Iraqi overthrow of Saddam not likely

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Washington is facing a dilemma about whether to depend on factions of the Iraqi army to rise up and overthrow Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, says Stratfor, the global intelligence agency.

In the end the United States will launch a conventional war while using Iraqi opposition members as an auxiliary force, which will likely cause Iraqi citizens to rally around Hussein in defending their country from invasion, Stratfor says.

Former Iraqi Gen. Nizar al-Khazraji, the chief of staff in Baghdad during the Persian Gulf War and now in exile in Denmark, recently warned that a U.S.-led invasion of Iraq would spell a "very dark future for all," while saying that the Iraq army is the best hope for bringing down Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, the BBC reports.

Washington would prefer for both military and political reasons that the Iraqis themselves overthrow Hussein. But unsure about the success and consequences of such a scenario, the Bush administration instead will proceed with a conventional war-fighting strategy. Iraq's armed opposition will be used as an auxiliary force, while the possibility that the country's army will topple Hussein during the war will remain the best, but still uncertain, hope to finish the battle quickly.

But an invasion by U.S. forces also likely will cause many Iraqis to rally around Hussein, leaving no easy solution and a big, messy war ahead: all of the U.S. might on one side and millions of Iraqis on the other.

If officials in the Iraqi army got rid of Hussein, it certainly would save Washington a lot of trouble, including serious military casualties. The Iraqi option would bring significant geopolitical benefits, too. Without the need for extensive U.S. air power or major deployments of U.S. forces, the backlash against Washington in the Muslim world would be avoided, and the U.S. relationship with its Arab allies would be preserved.

There would also be a much lower risk of damage to oil infrastructure in the region due to collateral damage caused by U.S. bombing and desperate acts of destruction by Hussein if he feels he is close to losing the battle.

However, the Bush administration is not likely to give the Iraqi opposition a chance. The likelihood of a successful revolt by Iraqi exiles and soldiers without the direct support of U.S. forces is low. Al-Khazraji volunteered to lead a rebel army into the country consisting of a couple of thousand or so former Iraqi officers who defected abroad and who would command several thousand Sunni Iraqi emigrants in the best-case scenario.

Iraqi Kurd and Shiite populations both oppose the Sunni-minority government represented by Hussein, but this has long been the case, and Hussein is still in power. They are unlikely to join the ranks of an opposition army. Moreover, Kurds accuse al-Khazraji and virtually all other Iraqi officers, be they in exile or still in the country, of war crimes committed against them for decades. So al-Khazraji would have to rely only on Iraqi Sunni emigrants.

This would leave him with a force not nearly big enough to defeat the Iraqi army. The likelihood of mass desertions from the army once the general's army crosses the border is extremely low, while the probability that just one brigade of Iraqi Republican Guard Corps will crash the armed opposition within days is very high.

A rebellion against Hussein by active-duty officers is the best hope for al-Khazraji and Washington. While in exile Al-Khazraji ideally preserved links with some current Iraq commanders who could rebel either on their own or in conjunction with the opposition army as it makes a thrust from the borders. However, the total control that Hussein and his security apparatus exercise over the armed forces drastically decreases the chances of successfully organizing an armed coup.

Furthermore, Hussein has replaced the army's senior- and middle-officer corps several times since al-Khazraji emigrated. Whatever ties he had are most likely broken, and there are few that remain who wish to risk their lives for such a precarious plan.

Washington also must think about the consequences of this option. Even if the Bush administration manages to get all disunited anti-Hussein opposition groups to act at the same time, their forces would not be strong enough to defeat Iraq's military machine. But even if a military coup against Hussein were to succeed, this would most likely force an ethnic civil war in the country.

Kurds would fight for their independence and never bow to a new Sunni government in Baghdad, especially if there are no U.S. forces supporting the new regime. The Shiites, Iraq's religious majority, would also secede and probably start a war for control of all Arab-populated areas of Iraq.

So in order to secure the complete success of its Iraq plans, the United States is likely to go ahead with its own massive attack while also using Iraqi armed opposition forces.

However, according to a detailed military plan presented to President George W. Bush by the Pentagon, it seems that the ousting of Hussein by Iraqi army commanders is seen as the only practical solution to the question of how to take Baghdad and successfully finish the war without major casualties, the New York Times recently reported. London's The Daily Telegraph also reported Sept. 24 that Gen. Tommy Franks, head of the U.S. Central Command, plans not to target Iraqi army soldiers specifically in the hope that they will defect.

But in defending Baghdad, Hussein will use only his most loyal units, such as Republican Guards brigades. Although some Iraqi commanders may well entertain thoughts of dealing with Hussein when the U.S. bombs fall, these officers would not get an opportunity to get close enough to him to attack. Moreover, they would not even know where he and his inner circle are located at that point. So although desertions of whole units are possible, the overthrowing of Hussein by Iraqi officers is much less likely.

Although U.S. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice recently said that the United States wishes to be seen as "liberators" promoting "democratization or the march of freedom in the Muslim world," the rest of the Arab world is unlikely to see this, especially during an Iraq war.

Many Iraqis support Hussein more out of fear than love, but they also have little love for the United States. They blame Washington for the enormous hardships suffered during the U.S.-imposed sanctions regime, including -- as alleged by U.S. and international human rights groups -- hundreds of thousands dead from starvation due to blockades and many civilian casualties as a result of U.S. bombings.

When the war starts, Iraqi soldiers and the populace will see American forces as invaders and occupants, and many will rally around Hussein as the only leader capable of offering an organized and strong resistance to "foreign oppressors."

History is full of examples of citizens uniting even behind dictators against foreign invaders. For example, when Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, Russians and people in other then-Soviet nations, even the people repressed by the Soviet security apparatus before the war, rallied solidly behind Joseph Stalin. Those who collaborated with the invading Germans got killed by guerrillas. The Iraqi officers who would rebel against Hussein during a U.S.-Iraq war could also be considered traitors by many in the country and treated accordingly.

This all suggests that there is no easy option available for the United States. There will be mass desertions by the Iraqis, but it is unrealistic to hope that the whole Iraqi army or the 29-million-strong population will switch sides and give American forces the kind of welcome they received in Paris in 1944. This realization is probably the most serious reason why preparations for this war by both the Bush administration and the Pentagon are taking so much time and effort and so many turns.

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