Abstract
The Department of the War (DOW) advocates and trains the Run, Hide, Fight (RHF) model as a primary response to active shooters on military installations. This article contends that RHF, a model designed for untrained civilians, is fundamentally misaligned with the doctrine, training, and ethos of uniformed personnel. We advocate for its immediate replacement with the Assess, Report, Neutralize (ARN) model, which aligns directly with established battle drills. While common counterarguments—such as risks of friendly fire and legal liability—are serious, they are addressable problems of training, and command and control, not disqualifying flaws. Drawing on FBI data, cognitive science, and military doctrine, we explain why service members, already conditioned to act under fire, must be empowered and trusted to do so in garrison. This recommendation has added gravitas considering Secretary of War Pete Hegseth’s recent authorization for off-duty service members to carry personally owned weapons on installations and his repeated calls to restore the warrior mindset across the Department of War.
Introduction: The Inevitable First Responders
The instinct of trained service members to neutralize a threat was clearly demonstrated during the August 2025 Fort Stewart active shooter incident. When a gunman opened fire in the 2nd Brigade 3rd Infantry Division area, unarmed soldiers did not default to a passive civilian protocol; they immediately closed the distance, subdued the attacker, and transitioned to providing life-saving combat casualty care. Their actions, occurring long before law enforcement could intervene, illustrate a fundamental truth: the ingrained training and warrior ethos of military personnel compel them to neutralize a threat, not to shelter from it. As Army Secretary Dan Driscoll observed following the event, these soldiers…
“ran at and tackled an armed person who they knew was actively shooting their buddies.”
Most recently, on 12 March 2026 at Old Dominion University, Army ROTC cadets demonstrated the same warrior instinct. When an attacker shot and killed their professor of military science, Lt. Col. Brandon Shah, the cadets immediately closed distance, wrestled the gunman to the ground, and neutralized him with improvised weapons—saving additional lives before law enforcement arrived. These examples are not anomalies; they are proof that the military’s trained response is to act, not to run, hide, or wait. These most recent events are not unique and are one of many that provide evidence that passive civilian active shooter models are misaligned with our warrior culture. Case studies from the 1995 Fort Bragg shooting to the 2015 Thalys train attack reinforce that service members, when faced with a lethal threat, should be encouraged and empowered to act, not instructed to remain passive.
The Right Tool for the Wrong People
The Run, Hide, Fight (RHF) reaction model was developed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the early 2010s for use by untrained civilians in workplaces, schools, and other public venues. It’s simple sequence—escape, if possible, hide if escape is not feasible, and fight only as a last resort—was designed to be easily recalled under stress by personnel without any prior tactical training. Throughout the Department of the War (DOW), installations continue to promote RHF as the standard active-shooter response for all personnel. While this approach is well-suited for an untrained civilian population, it is profoundly inappropriate for individuals with combat-focused training and a warrior ethos. RHF was not designed for military personnel whose combat effectiveness depends on disciplined initiative, teamwork, small-unit coordination, and aggressive action. Current DOW policy, in effect, teaches a conflicting and passive response model that creates hesitation at decisive moments, wasting precious seconds that, according to research, will likely increase the number of casualties. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth has prioritized restoring the warrior mindset across the department. The “Run, Hide, Fight” model directly contradicts this goal. Senior military leaders should apply the principles of mission command and apply disciplined initiative to fulfill the Secretary’s intent. They must replace this passive civilian protocol with one built for the realities of the modern battlefield and our warrior ethos. For trained service members, RHF is the wrong tool.
