The making of an unlikely coalition

On the face of things, President Bush’s call for an international coalition against terror ought to separate the “good guys” from the “bad guys.” In the style of the old West, he calls for the capture of the renegade Saudi-born militant Osama bin Laden, the prime suspect in the World Trade Center and Pentagon bombings, dead or alive.

But what happens when some would-be members of the posse wear black hats rather than white ones – when outlaws line up behind the sheriff to catch other outlaws?

Iran and Iraq, Washington’s archenemies over the past decade, are a case in point. Both joined the chorus condemning the atrocities in New York and Washington. The condemnations poured in from across Iran’s political spectrum in what appeared to be a well-orchestrated campaign. After all, no love is lost between Shi’ite Iran and the Sunni Taliban government in Kabul.

Iraq stopped short of any public announcement. Instead, Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz waited for the first week’s anniversary of the attack to send a letter of condolences for the families of the victims through a U.S. group opposed to U.N. sanctions against Iraq.

The letter, though tardy, looked like a positive Iraqi response to comments by U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of State Colin Powell that Washington had no evidence linking Baghdad to the terror attacks.

Later, it transpired that Mohammed Atta, the pilot of the first plane to crash into the World Trade Center, met an Iraqi intelligence officer in Hamburg several months ago. More signs of Iraqi intelligence involvement began to surface.

For the moment, policymakers in Washington are divided over whether to launch an offensive against Iraq in the framework of America’s campaign against international terrorists. If they decide to do so, they must also decide when to strike at Iraq – before, during or after the attack on Afghanistan. Those dilemmas must be resolved quickly. In the meantime, an immense U.S. air, sea and ground force is piling up in the Persian Gulf region.

That is not the Bush administration’s only dilemma. In general, there is a dearth of concrete evidence fixing the precise identity of the masterminds who orchestrated last week’s attacks. This difficulty has delayed the choice of targets for punishment, leaving Arab rulers with much-needed time for diplomatic maneuvering.

Egypt and Iran called loudest for the U.S.-led anti-terror coalition to form up under the United Nations aegis. While not wildly acclaimed, this proposal offers a recipe for certain governments faced with domestic constraints to nonetheless join up with the coalition. Followers of the bin Laden fundamentalist ethic – and some of his active cells – are to be found in almost every Arab and Muslim country. In Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, they are in the opposition, working outside the political system. In other places, such as Iran, they are threads in the fabric that holds the government together. Fearful of a backlash from their own extremists, both the moderate and the radical Arab states would prefer the initials “U.N.” on the letterhead of the anti-terror alliance, rather than “U.S.”

This device would enable moderate Arab countries such as Egypt to sign up for the U.S.-led coalition without incurring too much domestic opposition.

Saudi Arabia and other Muslim countries have laid a preparatory justification for future cooperation with the United States in the anti-bin Laden alliance, by enlisting their men of religion to issue decrees condemning the attacks against the United States – and terrorism in general.

One of the only three nations of the world to recognize the Taliban regime of Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia – where bin Laden was born, raised and educated – withdrew that recognition yesterday, further isolating Afghanistan. Its religious clerics declared that Saudi Arabia followed the true path of Islam, as opposed to the deadly detour taken by fundamentalist terrorists.

With that point of theological contention disposed of, King Fahd came out with unequivocal support for the United States and pledged Saudi cooperation in the war against terrorism wherever the battle may be fought. Saudi foreign minister Saud al-Faisal was dispatched to Washington for official talks to define the nature of that cooperation.

Those talks ran into the initial American problem in defining the war arenas. The Saudi foreign minister reportedly relayed a caution from his government to Washington to beware of attempting to conquer Afghanistan or any other hasty actions that would inflame the Arab world. Faisal made it clear that U.S.-Saudi mutual aid must be confined to oil and intelligence.

He also hinted that if bases were needed, they would not be withheld. Saudi Arabia’s willingness to contribute intelligence to the American-led war effort is a new departure and therefore of interest.

The Saudis have always withheld intelligence collaboration with Washington, jealously preserving their sovereignty in this respect. This sensitivity was reflected in the Saudi refusal to share intelligence in the U.S. inquiry into the 1996 Khobar Towers truck-bombing attack that killed 19 U.S. servicemen. Has this changed?

Not entirely, according to sources. While willing to join forces with the United States even more extensively than in the 1991 Gulf War, the rulers of Riyadh would not think of exposing their data bases on the militant cells swarming mainly in the Najd provincial town of Buraida, north of the capital, whose members radically oppose the ruling establishment on religious grounds. Some but not all are linked to bin Laden. Most are graduates of the Islamic fundamentalist seminaries of Pakistan and northern Afghanistan and they form a constant threat to the kingdom’s stability.

Another threat comes from the Shi’ite militants of the Saudi Hezbollah, centered in the Eastern oil-rich provinces of Saudi Arabia. This group has gained in strength in the last year.

All these dissidents, separately or in some form of ad hoc front, could be provoked into overt armed resistance if the royal house went too far in collaborating with Washington to fight Islamic fundamentalists. The pious and conservative Crown Prince Abdullah Abdulaziz enjoys more religious credibility in these circles than does the pro-Western King Fahd and his Sudeiri brothers. But he, too, knows that the only force capable of defending the throne against a religious uprising is the United States. He therefore steps with great care through the Saudi minefield. The reference to intelligence cooperation with Washington will certainly be limited to terrorist groups outside the kingdom.

The Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, despite the impressive volume of U.S. aid to his country, is far more reserved in his offer of assistance to the U.S. anti-terror campaign than his Saudi brothers. That is because he lacks Abdullah’s religious credentials at home and fears to bring down on himself the full fury of the militant religious sects standing opposed to his regime. Even so, his grievance against bin Laden must be acute, indeed, after he survived six attempts on his life by Islamic fundamentalists.

Tehran, despite its condemnation of the terror attack that toppled the twin towers, is divided on how far Iran may go in joining America’s anti-terror bloc. The voices opposing U.S. military action against Afghanistan are growing stronger, along with calls for Iran to remain neutral. Iran has sent a message to the United States hinting at support for “targeted” military action, or strikes against terrorist elements acting under Taliban protection, as opposed to an all-out assault against Afghanistan.

The Arab world has thus been pitched into a serious quandary by the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. They would dearly like to be neutral in the American campaign of punishment, lest they spark unrest or even revolution at home. Arab countries are willing to be seen standing behind a war against terrorism, but not to be branded U.S. collaborators.

However, Washington has told Arab leaders flatly that each must decide whether he is for or against America.

At the two ends of the scale, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Gulf Emirates, Jordan and Tunisia, have little choice but to jump aboard the U.S. gun wagon, doing so with varying shades of enthusiasm; Iraq, Yemen, Algeria, Syria and Lebanon, will stay out, while Morocco, Libya and Iran will strive to linger on the sidelines. Not all will succeed in striking their preferred postures. Some of their regimes may dearly for backing America, facing uprisings and domestic terror campaigns from their own militant Islamic opposition groups.

Iran and Iraq take the view that the U.S. must not be allowed to conquer Afghanistan, because its strengthened hand in the region would correspondingly limit the freedom of action enjoyed by the countries opposed to its policies.

However the U.S. war on terror develops, it will most certainly leave the Middle East ground shaking in its wake.