Pakistan bombing blunder by militants?

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An apparent suicide bombing left at least 11 French workers and two Pakistanis dead in Karachi today. Although both French and Pakistani officials quickly pointed the finger at al-Qaida, the operation is more likely the work of a local militant group.

This attack demonstrates clear differences between the central al-Qaida leadership and the agendas of smaller militant groups.

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According to local reports, a car full of explosives rammed a Pakistani navy minibus in front of the Sheraton hotel as French engineers and workers were boarding. The French staff is working on Pakistan's submarine program at the naval shipyards.

French and Pakistani officials quickly fingered al-Qaida as a top suspect in the attack, the third this year against Western targets in Pakistan, following the murder of U.S. reporter Daniel Pearl and the grenade attack against a Protestant church in Islamabad. This bombing, however, has the earmarks of a locally planned operation rather than the work of al-Qaida's central leadership.

Whereas al-Qaida operates on a global scale, choosing its targets and operations based on a broader strategy, local groups that are sympathetic to the network take a more tactical approach, which could prove detrimental to al-Qaida's agenda.

By targeting a bus full of French nationals, the attackers committed a serious miscalculation. France has thus far remained largely ambiguous as to its role in the global war against terrorism, but the killing of French civilians likely will lead to a major shift in the country's support and cooperation. It could also trigger a swift and harsh response from the Pakistani government, as the militants hit one of the military's major development programs – one that was intended to offer Islamabad greater leverage in a potential confrontation with neighboring India.

From the attackers' point of view, the bombing was a prime opportunity to make a clear statement against Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and his perceived acquiescence to the goals of the United States. A bus full of Western foreigners, parked in front of a hotel full of foreigners, was too good a target to pass up.

This is not to suggest that the operation was a spur-of-the-moment decision, rather that it was planned to make a maximum impact on the psyche of foreigners in Karachi – thus disrupting financial and political support for the Musharraf regime.

But the attack also shows the tactical nature of the planning. Localized militant groups, perhaps sympathetic with al-Qaida but not likely controlled by the network, see their target sets within their own field of vision, which is often extremely limited geographically.

Their primary goal was to hit foreigners in Karachi. Unfortunately for them, they could not have picked a worse group of foreigners to kill, as they have now incited the wrath of the Pakistani military establishment and effectively drawn Paris into closer alignment with Washington's anti-terrorism strategy.

Al-Qaida's central leadership takes a much more strategic than tactical view when planning operations. Al-Qaida chooses from a global target set, carefully selecting the attack that will have the greatest impact on the United States, the international Islamic community and U.S.-Saudi ties. It then carefully and meticulously plans the operation, a process that in the past has often taken more than a year.

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For al-Qaida's central leadership, an attack in Pakistan may be useful, given the level of Islamabad's cooperation with Washington and imminent joint U.S.-Pakistani military operations in the border regions with Afghanistan. However, the attack, and the reaction it generates in France and Pakistan, is counterproductive to al-Qaida's goals and may even strip away some of the support for the militant groups that has existed within the Pakistani military.

Al-Qaida's central leadership has carried out a series of high-profile, high-impact operations, including the simultaneous attacks on two U.S. embassies in Africa, the bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen and the simultaneous hijackings of four passenger airliners to strike the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Since Sept. 11, al-Qaida sympathizers have carried out other attacks as well, though they have been much more tactical in nature – from the killing of German tourists in an explosion in Tunisia to the bombing of the French engineers in Karachi.

This is the fundamental difference between the core of al-Qaida and satellite groups sympathetic with it, and it presents a problem for nations looking to counter al-Qaida and related militant organizations.

Although al-Qaida's actions are not entirely predictable, they are highly intensive and require much time to plan and execute. While local groups taking advantage of the global campaign against al-Qaida will continue to operate on a narrower scope, their attacks will be more frequent and harder to prevent.

Although some of these attacks – like the strike on the French workers – may prove counterproductive, the overall effect will leave U.S. coalition partners distracted from the central goal of destroying the al-Qaida network; they will have no choice but to deal with localized militant and terrorist threats simultaneously.

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