Time Is the Decisive Variable: The Stark Reality of FBI Data
Data synthesized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in its Active Shooter Incidents 20-Year Review, 2000-2019 confirms that time is the most critical variable in these events. The report’s analysis reveals that the majority of incidents conclude before law enforcement arrives, often in under five minutes. The FBI’s most recent annual report, Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2023, reinforces this finding, underscoring the reality that the individuals on-site are the true first responders. In practical terms, the casualty curve is set in the first five minutes; law-enforcement intervention often arrives after the worst harm is done. The data shows that incidents with immediate intervention from onsite personnel result in an average of ~3 casualties, while those where intervention waits for law enforcement average ~12 casualties. The fastest counter to an active shooter event is for those on scene to immediately disrupt the shooter. Military installations are unique environments with dense concentrations of personnel trained for combat, organic command and control (C2), and in-place reporting pathways. By coordinating their actions, military personnel can quickly develop situational understanding and execute a neutralization sequence, followed by immediate buddy aid for the wounded to save lives.
The Science of Action: Why RHF Creates Deadly Hesitation
Under acute stress, human performance relies heavily on what psychologist Daniel Kahneman termed ‘System 1’ thinking: fast, intuitive, and autonomic responses. When arousal spikes and the perception of time compresses, complex, novel reasoning degrades, while well-rehearsed psychomotor programs dominate. That is why the military insists on repetitions: drills become reflexes so service members can act without hesitation when it matters. One of the authors saw this firsthand in Iraq in 2005.
Before deploying, my unit drilled React to Contact relentlessly. When an IED detonated and was followed by small-arms fire, what happened next wasn’t a discussion; it was reflexive. We assessed the situation, moved out of the kill zone, reported we were in contact to our higher headquarters, established a perimeter, and suppressed the enemy. We had one playbook; it worked as trained.
Hick’s Law, a foundational concept in cognitive psychology, reinforces this principle by stating that reaction time increases as the number of possible choices grows. Introducing a competing model like RHF into a service member’s conditioning forces the brain to reconcile two incompatible action schemas (passivity vs. action) in real-time, creating cognitive dissonance. This mental tension is not abstract; it manifests as hesitation, second-guessing, and, in some cases, complete inaction during the critical first moments of a threat. The additional mental load diverts attention away from executing trained responses, thereby prolonging reaction times. In a military culture where identity is deeply tied to training, courage, and mission accomplishment, such contradictions erode confidence and trust in leadership. Aligning garrison active shooter guidance with battlefield doctrine through a model like ARN eliminates this cognitive conflict.
A Doctrinally Aligned Model: Assess, Report, Neutralize (ARN)
ARN outperforms RHF for service members because it is congruent with combat training, reduces hesitation, and leverages existing installation Command and Control (C2) reporting pathways and addresses lifesaving buddy aid. It is a direct translation of battle drills they already know.
- Assess: Rapidly orient on the threat (direction, distance, description). Move to initial cover that preserves observation. Positively identify the shooter and deconflict/coordinate with other responders to prevent fratricide.
- Report: Transmit a concise, standardized report (e.g., SALUTE-style) over the most available pathway (911, unit radio, phone apps etc.). This fixes the shooter in the common operating picture, a critical step for mitigating blue-on-blue risk when responding law enforcement arrives.
- Neutralize: If tactically feasible and within the Rules for the Use of Force, disrupt and stop the shooter by closing to restrain, using available tools, or employing armed response. Immediately transition to trauma care to stop the dying with triage and buddy aid until medical professionals arrive.
Addressing Common Counterarguments in Detail
1. The Legal Framework and Rules for the Use of Force (RUF)
A common objection to empowering service members to act is the perceived legal risk. This concern is misplaced. The ARN model does not authorize vigilantism or law enforcement actions; it operates squarely within the established legal principle of defense of self and others. This inherent right allows any individual, military, or civilian, to use necessary and proportional force to stop an imminent threat of death or grievous bodily harm. An active shooter in a garrison environment is the definition of such a threat. The actions proposed under ARN are not an exercise of law enforcement authority—which would be restricted by the Posse Comitatus Act—but are a life-saving necessity fully protected by law. Furthermore, in accordance with the Law of War and the military code of conduct, service members have a duty to act when they can feasibly protect others. Implementing ARN aligns policy with these existing obligations, reducing ambiguity and the risk of moral injury.
