Bribe or attack?

When we suspect that an evil nation-state is developing a nuke capability, and might give nukes to terrorists, we now have three courses of action.

1. Bribe the evil nation-state.

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In 1994, President Clinton bribed the North Koreans to "freeze" their plutonium-producing facilities and subject them to International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards. Alas, Kim Jong-Il didn't stay bribed. He's just abrogated the Safeguards agreement.

2. Attack and destroy the suspect facilities.

In 1981, the Israelis destroyed an Iraqi nuclear power plant already subject to IAEA Safeguards. Alas, the Iraqis promptly initiated a nuke-oriented uranium-enrichment program which they kept secret from the IAEA, and the Israelis.

3. Report our suspicions to the U.N. Security Council and let them deal with it.

Suspecting Iraq had resumed the nuke programs destroyed by the IAEA in the early 1990s, we sponsored Security Council Resolution 1441, which requires:

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that Iraq shall provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA immediate, unimpeded, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all, including underground, areas, facilities, buildings, equipment, records and means of transport which they wish to inspect, as well as immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted and private access to all officials and other persons whom UNMOVIC or the IAEA wish to interview in the mode or location of UNMOVIC's or the IAEA's choice pursuant to any aspect of their mandates;

And further requests:

that all Member States give full support to UNMOVIC and the IAEA in the discharge of their mandates, including by providing any information related to prohibited programmes or other aspects of their mandates, including on Iraqi attempts since 1998 to acquire prohibited items, and by recommending sites to be inspected, persons to be interviewed, conditions of such interviews and data to be collected;

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The IAEA has since conducted hundreds of inspections of suspect programs and dozens of interviews with Iraqis involved in suspect activities. Director General ElBaradei reported on some of those inspections and interviews to the Security Council as follows:

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Aluminium Tubes: Extensive field investigation and document analysis have failed to uncover any evidence that Iraq intended to use these 81mm tubes for any project other than the reverse engineering of rockets. The Iraqi decision-making process with regard to the design of these rockets was well documented.

Magnets: The IAEA has verified that previously acquired magnets have been used for missile guidance systems, industrial machinery, electricity meters and field telephones. Through visits to research and production sites, reviews of engineering drawings and analyses of sample magnets, IAEA experts familiar with the use of such magnets in centrifuge enrichment have verified that none of the magnets that Iraq has declared could be used directly for a centrifuge magnetic bearing.

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Uranium Acquisition: Based on thorough analysis, the IAEA has concluded, with the concurrence of outside experts, that these documents – which formed the basis for the reports of recent uranium transactions between Iraq and Niger – are in fact not authentic. We have therefore concluded that these specific allegations are unfounded.

New Construction: There is no indication of resumed nuclear activities in those buildings that were identified through the use of satellite imagery as being reconstructed or newly erected since 1998, nor any indication of nuclear-related prohibited activities at any inspected sites.

ElBaradei concluded his report as follows:

After three months of intrusive inspections, we have to date found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq.

Alas, it looks like we are going to unilaterally invade Iraq anyway.

But, by getting the Security Council to hold our Colt-45 to Saddam's head while the IAEA checked out our suspicions, we can say with some assurance that if you get nuked in your jammies, it won't be by an Iraqi nuke.

How about a North Korean nuke?

ElBaradei has warned that unless the Security Council forces Kim Jong-Il to allow IAEA inspectors to resume monitoring the operation of Korean plutonium-producing facilities – by June – Kim will have separated enough weapons-grade plutonium to make 6 to 10 nukes. Even if Kim can't make nukes, himself, he can – and probably will – sell that plutonium to the highest bidder.

What are we to do? Get the Security Council to hold our Colt-45 to Kim's head while the IAEA checks out and secures suspected facilities?

Well, unfortunately, if we ignore the IAEA findings and invade Iraq anyway, we may never get the Security Council to hold a gun to anyone's head – on our behalf – ever again.

So, we'll have to bribe Kim or attack North Korea, and the sooner the better.