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Venezuela is rapidly becoming more politically unstable as President Hugo Chavez, who weeks ago survived a coup attempt, sits on a social and military powder keg that could explode at the slightest misstep or provocation by any of the pro- or anti-Chavez groups battling for political power, says Stratfor, the global intelligence company.
Stratfor sources in Caracas report that tensions within the armed forces, known as FAN, are reaching dangerously high levels as Chavez purges senior generals and colonels. Dozens of officers have been relieved of their commands at garrisons throughout the country simply on suspicion of disloyalty to Chavez.
The purge is only one of several factors that stand to endanger Chavez’s relationship with the military, where anger already was mounting over poor military housing and Chavez’s flirtations with Cuban leader Fidel Castro and Colombian rebels. Now, testimony from an army general who once was considered one of the president’s closest friends is yet one more indication that Chavez is losing his allies within the FAN. Losing the military’s backing completely would hasten the president’s departure from office.
Although it was meant to strengthen Chavez’s support base within the FAN, the post-coup purge reportedly has affected dozens of officers who had no direct involvement in the ouster attempt but who now face the possibility of abruptly terminated military careers and negative economic consequences for their families. That, combined with resentment at seeing less-qualified colleagues promoted on the basis of political loyalty, is causing tempers to flare at many military garrisons.
Chavez’s increasingly fragile relations with the FAN were further undermined May 10 at congressional hearings on the facts surrounding the April 11 violence in Caracas. Several protesters were killed in clashes between pro- and anti-Chavez groups in the hours leading up to the coup.
During more than nine hours of nationally televised testimony, Army Gen. Manuel Rosendo – who was chief of the FAN’s unified command (CUFAN) on April 11 and was widely considered a loyal friend to Chavez – described in rich detail how Chavez and top military and political officials planned several days in advance to use the National Guard, army units and armed Bolivarian Circles to suppress a strike at Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) and break up a peaceful anti-Chavez protest on April 11.
For example, Rosendo was present at an April 7 meeting with Chavez, the FAN high command and then-PDVSA President Gaston Parra Luzardo to discuss contingency plans for managing the oil industry strike. Several MVR officials, including Assembly members Maduro and Flores, showed up with a seven-point plan to employ armed Bolivarian Circle militias to disrupt the strike and any street protests against the government. Rosendo said the attorney general was present but did not raise any legal objections while the MVR group proposed its solution for the PDVSA strike.
Rosendo also said that on April 10 he learned for the first time of a plan hatched by Gen. Francisco Belisario Landis to use National Guard (NG) units to break up the PDVSA strike, which had succeeded in massing thousands of company employees and their families and supporters outside PDVSA’s main office buildings in Caracas. Rosendo and other FAN officers objected that they had not been informed of the NG plan, as required by national security protocols for dealing with violent street demonstrations.
Belisario Landis reportedly replied that since information protocols had not been followed, he would not execute the orders he had received from Chavez. However, Belisario Landis was forced to back off anyway when nearly all of his generals also objected to the plan to use force, since that would harm the NG’s public image.
Rosendo testified that he was at FAN Inspector General Lucas Rincon Romero’s office in Caracas on April 11. There, he witnessed then-Defense Minister Jose Vicente Rangel speaking by telephone with Libertador Municipality Mayor Freddy Bernal and issuing orders to deploy the Bolivarian Circles to defend Miraflores presidential palace against the oncoming anti-Chavez march. Rosendo said he objected strongly, sought a personal meeting with Chavez and submitted his resignation as chief of the CUFAN if the Bolivarian Circles were not withdrawn immediately from the streets. Chavez reportedly replied that the militias would be pulled back, and Rosendo left the palace.
However, Rosendo said he received a telephone call a short time later from one of his executive officers who reported overhearing Rangel calling Bernal again and confirming his earlier orders to “bring our people to Miraflores, armed with clubs, bottles and knives.” Stratfor confirmed May 13 that the officer who overheard Rangel, an army captain, refused to retract his story when pressured to do so by Lucas Rincon and National Assembly member Tarek Saab Williams. The officer instead has declared his willingness to repeat the allegations under oath.
Rosendo admitted during his testimony that he refused a direct order from Chavez to execute the Avila Plan, which calls for using armored vehicles and massed concentrations of soldiers to control large-scale unrest and rioting. Rosendo justified his refusal by arguing that the anti-Chavez protest was peaceful until Bolivarian Circle militias opened fire. After that, he said, it would have been folly to insert heavily armed soldiers into a confrontation where it was unclear just who they would be trying to suppress and control.
Rosendo’s detailed testimony described what appears to have been a deliberate strategy by Chavez to deploy overwhelming military force against some 500,000 peaceful protesters – for the purpose of quelling violence that would have been triggered by pro-Chavez militias orchestrated by then-Defense Minister Rangel and senior elected officials. The plan to crush Chavez’s political opponents with massive firepower failed because Rosendo and other officers refused to obey presidential orders.
This evidence directly contradicts statements by Chavez, Rangel and other senior government officials that the president was the target of a planned coup attempt that day. It also raises questions about their potential legal and political liability for ordering measures that caused the gunfire in downtown Caracas.
As the National Assembly hearings into the events of April 11 continue, the Chavez regime is struggling to contain the damage and distance itself from allegations of high-level government ties with the Bolivarian Circles. Chavez also is trying to deflect public attention in Venezuela away from his regime’s role in the violence by indirectly accusing the United States of supporting the planning and execution of the failed coup.
However, this fallback strategy likely will fail in Caracas, where Chavez’s days in the presidency are clearly numbered. The conditions of political instability are now such that it no longer is a question of whether Chavez will leave office, but rather the manner in which he goes.
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