Nobel Prize for Dubya?
International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors believe North Korea is dangerously close to having nukes, whereas Iraq no longer is. Nevertheless, the warhawks don’t want Dubya to deal with the North Korean nuke threat the way he has dealt with Iraq – through the U.N. Security Council.
Why not?
Back in 1950, when North Korea attempted to annex South Korea, the U.N. Security Council promptly authorized a US-led coalition to assist South Korea forcibly eject the invaders.
Why didn’t Communist China or the Soviet Union veto the Korean War resolution? Well, at the time, Communist China wasn’t a Council member and – for that reason – the Soviet Union was boycotting Security Council meetings.
But, in 1990, when Iraq attempted to annex Kuwait, the Security Council – now including Communist China and the Soviet Union – did authorize a U.S.-led coalition to assist Kuwait forcibly eject the invaders.
At the time of the Gulf War, China was not yet a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. But Iraq was, and had signed an IAEA Safeguards Agreement, which was supposed to cover all materials, facilities and activities required to be declared by the treaty. Alas, it didn’t.
So, as a condition of the Gulf War armistice, the Security Council imposed – and Iraq accepted – economic sanctions, not to be lifted until IAEA inspectors could report to the council that Iraq was fully compliant with its Safeguards Agreement.
How about North Korea?
The Soviet Union had forced North Korea to sign the Treaty in 1985. After learning in the aftermath of the Gulf War what Iraq had done, China and the Soviet Union then forced the Koreans to subject the nuclear reactors, nuclear fuel, and associated materials they had supplied them, to a Safeguards Agreement.
In 1993, unable to verify that North Korea’s declarations were complete and accurate, the IAEA recommended the council impose sanctions.
North Korea promptly announced it was withdrawing from the treaty and abrogating its still-born Safeguards Agreement. No signatory had ever withdrawn from the treaty, nor had any Safeguards Agreement ever been abrogated.
Meanwhile, President Clinton had taken office. He offered the Koreans a zillion-dollar bribe to remain a treaty signatory. He required them to stop construction and operation of their declared facilities. He did not, however, require them to negotiate and fully comply with a complete and accurate Safeguards Agreement.
That’s too bad, because, as a consequence of actions taken since the Gulf War by the 40-member Nuclear Suppliers Group, and by the IAEA Board of Governors, it’s abiding by full-scope Safeguards Agreements that’s become all important, not being a treaty signatory.
To help prevent nuke proliferation, group members now require the importing country to subject “trigger list” items – such as nuclear reactors, uranium enrichment facilities and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities – as well as many “dual-use list” items not even mentioned in the Treaty, to a full-scope Safeguards Agreement.
The IAEA will – when requested – enter into such Safeguards Agreements, irrespective of whether the importers are treaty signatories or not. The agreements prohibit further export or international transfer of safeguarded items.
Alas, North Korea didn’t stay bribed and has recently acquired – apparently from Pakistan – undeclared nuke-related technology, equipment and materials. When confronted, they ejected IAEA inspectors and announced they were resuming operation and construction of formerly safeguarded facilities.
But, China and all 40 Nuclear Suppliers Group members will now require verified compliance with a full-scope Safeguards Agreement before providing any further technical assistance, materials or equipment to North Korea. And Pakistan has promised it won’t sin, again.
Both China and Russia voted last year for Bush’s resolution, which threatens Iraq with “serious consequences” if it fails to fully comply with its Safeguards Agreement.
Both China and Russia would likely vote for another Bush resolution, this time threatening North Korea with “serious consequences” if it fails to abide by its Safeguards Agreement.
By getting the U.N. Security Council to threaten first Iraq, and then North Korea, with “serious consequences” if they don’t fully comply with Safeguards Agreements, it appears President Bush is now in a position to sanctify any and all Safeguards Agreements, which will remain in full force irrespective of whether the signatory withdraws from the treaty.
Of course, if Iraq does fully comply, then there will be no rationale for a resumption of the Gulf War. That’s why the warhawks insist that Dubya must not deal with North Korea the same way he has dealt with Iraq. The approach seems to be working.
Who knows? Dubya may even win the Nobel Peace Prize.
