Ask almost anybody in an airport today whether they mind the long delays and they will tell you that they don’t because it is needed for security and that is now important to them. But these delays have added no substantial margin of safety to air travel.
Your immediate natural and fair response to this statement is likely, “But how can that be?” A first-hand look into the day-to-day function and organizational design of airport security will provide you with some real world insights into why it is the way it is.
To begin with, what is the present driver for having effective security? It is to prevent terrorists from using our aircraft as weapons again.
What are some of the things a terrorist must take into account when planning these kinds of assaults? Security is an obvious superficial answer, but that really revolves around the question of predictability. Any system that is predictable can be circumvented; it is uncertainty that is the factor that adds risk to their operations. Layers of uncertainty can add to the terrorist’s risks exponentially and harden a target considerably, but we will return to this after looking at what we have in place now.
There are some rules for airport security embedded in FAA regulations, but it is also the implementation by the airports and airlines that frame the organizational basis of the system. What is that underlying basis? It is a system based primarily on cost as opposed to any rational criteria of performance. The system now used to provide airport security is bid in the same manner as the contracting of commercial janitorial services. The lowest bidder wins. But what does that concept entail?
The contract fee covers rent, personnel, uniforms, insurance and the ever-invisible training that produces professional competence. Just as with any other contractor, the security companies must control costs. Since there are no standards for training or any real emphasis on competence this becomes one budgetary line item that is ripe for reduction.
Because the security company cannot stay in business if it does not turn a profit, salaries are routinely another area for cost reduction. For instance, at a mid-sized airport in the Southeast the average hourly wage for a security worker is $6.25, while that person’s supervisor makes $6.75. Comparing this wage scale to the $7.15 made by a 17-year-old high school student at a fast food store in the same locale makes the 200 percent employee turnover rate understandable, as well as the sadly predictable level of professional competence. You can only get what you are willing to pay for.
Even prior to the Sept. 11 attacks, it has been reliably reported that an organizational culture within the FAA routinely discouraged the reporting of security breaches. Given the level of public concern over airport security this entrenched culture has responded by burying adverse reports even more. Take, for example, a large Midwestern airport, where reported problems with equipment (explosives trace) and records keeping, as well as the handling of check points themselves, were not acted upon because the assumption of the need not to make security “look bad” took precedence over correcting performance deficiencies.
But what about the system of checks and balances created by FAA oversight of airport security?
When it is understood that it is the airline’s security contractor that pays the FAA’s fine in full to the airlines, while the airlines in turn then pay only a fraction of these fines to the U.S. government’s general fund, not to the FAA, the reality of the checks and balances take on a far different aspect. It can be viewed that this is in actual practice an airline profit center in and of itself and may provide an additional viable financial disincentive relative for improvement of security.
There is also the issue of contracted security screening companies, airport police and federal agencies working at cross-purposes. It would seem basic that there would be a unifying procedural document that all three would adhere to, but this seems to have been overlooked. Adding in the need to reduce waiting times for air travelers (a valid concern for both the customers and the airlines) is the response of harried supervisors who daily press for security people to “speed things up.” All in all, not an encouraging picture, is it?
OK, time to ask the $64,000 question: What do we do about this?
It has been suggested that the security system be federalized. Nope, don’t add another layer of bureaucracy to an already poorly designed and implemented system by newly hired managers who have no working knowledge of the scope or depth of problems inherent within it. Not a thrilling prospect when considering the historical effect upon performance that federalization has had (think new PC rules). This is a long-term issue and as any businessperson can tell you, placing a rush order on quick fixes without considering and addressing the fundamental causes brings its own substantial cost premiums and pitfalls.
That brings us back to what to do in the short term and the problems in implementing any terrorist attack. As predictability is what they need to make their plans, deny this to them while we make the FAA, airports and airlines fix their improperly designed and implemented system. Rapidly add a couple layers of truly randomly applied effective security checks and measures performed by teams of properly trained and equipped personnel. While playing hell with the terrorist’s ability to plan, it is an effective measure and can be applied relatively quickly when compared to fixing the systemic shortcomings described herein.
Costs should be contained and time is surely money, but these are not the only practical considerations. Performance counts too.
Note: Specific airports have not been named in this commentary, as this writer does not see the provision of that level of detail as presently appropriate for unlimited publication.
Tom Marzullo was a Special Forces soldier during Vietnam serving both on an A-Team and in MACVSOG. He completed his career in the U.S. Navy aboard submarines and was assigned to submarine special operations. He resides in Denver, Colo., with his bride of 21 years and their daughter.
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