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A conspiracy as large and sophisticated as that necessary to pull off the suicide attacks in New York and Washington potentially would have included plans for subsequent strikes.
In that scenario, terrorists would wait until the first flush of panic has subsided to make their next move. But the possibility of any early successes in the federal investigation could force attackers to move more quickly than planned.
From the culprits’ point of view, they succeeded more effectively than reasonably could be hoped: Although one suicide jet failed to hit a target, three succeeded.
Apart from the obliteration of the World Trade Center and the attendant carnage, the attackers succeeded in shutting down America’s financial markets and air transport system. The cost to the United States is incalculable and may well be a decisive factor in deepening the already serious slowdown in the American economy. In some ways, it was the perfect terrorist strike.
The critical issue now is whether this was planned as a single set of attacks or as the opening salvo of an ongoing campaign. To be more precise, were the Sept. 11 attacks planned with the intention of staging follow-on attacks? Did the attackers insert one or more additional teams into the United States prior to Sept. 11 that are now standing by, ready to strike, or was there only one strike team in place with a support team that has now completed its mission?
In the past, terrorist strikes have tended to be isolated events in which the attack and support teams are not expected to continue operations. Incidents like the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa have been followed by an extended pause while the counterattacks were absorbed, team members either captured or dispersed and later attacks planned as separate, discrete events. That may well be the case here as well, meaning the United States could expect the attackers to go to ground, absorb the counterattack and wait for another day.
But there is another possibility here: A campaign of subsequent, possibly low-grade strikes from additional cells already planted in the United States.
It is becoming clear that the number of people involved in the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks was extremely large for a terrorist operation. Apart from those aboard the aircraft – apparently somewhere between 12 and 20 people – a support team clearly had to be in place. Indeed, the detentions in Boston Sept. 12 might indicate that some of that team has now been captured. In any case, the attackers have committed what must be substantial resources to this operation – perhaps a large portion of their effective capabilities.
Moreover, the organizers were certainly aware when they planned the operation that the response from the United States would be massive and sustained. Apart from strikes on the planners overseas, security at the borders and within the United States would be increased by several orders of magnitude. That means that the ability to insert additional personnel into the United States after Sept. 11 would decline dramatically.
The planners, already having committed substantial resources to the World Trade Center and Pentagon strikes – and knowing it would be difficult to reinforce them for some time – surely put some thought toward expanding terrorist forces in the United States to include a second or even third team. Given the already high number of people involved, the security risks of a large operation had already been incurred. The use of additional teams, particularly teams with limited knowledge of each other, might not cost or risk much more.
This would appear to represent a shift from previous operating patterns, but then this operation was already a massive shift – in terms of size and ambition – from anything previously undertaken. We should not assume that precedent binds the attackers. Moreover, there is precedent both in Beirut, Lebanon, and in Israel for multi-phased operations, albeit not so far from bases of operation.
The goal of a multi-phased operation would be to maintain psychological pressure on the United States – keeping the population and government off balance – and to retaliate for inevitable American counterstrikes. Such strikes would not have to be as sophisticated or complex as the Sept. 11 attacks. Most important, they would not and should not be self-liquidating attacks in which the operatives would be destroyed in a single spectacular strike. Rather, these operations should be both effective and repeatable by the same team, at least until it was captured.
Consider a car bombing campaign. A team in place for many months would have opportunities to accumulate explosives and vehicles throughout the country without arousing much suspicion. The car bomb is a devastating weapon when used against buildings and crowded areas. The bombers can be far away when the bomb goes off, moving to their next explosive cache and vehicle. Particularly in a country the size of the United States, with careful preplanning, relatively few individuals could maintain a fairly intense tempo of operations before capture – moving from city to city in a wave of terror.
From the attackers’ standpoint, ideally, these operations would not begin until after the country began calming down and perhaps not until retaliatory military operations were under way. However, if it turns out that the FBI has in fact managed to break part of the network and that the networks had some knowledge of each other, the additional teams might feel compelled to move more quickly than originally planned in the face of potential capture. That would imply that a campaign might be imminent as the teams faced a “use it or lose it” scenario.
Let us emphasize as strongly as we can that this is pure speculation. We do not know whether additional teams were introduced prior to the attack, and if they were, we do not know their mission. If, however, the attackers can be credited with the sophistication needed to plan and execute Sept. 11 without detection, then we must assume they have thought through their options. One of those options clearly would be to have planned for secondary teams to carry out waves of terror attacks. If that is the case, then the more successful the FBI is in breaking into the network, the more time is working against the attackers. They might decide that they can’t hold off.
Under any circumstances, it is critical not to underestimate the thoughtfulness of an opponent. The attackers have thought about this carefully, so the possibility of additional teams should not be discounted.
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WND Staff