Suddenly, it’s Iran, not Iraq

By Gordon Prather

According to the Washington Post, Israeli Prime Minister Sharon and Defense Minister Binyamin ben Eliezer were in Washington this week attempting to convince the Bush administration that Iran poses a greater threat to Israel than does the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein.

Howzat? Well, for one thing, ben Eliezer reportedly believes that Iran will have nuclear weapons by the year 2005. George Tenet, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, apparently agrees, although his report to Congress says, “Tehran may be able to indigenously produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon by late this decade.”

And what about Iraq? As it happens, International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors verified just last week that the fissile material stored at Iraq’s Tuwaitha facility since 1981 has not been diverted to non-peaceful purposes.

Tuwaitha, which was destroyed during the Gulf War, is also where the Iraqis attempted to produce their own highly enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons, in violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. After the IAEA discovery of the Iraqi clandestine nuclear weapons program, additional protocols to the treaty were developed to prevent signatories from making such efforts in the future by giving the agency’s inspectors the ability to check out any suspicious activity or facility.

Although the agency’s board of governors adopted the Model Additional Protocol in 1997, most signatories to the treaty have not formally agreed to it. In particular, Iraq has not, so agency inspectors did not have the authority to demand to see everything they wanted to see last month.

However, U.N. Resolution 687, adopted in 1991, makes even more demands on Iraq than do the nonproliferation treaty’s additional protocols. The resolution requires that Iraq dispose of its safeguarded materials and refrain from rebuilding nuclear facilities destroyed during the Gulf War.

Resolution 687 does not apply only to nuclear weapons but also to chemical and biological weapons, for which inspections were conducted until December 1998. The IAEA inspectors determined that the Iraqis were complying with the nuclear provisions; however, since many chem-bio production facilities are virtually indistinguishable from genuine commercial facilities, the inspectors were never able to be sure that Iraq was in compliance with the chem-bio provisions of the U.N. resolution. Nor has Saddam allowed additional U.N. inspectors since 1998.

However, the IAEA was allowed to conduct its regular nonproliferation inspections in 2000, 2001 and 2002, and the agency is ready to resume its U.N. verification activities in Iraq, monitoring the disposition of Iraqi nuclear materials and verifying that no nuclear facilities are being constructed.

Since Iraq was in compliance with Resolution 687’s requirements in 1998, and has been bombed on numerous occasions over the past three years, Tenet doubts that Saddam has been able to produce much fissile material. In fact, Tenet’s chief concern is that Saddam might somehow acquire fissile material from outside Iraq.

Where would Saddam find it?

Like Iraq, Iran has not signed the Model Additional Protocol. But since 1993, Iraq’s arch-enemy has expressed a willingness to allow agency inspectors to look for “undeclared” nuclear material or clandestine nuclear activities. Therefore, if the inspectors have been competent, it should not be possible for Iran to divert its nuclear materials and technologies, much of which has been provided by Russia, to non-peaceful uses.

Nevertheless, in answer to a question about Iran’s nuclear capabilities, Tenet suggested last week to the Senate Intelligence Committee that Iran might still be able to make nuclear weapons from clandestinely produced fissile materials and sell them or the fissile material to Iraq.

Now Presidents Putin and Bush have declared that “urgent attention must be given to improving the physical protection and accounting of nuclear materials of all possessor States, and preventing illicit trafficking.” That statement goes beyond merely verifying compliance with treaties and protocols. The two presidents have also agreed to cooperate with the IAEA in order to prevent nuclear weapons and material from getting loose in signatory states which are subject to agency inspections.

This means that Putin and Bush will require the “Axis of Evil,” Iran, Iraq and North Korea, to make themselves subject to the nonproliferation treaty’s Model Additional Protocol as soon as possible. Then it will be up to the IAEA to verify that Iran, Iraq and North Korea are not making or trafficking in illicit nukes.

And what happens if the agency discovers illicit activity that could lead to a terrorist getting his hands on a nuke? In the words of President Bush, “They’ll find out.”

Gordon Prather

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Physicist James Gordon Prather has served as a policy implementing official for national security-related technical matters in the Federal Energy Agency, the Energy Research and Development Administration, the Department of Energy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of the Army. He also served as legislative assistant for national security affairs to U.S. Sen. Henry Bellmon, R-Okla. Dr. Prather had earlier worked as a nuclear weapons physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California and Sandia National Laboratory in New Mexico. Read more of Gordon Prather's articles here.