On Dec. 18, 2003, Iran signed an Additional Protocol to their Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. It will enter into force once the Iranian parliament ratifies it.
There are two categories of signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, (a) nuke states and (b) no-nuke states.
The NPT requires no-nuke states – such as Iran – to accept IAEA safeguards on certain proscribed “nuclear-related” materials and activities.
The original function of the IAEA was – and continues to be – to facilitate the international transfer of “Atoms for Peace.”
No-nuke signatories to the NPT have the right to acquire all materials and technologies related to the nuclear fuel cycle. The principal function of the IAEA-NPT Safeguards and Physical Security regime is to verify that no-nuke states don’t misuse any of those materials and technologies, once transferred.
The IAEA employs periodic on-site inspections and continuous on-site monitoring to verify the correctness of state reports of “declared” nuclear material and activities. These measures – authorized under NPT comprehensive Safeguards agreements – largely are based on nuclear material accountancy, complemented by containment and surveillance techniques.
However, at the end of the Persian Gulf War, the IAEA discovered that those measures – taken only at “declared” sites – were insufficient to detect or prevent clandestine nuke programs at other sites. Iraq had a multi-billion dollar broad-based “undeclared” program to enrich uranium that had gone undetected.
So, to increase the IAEA’s capability for detecting such clandestine programs, the international community developed a Model Additional Protocol. This protocol – which enhances the authority of the IAEA-NPT Safeguards regime – is to be used as a “model” for an Additional Protocol, to amend each existing IAEA Safeguards agreement.
The Model Protocol provides far greater transparency to nuclear programs and nuclear-related activities, enabling the IAEA not only to verify the non-diversion of “declared” nuclear material, but also to provide assurances of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and of any prohibited activities in a state.
The Model Protocol also provides for unannounced on-the-spot inspections, significantly expanding the access rights of the IAEA.
Last month, IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei reported that Iran had committed numerous breaches of its NPT Safeguards agreement, and had – over a 20-year period – concealed materials, facilities and activities that should have been “declared.” These covered the entire spectrum of the nuclear fuel cycle including the chemical processing of uranium ore and spent fuel.
However, ElBaradei noted there was no “evidence” that those activities that should have been declared had been linked to a nuke development program.
So, the IAEA Board of Governors called on Iran
… to undertake and complete the taking of all necessary corrective measures on an urgent basis, to sustain full cooperation with the Agency in implementing Iran’s commitment to full disclosure and unrestricted access, and thus to provide the transparency and openness that are indispensable for the Agency to complete the considerable work necessary to provide and maintain the assurances required by Member States.
And, the Board decided that
… should any further serious Iranian failures come to light, the Board of Governors would meet immediately to consider, in the light of the circumstances and of advice from the Director General, all options at its disposal, in accordance with the IAEA Statute and Iran’s Safeguards Agreement.
Finally, the Board noted
… with satisfaction the decision of Iran to conclude an Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement, and re-emphasizes the importance of Iran moving swiftly to ratification and also of Iran acting as if the Protocol were in force in the interim, including by making all declarations required within the required timeframe.
We’re a nuke state and are – therefore – not obligated to accept Agency safeguards on our nuclear activities. Nonetheless, it has been the announced policy of the United States since 1967 to permit the application of Agency safeguards to its nuclear facilities – excluding only those of direct national-security significance.
On June 12, 1998, we signed an Additional Protocol to our Safeguards Agreement. By submitting ourselves to the same safeguards on all civil nuclear activities that no-nuke parties to the NPT are subject to, we hoped to demonstrate that adherence to the Additional Protocol would not result in a commercial disadvantage.
The U.S. acceptance of an Additional Protocol was an important factor in the decisions of many no-nuke states to also accept an Additional Protocol. It will enter into force once the U.S. Senate ratifies it.
President Bush sent our Additional Protocol to the Senate for ratification on May 10, 2002.
