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Violence in the Middle East continues to escalate, but neither Israel nor the Palestinians seem willing to consider peace talks as a solution.
Israel’s calculation is that the situation is preferable to either the risks of peace negotiations or full-scale war and it will continue its policies of limited war during the next several months.
Israel’s strategy for the intifada is determined by the factors that impact its chances for survival. Since its founding in 1948, Israel has fought and won three wars against its Arab neighbors. But the Jewish state remains vulnerable; it is limited in strategic depth (only 85 miles wide at its broadest point), is inhabited in the territories by a hostile population, and will avoid a war of attrition.
Israel relies on the support of a world power for economic security and advanced technology and military assistance. It also employs a first-strike policy to prevent opponents from gaining a strategic advantage through surprise attack.
But Israel views the current crisis as less than critical. Israel must still consider its advantages and disadvantages, but survival is not at stake. This aspect is important for understanding the nation’s strategy.
The government is satisfied with the status quo. Sharon’s government enjoys wide support among Israelis. Although coalition politics are notoriously unstable, Sharon’s ruling coalition has suffered no fractures, and in fact was recently joined by the Center Party, which holds six seats in the Knesset, The Jerusalem Post reported Aug. 21.
Israel also retains the advantage in its conflict with the Palestinians. Tel Aviv is using targeted assassinations of Islamic militants, lockdowns of the territories and the demolition and seizure of security and political headquarters to diminish the Palestinians’ ability to inflict damage.
Despite the killing of 15 Israelis by a Hamas suicide bomb earlier this month, the success rate of Palestinian terrorist attacks has been reduced, and without external assistance from Arab governments, the Palestinians are isolated. Although the contest is far from over, Israel has the Palestinians on the rope.
Israel must also consider the positions of its Arab neighbors. Neither Egypt nor Jordan is willing to defend the Palestinians, nor do they need to attack Israel in order to guard their own national security. Both governments are held in check by a variety of issues that include limited military capabilities, economic and political concerns, their respective peace treaties with Israel and the U.S. aid that supports the current regimes in power.
Syria remains a threat, albeit a limited one. Lebanon will fall under the rubric of any decisions made in Damascus, and although Iraq would like to heighten the war in Israel, it does not have direct access to the territories. Its alliance with Syria might provide an opening for Baghdad to exploit, but U.S. military pressure will likely assure that Iraq is held in check.
Israel’s chief concern will be maintaining the support of the United States in the short- to mid-term. In the future Israel hopes to build enough bilateral relations with both first- and second-tier global nations that it no longer needs the sponsorship of a world power.
But in the meantime, Israel hopes to retain U.S. support both politically and economically. Jerusalem will be careful not to threaten Washington’s current interest in the Middle East – namely access to Arab controlled oil – by avoiding antagonizing its Arab neighbors and starting a larger regional war.
Israel is now at a point where it is free to act without fear of its neighbors or outside pressure. Given a free hand, it may intensify its policies incrementally in order to curtail alternate Palestinian tactics.
If the Palestinians step up their attacks and more Israelis are killed, the Sharon government will be under more intense pressure to conduct larger military operations against the Palestinians. But as long as it can contain the Palestinian threat, Israel will take its time dismantling the Palestinian Authority.
