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Tensions in Afghanistan and Pakistan are beginning to spill over into Kashmir, the disputed territory between India and Pakistan. But Washington will continue to support the government in Islamabad, which could spell trouble for the blooming strategic dialogue between India and the United States.
The increased diplomatic, economic and military ties between the United States and Pakistan will strain Washington’s relatively young strategic relationship with India.
The ruling party in New Delhi appears to understand the short-term nature of the U.S. shift toward Islamabad. But it will be hard pressed to maintain its pro-U.S. position under increasing domestic pressure.
The United States and India recently began exploring military and strategic cooperation after decades of cool relations. During the Cold War, the United States heavily supported India’s archrival Pakistan while New Delhi kept close ties with Moscow.
But a new relationship began forming with former U.S. President Bill Clinton’s visit to India in 2000 and extended this year to the planned visit of U.S. Gen. Henry Shelton, outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Shelton’s visit was formally aimed at restoring military ties between the two countries.
The motivation for this shift was largely due to Washington’s rising strategic concern with China. Many Indian officials already consider Beijing to be New Delhi’s largest threat, which is why Washington was seen as a natural ally.
But tactical needs following the Sept. 11 attacks forced the United States to refocus on its relationship with Pakistan. Pakistan has better connections and influence with the Taliban than any country in the region and can offer logistical support and air space for a possible U.S. strike against Afghanistan
In exchange for Pakistan’s cooperation, and to keep the government from falling into the hands of fundamentalists, Washington recently dropped sanctions against the country and is in deep negotiations on economic aid, military cooperation and debt restructuring.
At the same time, the United States politely refused India’s offers for port access for U.S. warships and basing agreements for U.S. aircraft. Both sides know the refusal isn’t personal but that it is meant to appease militant Pakistanis who fear a plot between Washington and New Delhi to dominate the region.
Recent statements from India’s ruling Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, think-tanks and newspaper editorials all acknowledge that U.S. attention to Pakistan in the short term does not necessarily preclude a long-term strategic relationship between Washington and India. But the strain on U.S.- Indian ties will intensify as the situation in Kashmir explodes.
The disputed territory is another hot spot that is near and dear to Pakistan’s extremist Islamic population, which wants to see Kashmir fully independent from India. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has been accused in the past of using Kashmir as a political safety valve, encouraging militant Pakistanis to fight the Indian security forces there rather than to focus their anger at the regime in Islamabad.
As the conflict in Afghanistan intensifies, Musharraf is likely to use similar tactics to preserve his government and bolster his credentials among extremist Muslims angered by his cooperation with the United States. On the other hand, continued violence in Kashmir or in the Indian heartland will undermine the already low credibility of India’s government.
The ruling coalition is still reeling from a series of scandals, ranging from the resignation of the defense minister, amid accusations of corruption, to revelations of stock-market rigging and major losses in India’s state-run mutual fund. Opinion polls in August also showed that Vajpayee’s personal popularity ratings have plummeted.
Despite Vajpayee’s move toward the United States, neither the Congress Party, India’s largest opposition party, nor the smaller Marxist parties are fans of a strategic relationship with Washington, and both will push Vajpayee to end his dialogue with America.
Vajpayee’s best hope is that a combination of U.S. covert military action and Afghan factional politics will keep the region relatively calm. This would take the pressure off Musharraf and keep militants out of Kashmir. But as Afghanistan explodes and Pakistan faces large-scale unrest, India’s government will jettison its public relationship with Washington to salvage its own future, delaying meaningful U.S.-Indian cooperation for years.
