Exile for Saddam?

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U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has raised the possibility that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein could abdicate and submit as an alternative to military action, reports Stratfor, the global intelligence agency.

But the exile strategy raises several problems, says Stratfor. If read as a sign of U.S. weakness, Rumsfeld's statement could prompt Hussein to dig in deeper.

It also is not clear that the Bush administration would be satisfied with anything less than Hussein's clear defeat – or that anyone could provide the Iraqi leader with the amnesty he would demand as a condition for regime change.

Before Desert Storm, a diplomatic flurry arose around the possibility that Hussein might abdicate. Yesterday, Rumsfeld raised that possibility again, saying that one way to avoid war would be for Hussein to resign and submit to exile. Significantly, Rumsfeld included the leader's family in the exile plan, making it clear that his sons and other relatives would have to leave Iraq with him.

Hussein obviously was not attracted by the possibility of exile in 1990 and 1991. He gambled that he would be able to survive the war, and he proved to be right. However, he might read the current situation differently, believing himself to be in greater danger and therefore taking exile more seriously. There also is a very real possibility that he might read Rumsfeld's statement as a sign of U.S. weakness.

If Hussein interprets the statement as an expression of hope that he might submit to exile, thereby allowing the United States to avoid the dangers of war, he might conclude that Washington is more averse to war than it appears and is looking for victory without conflict. That might cement him into position.

If, on the other hand, he reads it as Rumsfeld hopes – that exile is simply one possibility on the table but that Washington is neither hopeful nor terribly excited about the prospect – then, coupled with a sense that defeat is inevitable, there is a small chance Hussein might consider the option.

The fact is, abdication and exile might not be what the United States wants. Washington may want him not only defeated, but defeated in a certain way – very publicly and very thoroughly. The United States wants to demonstrate its power to an Islamic world that has been told by al-Qaida that America is not nearly as powerful as might be believed. For Washington, having Saddam walk away in a deal might not be as attractive as having him defeated.

Lurking behind all of this is a growing international relations dilemma: the emergence of international tribunals on war crimes and the intervention of national judiciaries claiming civil and criminal jurisdiction over political crimes in other countries.

If the United States were inclined to negotiate for Hussein's exile, it is not clear that it would be able to enforce any agreement it reached. Hussein would not go into exile without a guarantee of amnesty, and Washington could not unilaterally guarantee him anything.

It is not even clear that the United Nations would be able to keep the Spanish magistrate who pursued former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet and former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger from demanding Hussein's extradition. The gassing of Kurdish rebels certainly would be the pretext.

The exile strategy, therefore, brings up three problems. First, simply raising exile as a possibility might lower the probability that Hussein would submit to such a plan, since he might view it as an admission of U.S. weakness. Second, Washington may not want the Iraqi leader's ouster through negotiations; it might want a demonstrable victory. Finally, it is not clear that anyone can guarantee Hussein what he undoubtedly will require: freedom from prosecution.

Still, Rumsfeld mentioned exile, and it has to be something that Hussein and his inner circle are at least considering as an option, however far down the list. For all the difficulties of this path, it cannot be dismissed as a possible outcome.

Where the Iraqi leader might be allowed to go is, of course, another question. It is not clear who would want him. South Africa was on the table in 1990 but is not likely to be there now. Most countries that would consider hosting Hussein are countries that might cause him to conclude that he'd rather be dead.

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