As far as the five “permanent” members of the U.N. Security Council – the U.S., U.K., France, Russia and China – are concerned, the primary purpose of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is to prevent other NPT signatories from developing or acquiring nukes.
Why do nation-states without nukes comply with the NPT? After all, nation-states without nukes sometimes get invaded, but nation-states with nukes never do.
Well, the five NPT signatories with nukes essentially assured the 180 signatories without nukes that they would never need nukes to defend themselves. During the Cold War, the United States defended some NPT signatories against a nuke attack by the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union defended others against a nuke attack by us.
In addition, the NPT signatories with nukes promised to help NPT signatories without nukes develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
The International Atomic Energy Agency was given the job of monitoring “declared” activities of non-nuke signatories for NPT compliance.
In the aftermath of the Gulf War, it was realized that the IAEA needed authority to inspect suspect – but undeclared – sites as well. The additional authority is provided by an Additional Protocol to the NPT.
Then, in 1998, Pakistan and India conducted nuke tests. Neither were NPT signatories, but Pakistan has reportedly shared nuke materials and /or technology with nation-states that were.
Finally, a few weeks ago, we invaded Iraq, partly because we suspected Saddam Hussein was not in compliance with the NPT, even though Director General ElBaradei had just reported to the UN Security Council that: “As of 17 March 2003, the IAEA had found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons program in Iraq.”
Now, North Korea’s dictator believed that by designating North Korea part of the “axis of evil,” President Bush had signaled his intention to do unto Kim Jong-Il, next, what he had just done to Saddam.
So, Kim Jong-Il went ballistic. He abrogated the U.S.-Korean Agreed Framework, withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and abrogated his Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. He ejected the IAEA “verifiers” of NPT compliance, ripped the IAEA seals off his plutonium-producing reactor and associated plutonium recovery plant and restarted them.
A crisis for the IAEA-NPT regime? You bet.
Here are excerpts from Secretary Powell’s statement, read to last month’s 2005 NPT Review Conference PrepCom in Geneva by Assistant Secretary Wolf.
We meet at a time of considerable challenge to the NPT and to international peace and security.
NPT Parties – weapon states and non-weapon states alike – must take strong action to deal with cases of noncompliance and to strengthen the Treaty’s nonproliferation undertakings. We cannot allow the few who fail to meet their obligations to undermine the important work of the NPT.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must be relentless in pursuing suspected cases of noncompliance. The IAEA needs our full financial and political support to do its job. Universal adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol must remain a high-priority objective.
The NPT can only be as strong as our will to enforce it, in spirit and in deed. We share a collective responsibility to be ever vigilant, and to take concerted action when the Treaty, our Treaty, is threatened.
Let us act promptly and effectively to meet the challenges to the NPT. By doing so, we can help ensure that it remains an effective instrument of global security.
So, we’re going to take “concerted action” against North Korea, right?
Wrong.
It turns out Assistant Secretary Wolf wants us to take concerted action against Iran.
Iran provides perhaps the most fundamental challenge ever faced by the NPT. This is a country that professes to be in full compliance with its Safeguards obligations. It is a country that has been one of the largest beneficiaries of IAEA technical cooperation for peaceful purposes. But, as recent revelations have made all too clear, Iran has been conducting an alarming, clandestine program to acquire sensitive nuclear capabilities that we believe make sense only as part of a nuclear weapons program.
There are many opportunities for every state to make a difference in achieving nuclear nonproliferation objectives. It starts with robust support for the NPT. But declaratory statements must be backed up with political resolve to confront those who undermine nuclear nonproliferation and to take direct action to strengthen the barriers against possible future offenders. There must be serious consequences for those who violate their NPT commitments.
Excepting, of course, Kim Jong-Il.
