Intel-sharing a snag
for coalition

By WND Staff

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The United States and Europe will comprise the core of an emerging global anti-terrorism coalition. But the highly sensitive nature of intelligence-gathering and the pursuit of national priorities will make for an uneasy transatlantic partnership. The result will be enhanced, but still limited, sharing of intelligence as the European Union and United States pursue their own priorities.

Prime ministers from throughout the European Union met in Brussels Sept. 21 for an emergency anti-terrorism summit. The leaders were set to discuss a range of proposals meant to improve coordination of law enforcement and anti-terrorism activities within the union, as well as the European Union’s role in the emerging global coalition against terrorism.

The structure of that coalition – including who will lead it and how information will be shared among its members – is currently under debate in both Washington and Brussels. Both the union and the United States will seek control over operations and intelligence, but both sides will be reluctant to fully disclose their own information and capabilities. Without the ability to control the use of sensitive intelligence, such as how and when operations will be launched, countries like France and Germany will be reluctant to share their most important intelligence.

As in the past, U.S. and European intelligence agencies will share varying degrees of information, depending on national priorities and levels of trust. The coalition will be more effective at providing political cover for its various members – diversifying blame for any actions the coalition takes – than at creating a formalized structure to fight terrorism. The structure and trust required for most critical aspects of covert operations, such as tight control of information and coordinated action, will take years to develop, during which time terrorists could continue to slip through the cracks.

The fiery attacks on New York and Washington Sept. 11 forged a consensus to fight terrorism that might otherwise have taken decades. European nations previously resisted American efforts to broaden NATO’s mission to include fighting terrorism. Those efforts included a failed attempt in 1999 to extend Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for that purpose, the Financial Times reported Sept. 19.

But soon after the World Trade Center towers collapsed, Europe united to invoke for the first time that same article, which calls for joint action in response to an attack on one alliance member.

As evidence of terror cells operating in Germany, England and France mounted and unconfirmed reports of planned attacks in Brussels and elsewhere spread, the European Union quickly reached consensus to decisively address the threat of strikes on continental soil.

While national leaders threw their weight behind an anti-terrorism coalition, interior and justice ministers finalized a package of 37 measures to enhance the Union’s internal coordination. These include the creation of an anti-terrorism unit within Europol, tougher border and financial controls, union-wide search and arrest warrants and greater flexibility for extradition. This package was taken up at the Sept. 21 summit.

Despite historically close relationships between the United States and Europe and consensus on both sides for the coalition, there are significant barriers to intelligence-sharing across the Atlantic.

Besides a myriad of logistical hurdles, Europe wants to be an equal partner with the United States in this war, sharing evenly in intelligence and operational control. The United States will resist such a structure, choosing to share intelligence selectively as it sets its own priorities. European intelligence bodies likewise will resist sharing their most sensitive intelligence with the United States.

Europe is concerned that the international campaign against terrorism will be fought on American terms and will subjugate European interests and authority. They resent U.S. President George W. Bush’s unilateralist foreign policy and also feel empowered by Washington’s recent retreat from the stage in areas such as the Balkans and the Middle East.

Soon after the invocation of Article 5, French officials began emphasizing the need for consultations before any military action. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder told the German parliament Sept. 20 that “alliance obligations correspond with a right: namely the right to information and consultation.”

European officials have delivered with increasing frequency the message that intelligence-sharing is a two-way street. A high-level EU delegation went to Washington Sept. 20 to discuss the nature of that cooperation. In a news conference with U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell following the meeting, Louis Michel – foreign minister of Belgium, which currently holds the rotating EU presidency – repeatedly emphasized the need for information-sharing and called for “permanent, timely and comprehensive consultations at all levels.”

Though negotiations over operations and control of the coalition have been conducted at a low volume publicly, they cut to the heart of Europe’s relationship with the United States. This is a complex relationship that mixes intense support and cooperation with distrust and competition.

These same factors will guide intelligence-sharing in the coalition. While the United States, Canada and Britain already pool intelligence, other EU and NATO members – notably France – do not regularly share their secrets with the United States. France has always been keenly sensitive to issues of national sovereignty, particularly in a closely guarded area like intelligence. Although priorities will certainly differ within the union, they will shift more substantially across the Atlantic – leading to conflicts over when and how to act on intelligence.

European officials are keenly aware of Washington’s intelligence shortcomings and believe that on balance, they possess far better intelligence. European countries – including Ireland, Spain, France and Germany – have significant experience in dealing with domestic terrorism. European intelligence can also better track Al-Qa’ida cells active in Europe, as well as any banking and financial transactions they make.

The United States also needs European intelligence in foreign locations where it has limited access – including Pakistan, Sudan, Algeria, Kashmir, Lebanon, Indonesia and north and west Africa. Finally, Washington needs Europe to help forge and maintain a wider coalition, particularly with key partners in the Middle East.

Europe, meanwhile, would like access to U.S. intelligence and satellite technology. It also needs the United States, along with Britain, to play the military heavy. Taking a backseat in direct military operations will alleviate domestic pressures in France and Germany and will also allow them to be more effective as liaisons with coalition members in the Middle East.

For any long-term anti-terrorism coalition to succeed, there must be an appropriate structure and a core of trust that allows for the sharing of intelligence across governments. These will take years to develop and will hinder the speed and effectiveness of anti-terrorism operations.

The best hope may be that the European Union successfully coordinates its internal law enforcement and intelligence mechanisms. With the evaporation of continental borders and the coming common currency, the arguments for continental Europe to coordinate its own intelligence are much more compelling than arguments to share it with the United States.

Unified and effective intelligence could put Europe on more equal footing with the United States – a goal the Continent has sought for decades.


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