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A new United Nations proposal will likely spell the end of the international community’s involvement in Morocco’s 25-year quest to control the territory of Western Sahara. At the same time, the plan will prompt separatist fighters to switch to terrorist tactics.
The United Nations has proposed a new model for ending conflict in the Western Sahara between Moroccan occupiers and the indigenous Sahrawi people, the BBC reported June 22. The plan indefinitely delays a Sahrawi self-rule referendum in exchange for substantial local autonomy.
The proposal would rubber-stamp Morocco’s hold on the former Spanish colony and end nearly 25 years of diplomatic and military conflict. In doing so, the United Nations has clearly sided with Morocco, the United States’ most important ally in North Africa, and likely will sacrifice considerable credibility as an unbiased peacemaker. Within the region, the proposal may also force Sahrawi militants, known as the Polisario, to switch from conventional war to terrorism.
After Spain gave up its claim in 1975, the Moroccan army occupied the Western Sahara, which is about the size of Colorado and sandwiched between Morocco and Mauritania. The separatist Polisario (Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro) turned their gun sights away from the Spanish and toward the Moroccans, waging a low-scale conventional war until the United Nations sponsored a cease-fire in 1991. The United Nations agreed in 1988 to sponsor a referendum on independence for Western Sahara, but it was never held.
Morocco has maintained close diplomatic and security ties with the United States for decades. Since 1950, Morocco has received more U.S. aid than any other Arab or African country except Egypt, according to the Institute for Policy Studies, a think tank based in Washington, D.C. The country, located at the juncture of Africa’s Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts, also allows the U.S. Navy access to its port facilities and grants the U.S. Air Force landing, refueling and overflight rights.
If adopted, the new proposal would signal an end to most of the world’s involvement in on-again, off-again attempts to end the fighting in Western Sahara. The proposal basically recognizes Morocco’s territorial claim, gives the Sahrawis a bit of money and casts them out on their own.
The plan will allow the United Nations to end mediation efforts that have taken 13 years and cost half a billion dollars, with next to no results. But while the United Nations realizes a cost savings, it may lose credibility. The cave-in to Morocco and its sponsors in Washington comes on the heels of other diplomatic failures in East Timor and Kosovo. With this track record, the United Nations will be less likely to be sought out as a mediator by other militant groups.
But what is bad for the United Nations may be good for Moroccan diplomacy.
With the conflict officially ended, Morocco may finally rejoin the
Organization of African Unity, from which it resigned in protest after the
OAU recognized the government of Western Sahara. Morocco may even attempt to
warm its relations with neighboring Algeria, a traditional rival that has supported the Polisario.
Given the likelihood the United Nations measure will pass, the Polisario will probably make one last attempt to score a battlefield victory, but their chances of success are small. Morocco outmans and outguns the Polisario by a wide margin.
Unable to present a credible military threat, the Polisario may resort to terrorist tactics. This would be a real concern for the Moroccan government, which takes pains to protect its image as a stable nation suitable for foreign investment and tourism.
Mounting an effective terrorist campaign would be difficult for the Polisario. Western Sahara’s only cities, Laayoune and Dakhla, are far from Morocco’s population centers, so terrorist acts would make next to no impact. Nor is it a simple matter to turn rebel soldiers into terrorists. Willing Polisario members would need to master an entirely different skill set, and they would be matched against the Moroccan security services, some of the most effective in the world.
The Polisario’s only hope is to receive training and support from an outside country. But Algeria, the Polisario’s longtime sponsor, may not be willing to suffer a backlash for supporting terrorist attacks on its neighbor. Algeria has attempted to come to terms with Morocco during the past year. Supporting insurgents fighting soldiers is one thing, but supporting attacks on civilian targets is quite another.
Additionally, Algeria may not want to endanger its newly formed yet fragile relationship with the United States. Looking ahead, Algeria may decide that Libya, which is forming alliances all over Africa, is a greater security concern than Morocco.
The only other possible sponsor for the Polisario is Libya, but not for many years. Libya has nearly shed its reputation as a terrorist supporter and is hoping for follow-up investments. But Libyan leader Moammar Qadhafi makes a habit of forming relationships with small-time insurgents and dictators before they rise to power. He may open a channel with the Polisario to use in the future.
Until a sponsor emerges, however, the rest of the world will relegate the Polisario insurgency to the pages of history.
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