The Democrats’ dilemma

The election is over, and we will have four years in which to contemplate and analyze the astonishing feat that George W. Bush has just pulled off. He campaigned, convincingly, as a leader who knew that America was at war, and was grimly determined to win. A substantial majority of the American people accepted that assessment, and gave him four more years in which to wage the battle.

In the days ahead, we will watch him carefully to see how he discharges that mandate. We will also discuss the political ramifications of the almost total triumph of the Republican Party. But in this first post-election column, I want to concentrate on a related aspect of the Nov. 2 blowout – one with major implications for the health of American democracy. And that is the near-total collapse of the Democratic Party as a major player in American politics.

Our two-party system envisions opposing parties of roughly equal strength, slugging it out over the major issues confronting the nation, and taking turns dominating the political process. But ever since the triumph of Ronald Reagan a quarter century ago, the Democratic Party has had increasing difficulty playing its assigned role. In that time, only one Democrat has won the presidency, and Clinton’s first victory, in 1992, was a fluke: He “won” with just 43 percent of the popular vote, while George H.W. Bush and Ross Perot claimed 37 percent and 19 percent, respectively.

Two years later, the Republicans captured both Houses of Congress and (save for a year and a half caused by the defection of Vermont’s Sen. James Jeffords) have controlled both ever since. Even in 1996, running for re-election, Clinton again won only 49 percent of the popular vote, with Perot this time taking 8 percent and Bob Dole 41 percent.

This year, the Democratic Party entered the fray controlling neither the White House nor Congress, nor such major governorships as those of Texas, Florida or three of its supposed bailiwicks: California, New York and Massachusetts. And it emerged from the shambles of Nov. 2 having lost the presidency by 3.5 million votes, as well as seeing its minorities in both Houses of Congress shrink further, producing comfortable Republican majorities.

What is going on here? No doubt many factors are involved, but I believe the basic one is the fundamental modern structure of the Democratic Party.

In election after election, the Republican Party routinely carries by large margins what can still fairly be called “typical Americans”: white men (55 to 44 percent this year); married people of both sexes (57 to 42); people with children under 18 (53 to 45); Protestants (59 to 40); people with family incomes of $50,000 and over (56 to 43); high-school graduates (52 to 47); and college graduates (52 to 46).

The Democratic Party, either by choice or brute necessity, has structured itself as the defender of particular vocal minorities: above all the blacks (88 percent to 11 this year), but also the gays (77 to 23) and almost every reasonably loud special-interest group, from the ultra-feminists, the unions and the pro-abortionists to the anti-gun zealots and the further-out environmentalists. Together, these blocs can usually generate enough votes to send a fair number of Democrats to Congress, but they cannot pretend to represent the broad generality of the American people.

The result, inevitably, is that the Democratic Party is forced to serve as the spokesman for these varying interests, however far their views may be from the mainstream of American opinion. The Democrats’ passionate enthusiasm for “gay marriage” is only the most recent and most spectacular example of the damage this can do. America is unquestionably becoming more tolerant in its attitude toward homosexuals, and the Republican Party (led by President Bush himself, who has said he favors civil unions) has reflected this in its recent policy positions. But public opinion is clearly against expanding the traditional definition of “marriage,” and the Democrats are suffering accordingly.

Getting itself out of this dilemma is the Democratic Party’s great problem. It must learn to re-identify itself with mainstream American opinion, and this will almost certainly involve upsetting some of its present most passionate supporters. But the alternative is the party’s increasing irrelevance, and ultimate extinction.