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The Bush administration’s decision to delay the sale of the most advanced U.S. destroyer to Taiwan is not likely to halt China’s military buildup, according to STRATFOR, the independent global intelligence company.
While Washington hopes to retain a bargaining chip in future negotiations with China, the delay of the sale of Aegis radar-equipped destroyers is militarily insignificant. The weapons approved for sale to Taiwan will do as much in the next decade to advance Taipei’s military capabilities against China as an Aegis sale would have done in the long run. Bush’s decision is likely to accelerate growing military competition in the Taiwan Straits, reports STRATFOR.
The Bush administration informed Taiwan Monday that its annual request for U.S. military equipment — with the exception of its appeal for four Aegis radar-equipped destroyers — has been approved.
The administration made the Aegis exception in the hopes of curbing China’s military buildup, particularly Beijing’s missile force, which is seen as the gravest near-term threat to Taiwan. China has been deploying an average of 50 CSS-8 and other surface-to-surface missiles per year across from Taiwan, adding to an estimated 300 already deployed. According to Bush administration officials, the United States will reconsider the outstanding Aegis request if China continues to deploy missiles aimed at Taiwan.
But Taiwan will get everything else it wants, from diesel-powered submarines to submarine-hunting aircraft and amphibious assault vehicles. The capabilities these weapons systems provide take aim directly at China’s military strengths in the cross-straits security competition.
Bush’s decision not to sell Aegis-equipped destroyers to Taiwan amid Chinese objections is a symbolic gesture and one that will fail to stem the friction between the Chinese and Taiwanese militaries. Moreover, because Taipei is to receive a variety of advanced armaments that aim to undercut the People’s Liberation Army’s relative strengths, Beijing will not scale back its wide-ranging upgrade to the armed forces. China may, in fact, increase its military buildup, including its missile bases across from Taiwan, in response. The bargaining chip the Aegis boats represent may serve little purpose in the future.
Embarked on a major military buildup, China earlier this year increased defense spending by 17.7 percent, the largest increase in real terms in two decades.
Much of this buildup has focused on developing the capabilities needed should Beijing’s 50-year desire of reuniting Taiwan with the mainland come to blows. These capabilities include building an attack submarine force to deny access to the Taiwan Straits; deploying new surface vessels such as Russian-built destroyers that could help blockade the island; ordering new Russian-built fighter aircraft to weaken Taiwan’s relative air superiority; and, of course, introducing an overwhelming missile force a short distance from the Taiwanese capital.
In light of that buildup, Taiwan’s newly approved American weaponry will worry Chinese military planners because the weaponry could shift the military balance toward Taiwan.
The approved package, which is in addition to $20 billion in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan since 1992, includes: eight diesel-powered submarines to be built by a third country, most likely in Europe; four Kidd-class destroyers; up to 12 P-3 Orion anti-submarine warfare aircraft; Paladin self-propelled artillery systems; MH-53 minesweeping helicopters; AAV7A1 amphibious assault vehicles; MK-8 Mod-4 torpedoes; submarine- and surface-launched Harpoon anti-ship missiles; and a technical briefing on the developmental Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) mobile anti-missile system for possible future sale.
The eight diesel submarines the United States has agreed to help finance from a third party will prompt a Chinese response. One of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s modernization thrusts has been in undersea warfare.
China has four diesel-powered Kilo-class attack submarines from Russia. The first installment of a Chinese version of the nuclear-powered Victor III class Russian attack submarine, the so-called Type 093, is nearing completion.
Submarines are a critical component of Beijing’s anti-access strategy in the Taiwan Straits. A strong Taiwanese submarine force — it currently does not have one to speak of — could not go unchecked.
But when Taiwan will take possession of these submarines remains unclear. The U.S. arms package stipulates they will be built and delivered when Taiwan has the port facilities and operational training to support them.
Moreover, Germany, one of the primary potential sources for the diesel submarines, may not be so willing to build them for Taiwan over Chinese objections. A government spokesman told the Germany Press Agency on April 26: “As far as I know there has not been any such request, and if it comes it will not be approved.”
The submarines are not the only threat to China’s growing undersea fleet. The dozen P-3 Orion submarine-hunting aircraft that have been approved for Taiwan will go a long way in helping Taipei track China’s submarine activities in the Taiwan Straits, something Taiwan has had extreme difficulty doing — some Chinese submarines transiting the waterway have gone completely undetected, intelligence sources believe.
The Kidd-class destroyers lack the capabilities of the Aegis radar and do not have the ability to launch Standard air-defense missiles from vertical launch tubes. Nonetheless, they provide Taiwan’s answer to the four Sovremenny-class destroyers China is in the process of acquiring from Russia.
Submarine- and surface-launched Harpoon anti-ship missiles and new torpedoes will likewise help Taiwan to chip away at China’s anti-access strategy and naval blockade strategy.
Amphibious assault vehicles and Paladin artillery systems raise the specter of a future military confrontation that includes Taiwanese operations on the mainland, something Beijing must avoid to sustain its strategy. The technical briefing on PAC-3, while only the first step in upgrading Taiwan’s current Patriot anti-missile force, takes direct aim at China’s missile buildup across the straits, effectively doing what China sought to avoid in fighting the Aegis radar sale.
The decision to sell Taiwan a package of new weaponry without the Aegis destroyers is an effort to provide China with an incentive to slow down its growing arms race with Taiwan.
Focusing on the Aegis destroyers, however, misses the unfolding reality. Taiwan will get key capabilities — some of them sooner than anticipated — that would degrade China’s military capabilities in a battle for Taiwan.
China will respond accordingly. Regardless, it will continue its missile buildup across from Taiwan and other military developments. The negotiating chip the United States has attempted to retain will probably prove worthless. And the Aegis destroyers will find their way to Taiwan.
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