How to respond ... and to what effect

The killings and deliberate, public mutilations of the four American civilians in Fallujah have made headlines (and a ton of money for the media) across the globe. The same CNN producers who discussed the new opportunities to film the dead and maimed in the unobscured deserts of Kuwait and Iraq during the first Gulf War (ever so much better than the jungles of Vietnam) now have plenty of dead Americans to film at last.

Ratings and revenues are up ... there is joy in media boardrooms across the land. Hooray?

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When a radio talk-show host asked me about what our response should be, two thoughts crossed my mind immediately. The first was that to be successful in war, you plan and cause the enemy to react to you – not the other way around. The second item was to answer his question with a question of my own, namely: "What is the goal that you want to achieve?"

To satisfy the first edict of war and explore this second larger question, I will stipulate to the goal of a stable, self-governing Iraq as repeatedly stated by our president and the Coalition Provisional Authority while briefly exploring the major roadblocks to the goal that are inherent within the situation.

Rebuilding of the Iraqi national infrastructure

Under the Baathists, this all-encompassing requirement of modern civilization was left to rot in place while luxurious palaces were the order of the day. The CPA struggles daily against the leftover cultural rot and ubiquitous corruption from the Baathists to rebuild the infrastructure and services so long neglected.

In many ways, that motivational task is the most difficult: to prod a people long inured to slavery to rise up on the road toward independence of mind and spirit. All this while the rest of the Arab world openly conspires to keep their hearts and bodies in chains, lest their own peoples see hope for themselves.

Construction and acceptance of a basic government by rule of law

The long centuries of Iraqi history give no example of such a government to be copied and, as such, it is even more difficult to build a consensus based on such an utterly foreign ideal. This consensus is further blocked by the anger and distrust of both the Iraqi Shiia and the Kurds, but made utterly unworkable by the Sunni, who formed the nucleus of the Baathist power structure and who have firmly resolved to engage in bloody terror to keep this new form of government from surviving. The Sunni demand to return to what they feel is their accustomed position of complete dominance and will accept nothing less.

The Middle Eastern custom of revenge

Without doubt, we now know that Iraq has a huge number of unmarked of mass graves of Iraqi citizens, and a host of others, who were victims of the Baathist regime. The perpetrators of these studied atrocities committed over decades reside in what we now call the "Sunni Triangle" ... that includes the town of Fallujah. Arabic custom requires that such injuries be paid for in blood and all of the European foaming and gnashing changes that simple unassailable fact not at all. Diversity is what it is, after all ... warts and all.

So it within this highly volatile mix of issues that the question of "How do we respond?" was asked.

As with most complex problems, every potential solution brings its own problems with it. So we must pick and choose, then, between seeking to do the least harm as we perceive that to be through what appears to be own our rose-colored Western glasses, according to the light of Middle Eastern culture. If one fully embraces the paradigm of cultural diversity so beloved by academics these days, then we must also accept that there is a sharp cultural divergence on many ethical issues.

For the sake of this discussion, let us then assume we will apply a Middle Eastern cultural solution to an Iraqi national problem.

One of the key issues that any follow-on Iraqi national regime will have to face is the issue of revenge irrevocably intertwined with building a workable consensus for the new government and the costs of their resolution. Owning up to the inevitability of a culturally normed answer and its attendant costs, the question then devolves to one of timing and what might be an acceptable level of cost.

In Western terms, the answer is fairly simple: We (usually) abhor bloodshed and, therefore, the less loss of life, the better. This is tied to the second issue of the prevention, or the significant limitation, of a post-CPA Iraqi civil war. We are then left with the unpalatable choices of this internal resolution occurring in a controlled or an unmoderated fashion.

The only outside interests that we can truly depend upon to capably assist in these circumstances is the Coalition Provisional Authority. A quick look to the present condition of Haiti gives us a dismally clear picture of the United Nations' efficacy in promoting internal governance.

So based on the above, it seems that the least bloody path lies in the CPA limiting the arenas of revenge while attempting to bring all parties to the table, however grudgingly, to hammer out a modus-vivendi they can all minimally accept. For after all, it is the Iraqi people who must agree to the manner in which they might coexist. The solution here must be Iraqi at its heart – it cannot be Western and succeed. The proper acceptance of cultural diversity cannot simultaneously be selectively imposed upon by Euro-centric behavioral ideals just to spare our timidly squeamish.

As Fallujah has self-selected itself as a focus of resistance to a workable solution, so let the other Iraqi national cultures deal with their own problem ... with the CPA forcibly limiting the affected area. Allow the Shiia and the Kurds to agree upon the mission and function of a joint task force, and then allow their joint force to deal with the Sunni Arabs in Fallujah as a purely internal matter. For it truly is the undeniable task of the Iraqi people to hammer out this issue for themselves in the long term, so deliberately allow it to happen in this limited area ... and without the interference and kibitzing of the international press.

The world's media execs will be certain to generate enough buzz of their own to keep their company's revenues up, and since they habitually claim they truly have no interest in the outcome, the money should be enough for them as the impartial observers they loudly protest themselves to be.

Given the customs of the Middle East, the aftermath of this policy will eventually produce the willingness to compromise in sufficiently meaningful ways. Not a pretty picture, but one that we will surely see whether we want to or not.

Our only practical choice is to whether to guide the process. Blood will be spilled, the questions to answer now are: "Whose, how much and when?"

Let the Arab Sunni in Fallujah dance to this.

Tom Marzullo is a former Special Forces soldier and a veteran of submarine special operations. He resides in Colorado.