains a sensitive issue between the
U.S. and Russia for the station project. The Clinton administration has
elected not to share space encryption electronics with Russia due to
concerns from both Washington and Moscow.

In its November 1999 report, the GAO wrote, “NASA officials stated that
Russia would not be included as a destination in any potential licenses for
encryption technology.

Both the United States and Russia have their own encryption systems.”
Highlighting the mutual mistrust in this sensitive area, while the
International Space Station is meant to be a joint project between the two
countries, “Russia and the United States prefer using their own (encryption)
systems,” according to NASA.


Charles Smith is a WorldNetDaily staff writer.

Charles Smith

Charles R. Smith is a noted investigative journalist. For over 20 years, Smith has covered areas of national security and information warfare. He frequently appears on national television for the Fox network and is a popular guest on radio shows all over America. Read more of Charles Smith's articles here.