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Due to the split between the State Department and Pentagon – which already has led to two U.S. foreign-policy embarrassments this year: the failed coup in Venezuela and an inability to form a coherent plan regarding Iraq – the White House may be forced to finally make clear what direction U.S. foreign policy will take, according to Stratfor, the global intelligence company.
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Recent tussles between Colin Powell's State Department and Donald Rumsfeld's Pentagon have not exactly been well-kept secrets. While infighting and power grabs are nothing new to Washington, the effects of the disagreements within the Bush administration have moved beyond the Beltway and are beginning to hinder U.S. foreign policy.
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President George W. Bush generally has been praised for his hands-off management style, which delegates authority and decision-making down to subordinate levels. However, holding a relatively loose rein has caused two policy fiascos in a row. Infighting and competition between the State Department and the Pentagon crippled the U.S. response to the attempted coup against Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez last month and are hamstringing Washington's ability to work with opposition groups inside Iraq.
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While the top policymakers in the White House are uniformly hawkish on Iraq, they disagree about the best way to depose Saddam Hussein. The Pentagon favors allying with the Iraqi National Congress, or INC – a weak and disorganized coalition of opposition groups – and using it as political cover for a military campaign that would leave the United States heavily involved in governing Iraq after the war. The State Department leans toward subtler methods, including working with former members of the Iraqi military in hopes of fostering a coup – or at least whittling away at Hussein's support base.
In essence, the Pentagon espouses an aggressive, unilateral foreign policy, while the State Department continues to voice concerns over the potential for destabilization across the Middle East that a conventional military campaign against Baghdad may cause. The implications of the debate between State and Defense go far beyond the elimination of the Hussein regime. Whatever method Washington uses will have profound effects on its relations with the rest of the Middle East and will serve as a model for U.S. foreign policy for years to come.
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Neither State nor Defense has been able to overcome the resistance to the other's plans, but each has been able to scuttle the other's efforts. The State Department controls the funding for the INC, due to an act of Congress, and has begun cutting off the group's resources. The INC-operated satellite channel Liberty TV ceased broadcasting into Iraq late last month, and the rebel group plunged $2 million in debt after State cut off funding in February in a dispute over accounting procedures.
The cuts came after the cancellation in February of a conference of Iraqi opposition leaders – mostly ex-generals – that the State Department wanted organized by the Middle East Institute think tank. The conference was canceled after INC supporters in Congress froze its $5 million budget, with the support of the Pentagon.
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The Iraqi infighting occurred at nearly the same time Washington fumbled the near-coup in Venezuela. Although the details remain murky, it appears that several U.S. agencies, including State and Defense, gave moral (if not material) support to multiple factions inside Venezuela. As Chavez fell, the factions spent more time bickering amongst themselves – several may have believed they had the sole support of the U.S. – rather than guarding against Chavez's counter-coup.
So far, the result of the State-Defense split has been Chavez's renewal of his lease on power and the crippling of U.S. interaction with the Iraqi opposition. The situation is an annoyance during peacetime but intolerable during time of war. The potential future scenarios are: a continued split, damaging U.S. policy on covert operations, or a final decision from the White House about whose foreign policy vision will be the U.S. model, that of the State Department or the Pentagon.
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