Editor’s note: In partnership with Stratfor, the global intelligence company, WorldNetDaily publishes daily updates on international affairs provided by the respected private research and analysis firm. Look for fresh updates each afternoon, Monday through Friday. In addition, WorldNetDaily invites you to consider STRATFOR membership, entitling you to a wealth of international intelligence reports usually available only to top executives, scholars, academic institutions and press agencies.
As the world’s eyes turned toward Afghanistan and a U.S.-led war on terror, Iraq’s foreign ministry was upended and reshuffled. It now appears that Qusai Hussein, Saddam’s second son and likely successor, has taken actual control of the ministry laying the groundwork for the United States eventually to normalize relations with Iraq.
Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri al-Hadithi called on Muslim foreign ministers gathering in Qatar Oct. 9 to condemn U.S. strikes on Afghanistan, saying the United States could also target Iraq to settle old scores. Al-Hadithi was speaking before an emergency meeting of the 56-nation Organization of the Islamic Conference.
Most Iraq-watchers saw al-Hadithi as a chair-warmer when he was appointed foreign minister six months ago. But in recent days, he has overseen the largest reshuffle in the Iraqi Foreign Ministry since the 1991 Persian Gulf War. It now appears that Qusai Hussein, President Saddam Hussein’s heir apparent, has control of the ministry, with his loyalist al-Hadithi officially at the helm. Qusai’s move into foreign policy won’t make headlines, but it will be noted by state departments and foreign ministries from Washington to Tokyo. Qusai is as ruthless as his father but maintains a lower profile. More important, the United States and its allies have not demonized him. His ascendancy is an essential step for the eventual normalization of relations between Washington and Baghdad.
It is impossible to say at this point when Washington, focused on its new war against terrorism, will re-examine diplomatic priorities such as the standoff with Iraq. But lowering tensions with the Middle East nation whether in six months or six years could allow the United States to shed a diplomatic albatross that has hindered its relations with Muslim countries for a decade.
The foreign ministry reshuffle began in early October, when two senior deputies, Nabil al-Tikriti and Nuri al-Weiss, were sacked, according to the opposition Iraqi Press. Their departure was surprising, since the two leveraged their positions within Saddam’s clan to wield tremendous authority over Iraqi diplomacy. The deputies apparently ran afoul of al-Hadithi, who reportedly told Saddam in a letter that they prevented him from overhauling Iraqi diplomacy. This argument likely resonated with Saddam, who was reportedly incensed by his diplomatic corps’ inability to muster international consensus to end U.S. sanctions against Iraq.
Al-Hadithi had another element in his favor: his close relationship with Qusai. Details are scarce, but opposition reports suggest that Qusai sponsored al-Hadithi’s rise to power.
The younger of Saddam’s two sons, 35-year-old Qusai has spent the past decade building a power base in Iraq. He has almost total operational control over Iraq’s armed forces. Since 1995 he also has led efforts to conceal Iraq’s chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs, according to the U.S. State Department. The Iraq Press reports that Qusai recently spearheaded the plan to improve the Iraqi air defense system, which has downed three unmanned U.S. reconnaissance vehicles in the past few months.
This summer Qusai took on his first official role when he was elected to the Ba’ath party’s highest authority, its 18-member regional command. This occurred shortly after he was appointed a deputy commander of the Ba’ath military branch.
The diplomatic shakeout now gives Qusai de facto control over Iraq’s foreign policy apparatus, marking the first time he will have influence on policies that extend beyond Iraq’s borders. The elimination of competing power bases within the foreign ministry gives al-Hadithi, his loyal point man, a relatively free hand. And despite his inexperience, Qusai has the ability to secure many of Iraq’s foreign policy goals.
Possibly the biggest advantage Qusai has is that he is not his father. He does not carry the personal and diplomatic baggage that has kept Saddam and Iraq under sanctions and no-fly zone patrols for the past decade. Western governments and media have not demonized him to the point that it is now nearly impossible for Washington to back out of its policy on Iraq.
A diplomatic breakthrough won’t happen tomorrow or in the near future. But Qusai’s ascension marks a critical step in Iraq’s efforts to shed its pariah status.
Get a discounted annual STRATFOR membership.
