Iraqifada reveals
U.S. air war crisis

Editor's note: Joseph Farah's G2 Bulletin is an online, subscription intelligence news service from the creator of WorldNetDaily.com – a journalist who has been developing sources around the world for the last 25 years.

As the guerrilla war in Iraq continues, more experts say the U.S. military problems are not on the ground, they are in the air.

Military experts observing developments in the counter-insurgency campaign in Iraq and Afghanistan, have noticed the absence of significant, rapid and pinpoint air support to troops on the ground.

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The issue raises more than just concern over tactics and the conduct of the campaign. It appears there is a serious shortage of adequate equipment, or at least inefficient use of what is available, experts tell Joseph Farah's G2 Bulletin, the online premium intelligence newsletter published by WND.

Could the biggest problem in a war marked by dazzling air bombardment campaigns dubbed "shock and awe" now be the lack of proper air support?

As discussions of the Iraqifada continue in Baghdad and Washington, many experts are reminiscing over the old and famous OV-10 Bronco, one of the most important counter-insurgency aircrafts of the late 1960s and the early 1990s. The Bronco is still in service in Latin America, Asia and Africa, where armies are involved in fighting guerrillas. It also is still in service with U.S. law-enforcement agencies combating the drug trade. This plane was specifically designed to cope with missions such as those arising in Iraq and Afghanistan on a daily basis.

However, hopes for some Broncos to be re-introduced to service were not fulfilled. A review of the U.S. arsenal and plans to develop new aircraft reveals the lack of exactly such a weapon system. It seems the Pentagon continues in its efforts to achieve the so-called "last hurrah" of manned fighter jets for this millennium, believing the F-35 now being developed will become the last manned aircraft before the U.S. Air Force moves to other futuristic alternatives. These would most likely be drones and other highly sophisticated airplanes without pilots.

Billions are being allocated to the development of super-modern airplanes carrying staggering costs. This questionable priority determination has caused the neglect of developing aircraft and helicopters designed to fight non-high-tech wars the U.S. is involved with in several places around the world. It seems a Cold War era concept still overrides the necessity to be able to "regress" to the needs of relatively small-conflict theaters requiring the resuscitation of good old warhorses.

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Military analysts and historians point to the U.S. experience during the Vietnam War when the military had to revive some old weapon systems to meet needs on the ground. One of these was the AD-1 Skyraider tactical support fighter bomber, a legendary plane, developed toward the end of World War II and introduced to the military by 1946. Skyraiders, nicknamed "Sandy," were regarded as one of the most successful machines in the war. Their ability to provide pinpoint close support, especially to downed pilots, is one of the success stories of that war. Skyraiders began to phase out and were handed over to the South Vietnamese as more Broncos and the first Cobra AH-1H attack helicopters started to arrive in Vietnam. Other Skyraiders went on to serve the French air force in their counter-insurgency operations in Djibouti, Chad and Madagascar.

This type of aircraft, with its unique qualifications, is not being utilized. G2 Bulletin has learned that so far there are no plans to either re-introduce old equipment or to develop new systems with similar characteristics specifically designed for counter-insurgency.

Plenty has been published over the use in the current wars of attack helicopters, predominantly the super-modern Apache AH-64A/D Longbow. However, the quality of its performance has created hot debates among experts, including assessments the Longbow, a machine developed to fight massive armor formations, does not qualify for any specific counter-insurgency mission.

Inter-service rivalries, impartial reviews on the conduct of the Iraqi and Afghani wars, including some available publications, exhibit increased criticism over the performance and use of the Longbows. Many point to the fact that while the Longbow received poor reviews, the older and smaller upgraded Cobra was described as much more effective. One of the basic differences is in the method and tactics of the two helicopters. The modern one delivers its main armaments from a static, long-range position, while the Cobra is capable of directly attacking small targets, delivering armament while flying fast and low. Thus the Cobra is of much better use to ground forces fighting guerrillas than the super-modern, and less adequate, Longbow.

Ironically, the U.S. Army celebrated, shortly before the war, the phasing out of many Cobras. Lessons from the first Gulf War, where U.S. Marine Broncos and Army Cobras proved their value, were brushed aside.

This haste in removing two aircraft with first-class performance reputations may have come as a result of the fact forces fighting during the 1991 Gulf War did not encounter guerrillas.

In the future, such wars could be concurrently spread over many parts of the world. Localized conflicts are likely to include a main segment of counter-insurgency, a type of war where an F-15 or a B-1 bomber will have relatively low success, unless the U.S. opts for the unthinkable mega collateral damage to kill a few guerrillas in each engagement.

One of the most vital U.S. allies when it comes to the value and various qualities of attack-helicopter tactics is the Israeli air force. Their experience in using attack helicopters for urban warfare settings has proven on an almost regular basis a high success rate. Careful not to openly criticize their best friend, Israeli military analysts simply came to the conclusion the tactics of deploying attack helicopters and close support to small units has failed to achieve its goals in Iraq. An Israeli military analyst, identified only as "Erez," said the U.S. will have no choice but to include more Cobras, pointing to the size, speed and type of weapon systems used with this attack helicopter.

Another analyst referred to an article in the Israeli air force magazine, which pointed to a debate within the U.S. military. Apparently, some had claimed attack helicopters failed during the initial period of Operation Iraqi Freedom, whereas fighter bombers claimed they could prove their success with the use of "smart bombs."

The debate continues on to the issue of misinterpretation of battlefield conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the wrong evaluation Iraq can be pacified by a dramatic demonstration of ground forces.

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