We invaded Iraq – or so the warhawks claimed – to prevent Saddam Hussein from nuking us in our jammies. It mattered not that Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, had just reported to the U.N. Security Council that “As of 17 March 2003, the IAEA had found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons program in Iraq.”
Now, Kim Jong-Il – at the other end of the “axis of evil” – may be crazy, but he’s not dumb. So, Kim immediately ejected the warhawks’ whipping boy – ElBaradei – from North Korea and revived his own nuke development program, whereupon a thoroughly alarmed ElBaradei reported to the Security Council that North Korea could soon have enough weapons-grade plutonium to make at least a half-dozen nukes.
By now, thanks to the warhawks, Kim Jong-Il has a new cash crop.
So, did the warhawks apologize to ElBaradei? Admit he was right about Saddam? Did they attempt to restore the credibility and authority of the IAEA? Did they insist the Security Council pass a resolution demanding that Kim Jong-Il re-admit the IAEA inspectors or face “serious consequences”?
No way!
Instead, they continue to beat up on ElBaradei about Iraq and North Korea and, lately, Iran.
Now, the primary purpose of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is to prevent signatories not already having nukes from developing or acquiring them.
But, as an inducement to sign, non-nuke signatories are promised all the nuclear “peaceful purposes” stuff they can digest, with the caveat that anything that could be used to develop nukes has to be “declared.” The International Atomic Energy Agency was given the job of monitoring “declared” activities, and verifying NPT compliance.
In the aftermath of the Gulf War, it was realized that the IAEA needed authority to inspect undeclared – but suspect – sites as well. The additional authority is to be provided by an Additional Protocol to the NPT.
More than a hundred NPT signatories – including Iran – have not yet negotiated Additional Protocols.
Just as the warhawks were searching for an excuse – any excuse – to invade Iraq last year, they are searching for an excuse – any excuse – to invade Iran this year.
So, at their insistence, in February ElBaradei visited the Iranian facilities which constituted – according to warhawk “intelligence” – an illicit nuke program.
At Natanz, ElBaradei found a uranium enrichment pilot plant nearing completion and a commercial-scale plant under construction. In addition, other IAEA inspectors visited a heavy water production plant under construction at Arak.
Although they were not yet required to do so under the existing Safeguards Agreement, the Iranians “declared” them and agreed to provide, in future, earlier notification on new facilities and on modifications to existing facilities.
They have subsequently informed ElBarfadei of their intentions to construct a heavy-water 40-megawatt research reactor at Arak and a fuel manufacturing plant at Esfahan for the nuclear power plants being built at Bushehr,
In addition, Iran belatedly acknowledged the receipt in 1991 of almost two metric tons of natural uranium, which they stored at Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories. Iran said it had converted about 400 kilograms into uranium metal.
The Iranian position was that the amounts of natural uranium were small, well below the IAEA threshold of “one effective kilogram” of fissile material, and didn’t need to be reported. The IAEA position is that, whereas amounts larger than “one effective kilogram” are subject to more stringent controls and reporting requirements, all amounts and the uses thereof have to be reported.
Well, the warhawks were dancing in the streets. Iran had violated its Safeguards Agreement. Get the Security Council to pass a resolution demanding that the Iranian mullahs abandon any and all nuclear activities by Tuesday of next week or face “serious consequences.”
But this is as far as ElBaradei would go in his official report:
- Although the quantities of nuclear material involved have not been large, and the material would need further processing before being suitable for use as the fissile material component of a nuclear explosive device, the number of failures by Iran to report the material, facilities and activities in question in a timely manner as it is obliged to do pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement is a matter of concern.
“Matter of concern”?
No casus belli?
No serious consequences?
Well, ElBaradei did strongly urge Iran to negotiate an Additional Protocol.
