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Beijing, winning an International Olympic Committee vote today to host the 2008 Summer Olympic Games, expects to gain international prestige, greater economic investment and a nationalist symbol to rally the country’s 1.2 billion citizens.
“There is a feeling that it would be good for the world and good for China if they win,” IOC vice president Kevan Gosper, Australia’s most senior IOC official, told the Associated Press before the vote.
Eight years ago, with the memories of Tiananmen Square still fresh, the IOC passed on China, choosing to go to Sydney for the 2000 Games. Beijing led every round until the last, when Sydney won by two votes. But its successful bid for the 2008 Games will bring increasing scrutiny of its respect for human rights, forcing the image-conscious regime to limit its crackdown on internal social unrest. But the government’s restraint may not last long. Dissidents inside China and foreign anti-government forces, such as Taiwan, will be encouraged to challenge the regime.
To prepare for the attention, China has been making deeper structural changes in its security forces. Since the middle of last year, China has established anti-riot squads to develop a more effective, and non-lethal, method of countering growing demonstrations and protests.
The government emphasized the need for special training for the squads, warning that ill-trained forces risk “escalating conflicts by [using] inappropriate measures,” according to a Chinese public security official cited by the official Xinhua News Agency.
China’s government also changed the uniforms of Beijing’s police from military green to blue in late 2000, in a symbolic attempt to reshape the image of public security.
However, such efforts do not reflect a softer stance by the regime on internal social stability, or a greater tolerance for anti-government activities. Rather, Beijing is, if anything, even more concerned with containing social unrest. The government has launched a series of crackdowns on corruption and organized crime, and is targeting religious and ethnic groups considered a threat to internal stability.
But the government must maintain an inviting climate for potential foreign donors and investors; already, 60 percent of its Olympic bid budget comes from foreign corporations. But the government’s growing concern with image will require Beijing to deal more delicately with internal social unrest than it has in the past. For instance, the government recently allowed seven North Korean refugees to leave China for South Korea, despite a signed agreement with Pyongyang to return such refugees to North Korea.
Beijing’s restraint will encourage both internal and external forces to step up efforts to discredit the Chinese government or fight for more rights. It may also open the door for more pressure from overseas interest groups – be they dissidents or foreign governments such as Taiwan – to encourage anti-government activities inside China.
The dissident movement is not limited to well-known religious groups such as Falun Gong or pro-democracy elements; it has the potential to spread across all sectors of society. From academics and businessmen seeking more intellectual or economic freedom, to unemployed factory workers and disgruntled farmers, the short-term protection of international scrutiny may counter their fear of government retribution.
These social forces will test both the regime’s ability to keep control and its tolerance for domestic opposition. If history is any guide, when pressured for greater political freedom and reform, Beijing’s response is to ensure its own power regardless of international opinion. As in the case of the Tiananmen Square massacre, the government will delay retaliation to a degree in the interest of image control, but if the anti-government movement gets out of hand, the restraint is not likely to last.
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