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As Uzbek and Tajik factions of Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance posture and launch piecemeal assaults on Taliban positions, the Iranian-backed Hazara factions have done little.
This reticence could reflect political maneuvering by Iran. But signs are emerging that Tehran is neglecting the Afghan war because of its destabilizing impact on domestic politics.
Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance is preparing to launch simultaneous attacks on Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif, spokesman Haron Amin told reporters Nov. 5. Arif said the offensive could begin in about a week, but only if opposition forces receive additional weapons, supplies and air support from the United States.
Since Sept. 11, the Northern Alliance has staged a series of offensives against the Taliban in northern Afghanistan, though fitfully and with limited success. The opposition’s political and military activity has been concentrated among the Russian-backed Tajik and Uzbek factions of the Northern Alliance, with little apparent support from the Iranian-backed Hazaras. Though the limited showing of the Hazara on the battlefield could be the result of Tehran’s foreign policy maneuvering, it appears more likely that Iranian reticence stems from the war’s destabilizing impact on Iranian domestic politics.
Washington has expressed concern that U.S. military action in Afghanistan could spark threats from Islamic militants to the regimes of such regional allies as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Unexpectedly, it appears to be igniting a challenge to the Iranian regime from pro-Western factions. This will force the Iranian government to seek self-preservation by rallying behind a more hard-line, anti-U.S. position.
The Northern Alliance is a loose coalition of factions defined primarily by ethnicity: the Russian-backed Uzbek and Tajik forces and the Iranian-backed Hazaras. The relative inactivity on the part of the Hazaras may, however, be due partly to geography, since the Tajiks and Uzbeks enjoy access to supplies and media in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
But Iran apparently has made little effort to supply its proxies from the west, nor has it gone out of the way to encourage Hazaras to take part in the recent fighting. Moreover, the primarily Tajik and Pushtun forces of Ismail Khan, who draw some support from Iran, were forced to quickly call for assistance due to inadequate supplies when they attempted to join the battle. The only Iran-backed faction that seems eager to fight is the Hisb-i-Islami of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, who has openly suggested backing the Taliban against the United States.
Three explanations are possible for Iran’s reluctance to support the offensive in Afghanistan. First, Iran could anticipate the failure of military action by the Tajik, Uzbek and Pushtun forces of the Northern Alliance, and is therefore saving its assets for a better future opportunity.
If Iran thought the U.S.-backed offensive could succeed, it would certainly push the Hazaras to secure their share of territory and political clout in a post-Taliban Afghanistan. But the Northern Alliance, on the ropes as recently as early September, has had little time to improve its fighting capacity and has been soundly rebuffed in attacks on Mazar-e-Sharif. Poorly equipped and supplied and with limited U.S. air support, the Northern Alliance is unlikely to achieve major advances before next year.
Alternatively, Iran could be withholding the support of its proxies in an effort to cut a better political deal up front. The United States has been trying to broker a balanced post-Taliban power-sharing deal involving the Russian-sponsored Tajiks and Uzbeks and the Pakistani Pushtuns, but it has said little about the Hazaras.
This is odd, since the Hazaras – representing 19 percent of the population – are the third-largest ethnic group in Afghanistan after the Pushtuns and Tajiks. They outnumber Uzbeks by a factor of three. Their military force, the Hisb-i-Wahadat, is the second-largest faction in the Northern Alliance, with an estimated 8,000 soldiers. The Hazaras occupy a vast area of strategically important territory in central and western Afghanistan.
But it is increasingly evident that Tehran’s reluctance to become more fully involved in the war in Afghanistan stems less from its foreign policy concerns than from internal tension within Iran. The debate over how to react to U.S. action in Afghanistan is intensifying the existing internal dispute over whether or not to normalize relations with Washington.
Since the election of President Mohammad Khatami, public and often acrimonious debate over whether or not to seek rapprochement with the United States has gripped Iran.
On one side, Khatami and his supporters argue that Iran’s continued economic isolation and the resulting millions of unemployed youth threaten national stability and security. They argue that if some moderation politically and socially is required to end sanctions and lure investment, it would be a small price to pay for the survival of the regime.
On the other side, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei argues that to open a theocracy to compromise undermines the very justification for the regime and that rapprochement with the “Great Satan” will lead to the clerical regime’s downfall.
But the debate has not been contained within the clerical regime, nor do Khatami and Khamenei represent the most extreme positions. Both leaders have struggled to control extremist mobs that threaten to destabilize the government. Pro-reform students rioted in July 1999 after young conservative extremists and police raided a student dormitory and killed several students. The ensuing clashes forced Khatami and Khamenei to unite in the interest of stability and order. Mass demonstrations against economic hardship and inadequate public services in the summer of 2000 also threatened both factions.
U.S. military action in Afghanistan has reignited Iran’s internal struggle. Washington has forthrightly acknowledged that it is ready to re-evaluate relations with Iran. This opportunity has heartened those in Iran who seek to open a dialogue with the United States.
Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi told reporters in Japan Nov. 1 that Iran could have diplomatic relations with any nation but Israel. Heidar Ebrahim Salami, head of a foreign affairs commission in the Iranian parliament, argued it would serve Iran’s interests to hold direct talks with the United States over the future of Afghanistan. And Mohsen Rezai, current secretary of the Expediency Council and former head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, told the Financial Times that Iran could be willing to work with the United States against terrorism, perhaps even sharing intelligence.
Tehran reportedly has asked former Hezbollah security chief Imad Mughniyeh, who is wanted by the FBI, to leave the country. Iran has also reportedly withdrawn hundreds of Revolutionary Guard military advisers from Lebanon, Bosnia and elsewhere, and attempted to restrain the militant groups it supports. And Tehran reportedly offered to rescue any U.S. servicemen down inside Iranian territory.
However, the potential for normalized relations with America has also fueled public demonstrations in support of the United States and against the Iranian regime. Following the Sept. 11 attacks, spontaneous memorial vigils took place in Iran. Mass demonstrations followed Iran’s World Cup soccer losses to Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. In the latter case, the demonstrations turned violent, with Iranian youths attacking government buildings, burning police cars and chanting slogans against the clerical regime. The riots spread from Tehran to Abadan, Isfahan, Kerman and Mashad.
In the face of this unrest, conservatives have stepped up efforts to rein in the pro-Western movement. Khamenei has warned that any official publicly advocating diplomatic contacts with the United States will be sacked. Thousands of demonstrators have been arrested, and courts have reportedly been ordered to deal with them harshly.
Officials have confiscated thousands of satellite dishes – enforcing a 1995 ban that had been overlooked – and quashing broadcasts from Iranian opposition groups based in the United States. Conservative newspapers have railed against cooperation with the United States, focusing on civilian casualties in Afghanistan and alleged U.S. ulterior motives in the region. And the Iranian government has opened the former U.S. Embassy in Tehran as a museum of U.S. crimes against Iran and the world.
The net result of this unresolved conflict has been limited and disjointed involvement by Iran and its proxies in Afghanistan. As Iran’s leaders focus on quelling opposition to the regime, they will only be more reluctant to cooperate in any way with the United States in Afghanistan or in general. Conservatives and reformers alike will have to focus on condemning the bombing of civilians and the overall U.S. war effort in Afghanistan, appealing at the same time for Islamic unity. As the United States gets bogged down, it will only perpetuate this Iranian position.
Paradoxically, the conflict in Afghanistan should logically drive the United States and Iran together, but that potential is too destabilizing and will instead tend to drive the countries apart.
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