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Maoist insurgents have stepped up their attacks in Nepal. But the king has not unleashed the Nepalese army, apparently gambling that rebel victories will discredit the government. If successful, the ploy will increase the monarch's power, but it might also ignite a guerrilla war that could eventually involve China and India.
Attacks by rebel Maoists are on the upswing in Nepal; more than 70 policemen are presumed captured after about 300 rebels attacked a police station in the northwest on July 12, just eight days after rebels allegedly planted more than a dozen bombs in the capital city of Katmandu. But King Gyanendra has not deployed significant numbers of army troops to subdue the rebels.
Rather, Gyanendra appears to be following the policy of his brother and predecessor, the late King Birendra, who was assassinated along with members of his family by his son on June 1. Birendra had put the onus for quelling the insurgency on the prime minister and police. In withholding the army, Gyanendra may be counting on rebel violence to discredit Nepal's struggling civilian government and potentially lead to a re-establishment of the monarchy's sovereignty.
But this strategy is dangerous. The Maoists are gaining momentum and moving their operations into Nepal's more populated areas. Although the king's ploy will likely allow him to wrest power from his civilian rivals, it also risks plunging the country into a prolonged rebel war that could potentially draw in neighboring China and India.
Nepal's Maoist insurgency began in 1996, six years after street demonstrations by pro-democracy activists pressured the country's monarchy to share power with a parliament and prime minister.
The Hindu kingdom, uneasily situated between rivals China and India, controls the Kuti, Kerong and Kodari passes, some of the few navigable routes through the Himalayas, and is flush against several of India's most populous northeastern states. Nepal has been the scene of small-scale power games between China and India and could serve as a flashpoint should either neighboring power incite the other.
Nepal's Maoist insurgents control about a quarter of the country and operate in about 70 of 75 administrative districts, according to the Katmandu Post. No longer content to stay in the sparsely populated hill country, they have staged recent attacks in the more densely populated southern plains. In five different cases since February, 300 to 500 rebels have coordinated to simultaneously attack police posts, according to the South Asia Analysis Group.
The monarchy's political policies may be part of the reason for the Maoists' successes. For years, the Nepalese crown insisted the insurgency is a police problem and refused to commit the 45,000-man Nepalese army to the battlefield. But the police are poorly trained, poorly equipped and outnumbered. Even now, after a significant increase in Maoist activity, only a few thousand troops have been deployed to the countryside, according to India Abroad, a weekly international newspaper.
Gyanendra appears to be hoping that public disgust with the Maoist uprising will be directed toward the relatively young and unproven democratic government, rather than at the monarchy.
While the king has final authority over the army, which remains loyal to the crown, nearly all operational decisions for running the country are left to Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala and the Cabinet, both of which have been extremely ineffective to date. Before his assassination, Birendra had publicly chastised Koirala for his inability to use police forces to bring the Maoists under control.
A likely future scenario is that Gyanendra may allow conditions to become so grave that he can call a state of emergency and suspend the constitution.
But allowing the insurgency to wage on in order to score political points is risky. There are about 1,500 to 2,000 full-time guerrillas, plus another 10,000 irregulars. The rebels can take advantage of rugged hills running the length of the country. The civilian population, 85 percent of which lives in rural areas, is poor and isolated from the capital, and many will be sympathetic to the Maoists.
The military does have advantages in manpower and resources. The army numbers about 45,000, and there are another 40,000 police and security personnel. The government also plans to import $50 million worth of weapons in the next year, Agence France-Presse reported.
Despite their lack of resources, the rebels have the terrain and population on their side and will be able to retreat to the hills when threatened. They will not be able to defeat the military, but the military will be equally unable to completely wipe out the rebels. The likely result is a drawn-out guerrilla war.
The strategic danger for the region is that the conflict could draw in neighboring India. New Delhi doesn't want a revolutionary government in Nepal, especially one that might support Maoist militants in northern India. The Indian government may send arms or advisers if Nepal is sufficiently threatened.
But an Indian military buildup in what is seen as a buffer state would likely raise tensions with China and increase instability in the region, with Nepal caught in the middle.
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