Has United States diplomacy failed in the Iraq crisis?
According to many commentators, including some of those who support President George Bush’s stance, the answer is yes.
The truth is that we need historical perspective to know the answer. But, on the face of it, it would seem that United States diplomacy has been found wanting.
In his well-argued articles in the New York Times, Tom Friedman has criticized the way the United States has implemented what is otherwise a worthy policy on Iraq.
For instance, according to Friedman, the United States has failed to build patiently an international coalition, in contrast to the successful endeavor undertaken by Jim Baker, the secretary of state during the Gulf War back in 1991.
Without wishing to underestimate the diplomatic success of the United States in the first Iraq crisis, the comparison as such is hardly valid.
The case before the United States then was relatively easy to convey: an Arab country, Kuwait, had been invaded and absorbed by Iraq. Liberating it was a goal most countries in the world, including most Arab states, could easily adhere to. Iraq’s threat in that instance had been displayed for all to see in a concrete manner.
Nowadays, the United States is trying to convince the international community of a menace that is potential in nature.
In the current crisis, the Bush administration has been attempting to depict a threat. In the previous crisis, the United States had merely to show the tangible consequences of a threat.
Furthermore, Friedman and many other commentators argue that a more subtle and sophisticated diplomatic process was needed to elicit the support of the international community.
Perhaps. But one should be careful not to carry this argument too far.
A more refined diplomatic handling of the crisis might have assuaged some of the fears genuinely harbored by many people about the consequences of a war in Iraq. Indeed, a subtler approach to public opinion in some countries in Europe might have moderated some of the criticism leveled at President Bush.
However, this by itself would most probably not have altered the stance adopted by France and Germany, for instance, nor have resulted in a more passive policy on the part of President Chirac.
French policy is apparently shaped by a combination of French economic interests in Iraq, domestic pressures and a traditional disdain of U.S. foreign and defense policies – as well as a Gaullist renaissance of national grandeur.
The French have a clear-cut interest in the status quo in Iraq.
No diplomatic face-lifting would have changed that.
One should not ignore the simple fact that most European governments do support the United States. Is diplomacy thus tested only on the failure to convince the minority of countries in Europe rather than on the success of persuading the majority?
So far as the Arab states are concerned, these would not have supported even the threat of U.S. military action, at least not openly, for fear of a backlash in local public opinion and the precedence set by regime change in Iraq, brought about by outside U.S. intervention – no matter how sophisticated and subtle United States diplomacy might be.
Indeed, it might be argued that the failure of diplomacy in this crisis was the mere insistence on its use. Perhaps, had the United States been more resolute and less prone on immersing itself in the diplomatic quagmire of the United Nations, this crisis would not have reached the proportions it reached – particularly if the war had been swift and decisive, as many expect it to be.
This is not to say that the United States was necessarily wrong in going to the United Nations. After all, it did so not out of its own volition, but forced by circumstances to help its ally Tony Blair in Britain and to try to elicit international support.
And, let’s be candid about it: The United States did not expect to be vacuumed into this spiral of never-ending diplomatic yo-yo. But this is nothing more than the reflection of national self-interests at play. The more the United States wants to find a diplomatic license to advance its cause, the more the other players feel reinforced in their respective positions and strengthened in their diplomatic leverage.
There is much President Bush could have done that he did not do. But there is little he could have changed even if he had done more.
Dr. Yoav J. Tenembaum is a journalist and political analyst based in Israel. He has been published in a variety of newspapers and holds a doctorate degree in Modern History from Oxford University, where his doctoral thesis was on the international relations of the Middle East. Additionally he holds a masters degree in International Relations from Cambridge University and obtained his first degree in History at Tel Aviv University.
