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The United States has shifted its focus in the war against terrorism from Afghanistan to the Middle East, where it must rely upon local governments to prevent al-Qaida from regrouping. Washington will now step up demands for cooperation as well as intimidation tactics, further damaging already strained relations with Middle Eastern countries.
U.S. Navy officials forcibly boarded an Iranian tanker flying the flag of Belize on Dec. 19, using explosives to open a door after the crew refused to cooperate. Swiss Ambassador to Iran Tim Guldimann, who represents U.S. interests in Tehran, claimed the Navy had mistaken the vessel for a tanker smuggling illegal Iraqi crude, though it proved to be carrying Saudi crude from the port of Jibeir to the Abadan refinery in southern Iran.
The aggressive tactics used in boarding the Iranian ship are not unusual for the United States, but they are indicative of heightened tension in the Persian Gulf. U.S. forces on the lookout for al-Qaida fighters fleeing Afghanistan have raised their alert level throughout the region and are now turning to regional governments to act as proxies in the war against terrorism. The interdiction of the oil tanker is the first of what will likely be a series of incidents that will aggravate U.S. relations with Middle Eastern governments.
Washington is now employing a two-pronged strategy to secure anti-terrorism cooperation from these governments: It is intimidating foes and pressuring allies to step up their own counter-terrorism efforts. But local political and military realities – as well as growing anti-American sentiments – will limit what Middle Eastern regimes can do to help capture al-Qaida fighters. In Saudi Arabia, for instance, the government recently arrested hundreds of rioters in the port city of Jeddah. Domestic political concerns, however, would prevent Riyadh from extraditing suspected al-Qaida members or even allowing U.S. intelligence to question them.
The Taliban’s loss of power in Afghanistan and the deployment of U.S. and allied forces has left al-Qaida’s Arab members with no place to go but home. Most of al-Qaida’s senior leadership and a vast majority of its fighters were so-called Afghan Arabs – fighters from Arab nations in the Middle East – rather than Afghans or Pakistanis.
Firm numbers are not available, but at least two-thirds of al-Qaida’s 30 senior leaders remain unaccounted for, the Scottish daily The Herald reported Dec. 18. According to other reports, at least 2,000 al-Qaida fighters fled to Pakistan, where only a few hundred have been arrested. Though hundreds may still be hiding in Afghanistan and Pakistan, others reportedly are returning to their own countries or other Middle Eastern states where the United States would find it difficult to reach them. As a result, Washington is beefing up its interdiction efforts in the region. Washington also is combining political pressure with intimidation to gain the cooperation of regional governments.
The United States is circumspect toward Iran. For instance, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice recently reiterated allegations that the Iranian government was involved in the bombing of a U.S. military barracks in Saudi Arabia in 1996. These statements, combined with the interdiction of the Iranian oil vessel, seem a subtle warning to Iran that Washington is edging toward a more hostile stance.
Where Iraq is concerned, Washington is being much more explicit. In early December, the United States moved the headquarters of its Third Army division to Kuwait, bolstering its troops along the Iraqi border. Leaks to the U.S. press suggest that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are reviewing a plan to invade the country. The moves are at least part bluff. Washington has little international support at the moment for an invasion of Iraq, and plenty of opposition. Nonetheless, the buildup is intended as a warning to Baghdad that the United States would invade at the slightest hint the Iraqi government was harboring al-Qaida fighters.
For its allies, the United States is negotiating counter-terrorism deals and pressuring regimes to crack down on suspected Islamic militants. For instance, Washington has offered Yemen $130 million for its fight against terrorism, and it has asked the government in Sanaa to allow U.S. Marines to hunt alongside Yemeni security forces for al-Qaida fighters, the Associated Press reports. In Somalia, U.S. intelligence and military officials already have been deployed to gain the cooperation of southern-based groups that might offer sanctuary to al-Qaida militants.
Despite the tactics of intimidation, pressure and cooperation, Washington’s hands basically are tied once al-Qaida members reach their home countries. There is little Washington can do in places like Saudi Arabia or Egypt, where political realities prevent the regimes from allowing U.S. forces to conduct search-and-destroy missions. Though Riyadh and Cairo already have begun conducting sweeps, arresting hundreds of suspected militants, neither of these countries are likely to extradite suspected al-Qaida members to the United States.
In countries like Yemen, Algeria or Somalia, Washington may have more room to maneuver – but even there chances of capturing key fighters are reduced. Though the governments in Sanaa, Algiers and Mogadishu may wish to prevent al-Qaida fighters from taking sanctuary, they exert little control outside the capitals.
The United States has fewer options – both politically and militarily – in the Middle East than it had in Afghanistan. Washington cannot conduct military operations in most Middle Eastern countries, rendering it almost wholly reliant upon its allies in the region to capture al-Qaida fighters.
By adopting a hard-line stance – the “either with us or with the terrorists” position the Bush administration assumed after Sept. 11 – the United States demonstrates that it will accept nothing less than full cooperation from its Middle Eastern friends and foes. But such a strategy could easily backfire, ruining U.S. relations with Middle Eastern allies like Saudi Arabia or even Yemen.
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