Strategic retreat

You may have noticed the anguished cries emanating from the legions of arms-control – aka “disarmament” – weenies scattered around the world, caused by the stated intention of President Bush to withdraw from the ABM treaty. You can see why they’re anguished: According to them, the world was already on its way to hell in a wheelbarrow because President Bush had refused to subject us to the Kyoto Protocols on global warming. Now, in their minds, all-out thermonuclear war is about to break out any minute between the United States and Russia, and no one will be around to see whether or not they were right about global warming.

As to the ABM treaty, wherein Nixon and Breznev each agreed to leave their respective homelands absolutely defenseless against attack by “strategic” ballistic missiles, it’s high time someone abrogated it. You see, the ABM treaty prohibits even the development or testing of any mobile land-based, sea-based, air-based or space-based ABM systems and their components that could be used to defend us against “strategic” ballistic missiles.

What is this thing called a “strategic” ballistic missile that we’re not allowed to defend ourselves against? Well, way back in 1972, when the ABM treaty went into effect, the only “strategic” ballistic missiles were those intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles that could deliver a nuke warhead to the heartland of America or Mother Russia. But, because of the way the ABM treaty is written, it turns out that it is where the ballistic missile warhead actually impacts – or was intended to impact – that really matters. That is, it doesn’t much matter where the missile was originally launched, or who launched it.

So, as defined by the ABM treaty, what is a “strategic” ballistic missile? Essentially, it’s one whose warhead impacts – or was intended to impact – either the United States or Russia.

Now there are four ways to destroy a ballistic missile and/or its warhead: (a) before launch, when the missile is in a silo or aboard some mobile launcher; (b) shortly after missile launch, while in the boost phase; (c) after boost, when the warhead has been detached and is in its exo-atmospheric trajectory or (d) when the warhead is re-entering the atmosphere for its “terminal” dive.

Back in 1972, “terminal” ABM defense was the only option seriously considered, and the principal impetus for the ABM treaty was that both sides considered terminal defense to be both prohibitively expensive to mount and relatively easy to defeat.

But as has become more and more apparent, especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ABM treaty not only prevents us from defending our homeland against Russia’s strategic missiles, but now effectively prevents us from defending ourselves against anyone’s strategic missiles. In particular, President Clinton wasn’t able to get away with claiming – as he tried to do – that the limited ABM system he was building in Alaska was allowed by the ABM treaty because it was intended to defend us against North Korean, not Russian, ICBMs.

In the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein launched about 90 Scud ballistic missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia. Is a Scud – which has a range of only a few hundred miles – a strategic ballistic missile? Well, according to the ABM treaty definition, it appears that it can be if – and only if – its warhead impacts our homeland or Mother Russia.

If Castro launches a Scud and its warhead impacts Florida, then – strictly speaking – the original U.S.-Soviet ABM treaty wouldn’t allow us to defend ourselves against it. We wouldn’t even be allowed to develop the capability to defend ourselves against it.

As long as the ABM treaty remains in force – and is enforced by nit-pickers – it appears that we are at the mercy of the Cubans, Mexicans, Canadians and any passing ship captain who happens to have a Scud on board.

Well, it may be that such silliness is the reason that both Bush and Putin – and some of our NATO allies – had already embraced the concept of boost-phase interception of ballistic missiles. The attractiveness of boost phase interception – probably ship-based, and hence prohibited by the ABM treaty – should have been the basis for Bush and Putin agreeing to put aside the ABM treaty.

Unfortunately, it appears that the reason we are withdrawing from the ABM treaty is so we can proceed with President Clinton’s hare-brained, exo-atmospheric, mid-course interception scheme, with interceptors based in Alaska, supposedly to defend us against North Korean ICBMs. No wonder Putin is opposed to that.