U.S. military risks
falling behind

By WND Staff

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The Bush administration’s pledge to reform the U.S. military has met strong domestic opposition as rising operations costs hamper the Pentagon’s ability to finance its much-touted revamping of the armed forces. The military will likely keep its basic structure for at least a decade. But as the United States continues to rely on aging conventional forces, potential adversaries will close the gap in war fighting capability.

After six months in office, the Bush administration is witnessing one of its primary campaign pledges – to revamp the U.S. military to counter 21st century threats – held hostage. The White House is hindered by a defense policy and planning process so politicized that necessary changes in weapons and force size are nearly impossible to implement. Meanwhile, the rising cost of current global operations is straining the military’s resources.

U.S. President George W. Bush’s plan to “skip a generation” in technology and prepare the armed forces for a host of future threats faces a minefield in the next decade and beyond. A combination of domestic politics and growing operations costs will occupy the military and delay the development of next-generation technologies. The army also will be impeded in its planned transition from a larger Cold War force to a smaller, highly lethal and more agile force that can strike from virtually anywhere.

The development of select next-generation technologies will progress, but the United States will continue to rely on its traditional military forces – manned aircraft, large flotillas of warships and logistics-intensive army units – for at least a decade, much longer than supporters of a transformed military might like. But the longer Washington hangs on to its traditional military structure, the higher the risk that potential adversaries will close the gap in war fighting capability.

With the possible exception of missile defense, which has made modest political and technical progress this year, the Bush administration’s campaign pledge to overhaul the armed forces is generating a lackluster response. The U.S. Congress is reconvening this month to take up the White House’s spending priorities for the fiscal year beginning Oct. 1, and with the budget surplus shrinking and the administration’s $1.3 trillion tax cut in effect, Bush’s agenda is facing mounting obstacles.

Defense reform was a key piece of that agenda. But Bush’s reforms were predicated on the need to reduce or terminate weapon systems and cut the size of the military to account for today’s world of limited conflicts and peacekeeping operations as well as identify other ways to save billions of dollars.

Without such belt-tightening measures, the Pentagon cannot afford to fund next-generation projects such as missile defense, enhanced space operations, computer warfare, pilotless attack aircraft, small high-speed warships and a wide range of so-called standoff capabilities that would allow Washington to bring military pressure to bear without heavy reliance on foreign bases.

The administration’s few attempts so far at slashing weapons programs have demonstrated the political difficulty it faces in undertaking a military transformation.

For example, a proposal to cut the U.S. fleet of more than 90 B-1 bombers by one-third essentially has been scuttled by members of Congress with affected air bases in their districts.

The Army’s Crusader field-artillery system, a multibillion dollar project to build a new fleet of large armored vehicles, likewise has strong supporters in the political process even though the tanks are too heavy to deploy quickly to hot spots around the world.

These programs, though, are considered to be among the easiest to cut in the name of transformation. Others, such as the Pentagon’s three new tactical aircraft programs, have even stronger political support.

While politicians have opposed weapons cuts, the military is resisting money-saving proposals to cut the size of the armed forces. And efforts to gain congressional approval to close unneeded and costly bases have fallen on deaf ears on Capitol Hill.

But the most significant drain on Bush’s plans to phase out the Cold War force is the need to maintain current operations around the world, including peacekeeping missions in the Balkans and the containment of Iraq.

The military’s growing role in executing American foreign policy and the concurrent strain on military resources are making it extremely difficult to prepare for tomorrow’s wars with a new generation of weapons.

Reports continue to emerge, for example, of spare parts shortages for front-line weapon systems such as fighter planes while housing and other infrastructure needs and personnel costs continue to rise.

The White House is hard-pressed to fund even these pressing needs, let alone its long-term vision. A request for $18 billion in supplemental funding to carry the Pentagon through the end of this fiscal year is at risk of being slashed by Congress amid news that the expected budget surplus in the coming years will be significantly smaller than anticipated. Bush’s $328 billion defense spending request for next year is likewise going to face heavy congressional scrutiny.

A recent military war game demonstrated that even with a new strategy that discards the decade-old two-war approach, forces in the field will continue to be strained. In the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s “Positive Match,” a computerized war game held from Aug. 21-24, participants found that cargo aircraft, intelligence and surveillance systems and command and control operations remained under great pressure, Inside the Pentagon reported on August 30.

Day-to-day military operations for the foreseeable future will be preoccupied with maintaining peace and stability, further stretching capabilities and resources.

Defense Department documents show a potentially significant military buildup between 2002 and 2008, including a new air base in Qatar and new facilities in Turkey, an expansion of the U.S. presence on the Diego Garcia military base in the Indian Ocean and a sizeable increase in troops and infrastructure, including a submarine base, on the U.S. territory of Guam in the Pacific Ocean. Troops and resources will also be shifted to Asia.

Washington will introduce new technological capabilities but will only be able to do so piecemeal, beginning with missile defense. As the United States maintains its current basic military structure, with perhaps a different geographical emphasis, potential adversaries will have more time to identify weaknesses in America’s conventional forces and increase their search for the U.S. military’s Achilles heel.

China, for example, has placed a premium on developing new capabilities, such as submarines and computer warfare techniques, to overcome U.S. conventional military power. Beijing, as well as Iran, Iraq and North Korea, will also continue to develop missiles designed to hamper future U.S. military operations, including those targeting the aircraft carrier, the symbol of American military power.


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