With his declaration May 12th that Iran could enrich uranium after a moratorium, President Trump opened up a nuclear Pandora’s box. Whether he seals the deal to take possession of all of Iran’s uranium or fails to reach any nuclear understanding with Tehran at all, his willingness to allow Iran eventually to enrich has all but ensured Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, and Egypt will lust to make nuclear fuel and get to the brink of bomb-making as well.
This should be avoided.
Previously, Trump insisted Iran terminate all of its uranium enrichment activities. He even offered to have the Saudis enrich Iran’s fuel. It’s unclear if this is still his plan. It’s still expected that Trump will sign a U.S.-Saudi civilian nuclear cooperative agreement for Congressional approval. If Congress doesn’t act, the agreement would come into force in roughly five months. The text makes no mention of uranium enrichment.
This agreement would, however, allow Trump and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman later to greenlight U.S. enrichment assistance to the Kingdom in a “subsequent agreement.” Such a follow-on deal seems likely. Last November, the administration and the Kingdom reached a side understanding to safeguard “the most proliferation sensitive areas of potential nuclear cooperation… [including enrichment, conversion, fuel fabrication, and reprocessing].” This indicates the administration has all but decided to help the Saudis make nuclear fuel.
Once it does, though, there will be trouble. The UAE—Riyadh’s neighbor—legally forswore making nuclear fuel in the U.S. nuclear cooperative agreement it signed in 2009. That deal, though, also stipulated that the UAE could renegotiate their agreement if Washington struck a more generous agreement with any of the UAE’s neighbors.
The UAE threatened to do just this when President Obama allowed Iran to continue to enrich uranium. Demanding renegotiation is even more likely now with UAE-Saudi relations on the skids: If the United States greenlights nuclear fuel-making for Riyadh, Abu Dubai is sure to demand equal treatment.
What might follow? Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Hakan Fidan, his heir apparent, have heavily hinted that Turkey needs its own weapons. Turkey is building two large Russian power reactors and previously rejected Washington’s request that Turkey renounce making nuclear fuel. Earlier this month, Turkey proudly launched its first intercontinental ballistic missile. Meanwhile, Egypt’s construction of two large Russian power reactors has raised Israeli concerns.
Do these nations have a clear right to make nuclear fuel? On April 29, Christopher Yeaw, U.S. representative to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, insisted Iran’s “inalienable right” to enrich uranium was “imaginary.”
The NPT text doesn’t mention any such right. During treaty negotiations in 1967, several developing nations wanted the NPT amended to guarantee non-weapons states access to “the entire nuclear fuel cycle,” including uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing. Their amendments were rejected.
The Swedish, British, and Burmese representatives explained why: Making nuclear fuel brings nations so close to bomb-making that even with intrusive inspections it would be impossible to detect a military diversion in time to prevent bombs from being built. As such, fuel-making activities cannot be safeguarded and should not be regarded as being “peaceful.”
Yet, some insist that if states allow inspections, they should be permitted to make nuclear fuel. Might Washington help the Saudis enrich if this activity was conducted on an American military base in Saudi Arabia? Perhaps nuclear experts could create some magical “black box” process that would allow the Saudis to enrich without ever learning how to do so. Americans could operate the plant.
Perhaps, but at best it still would be theater. At any time, a state making nuclear fuel can tell foreign inspectors or operators to leave. Iran threw American and western nuclear personnel out of the country in 1979 when they overthrew the Shah. Nuclear reactors may operate up to 80 years—a period long enough for Americans to be thrown out of other Middle Eastern countries again, including Saudi Arabia.
What is the fix? The United States and other nations have previously allowed non-weapons states to make nuclear fuel (e.g., Japan, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Holland, and Germany). Washington should propose that, henceforth, NPT members should not help any additional non-weapons states enrich or reprocess.
As for Saudi Arabia, the immediate threat of an Iranian bomb has receded. More important, the United States and Israel have clearly demonstrated their will to keep it that way and, Saudi pleading to the contrary, there is no sound economic case for the kingdom to enrich.
The United States, in short, should hang tough, insist Iran stop making nuclear fuel, and hold the line with Saudi Arabia and others. At the very least, whatever Washington demands of Tehran it should demand of Riyadh. The alternative is to load up the Middle East with nuclear fuel-making states. That will make the current Iran crisis seem secondary.
Henry Sokolski is executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. He served as deputy for nonproliferation policy in the Department of Defense (1989–1993), and is the author of China, Russia, and the Coming Cool War (2024).