2. Blue-on-Blue Confusion and Friendly Fire
This is a C2 and training problem, not a flaw in the ARN model. The Assess and Report steps are specifically designed to mitigate this risk by establishing a common operating picture. The solution is not to teach a passive reflex, but to solve the C2 challenge with functioning installation Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), clear communication plans, common brevity codes, and joint drills and exercises between installation tenants, Military Police, and local law enforcement. If a squad can de-conflict movement in combat under fire, it can be trained to do so in garrison.
3. The Unarmed Service Member
This argument incorrectly equates neutralization with shooting. Neutralization is about disrupting the shooter’s ability to cause casualties. This can mean physical restraint, barricading, blocking egress, or using available tools as improvised weapons. Data from the FBI’s 20-year review shows that unarmed citizens successfully ended 12% of the active shooter incidents they studied. Service members possess significant advantages in physical conditioning, teamwork, and situational awareness that make such unarmed neutralization even more effective. ARN formalizes these capabilities into a recognized and trained response. Secretary Hegseth’s April 2026 authorization for off-duty service members to carry personally owned weapons on installations further empowers this capability, ensuring that neutralization need not solely rely on physical restraint or improvised weapons.
4. The Simplicity of RHF
Simplicity is relative. For an untrained civilian, RHF’s mnemonic is simple. For a soldier, it is complex because it conflicts with deeply ingrained training. ARN is operationally simpler for a trained warfighter because it is merely a garrison-translation of the React to Contact battle drill they already know by reflex. This reduces the need for retraining and eliminates the conflict between garrison and combat reflexes.
Implementation: A Six-Step Plan for Rapid Adoption
The DOW should implement the following recommendations immediately:
- Publish DOW-level policy directives clarifying that RHF is the model for DOW civilians and dependents, while ARN is the model for uniformed service members on federal property. Clarify commander’s intent, authorities, and RUF.
- Explicitly direct commanders to exercise mission command and disciplined initiative to align active-shooter response with the Secretary of War’s intent, replacing RHF with ARN for uniformed personnel while retaining RHF for civilians and dependents.
- Issue a Training Circular that maps ARN directly to established immediate action drills like those in ATP 3-21.8, Infantry Platoon and Squad. Ensure medical integration by incorporating ATP 4-02.1, Casualty Response, Tactical Combat Casualty Care, and First Aid so that stopping the dying begins immediately after the threat is contained.
- Update Programs of Instruction (POIs) and AR 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development to require annual ARN familiarization and practical application. Require installation force protection drills that incorporate ARN lanes/exercises with role-players and simulation rounds, including joint rehearsals with MPs and local law enforcement.
- Reinforce existing installation Emergency Operations Center structures and ensure rapid reporting pathways are established and trained.
- Establish a rapid awards review pipeline (e.g., Soldier’s Medal) and require Public Affairs Offices to publicly highlight lifesaving interventions to reinforce the standard.
Recognition Anchors the Norms We Desire
While policy and training shape behavior, recognition is a powerful tool to cement culture. When service members act decisively to stop a killer, the profession must publicly recognize them. The U.S. Army’s Soldier’s Medal, for example, exists precisely to honor heroism not involving conflict with an enemy. Recognition psychology research shows that formal acknowledgment of desired behaviors strengthens those behaviors across an organization. When members see peers celebrated for a specific action, they are more likely to emulate it. This is not about vanity; it signals the standard, reduces hesitation for the next person under pressure, and spreads the story of what ‘right’ looks like across the force. The Secretary of the Army’s immediate recognition of the soldiers at Fort Stewart and France’s award of the Légion d’honneur to the Thalys train responders did exactly that: it honored the actors while teaching a broader audience the societal value of decisive intervention.
Conclusion: Replace RHF With ARN—Immediately
RHF remains a well-suited model for untrained civilians, but for service members, it is fundamentally misaligned with military doctrine, training, and professional identity. As we have shown, ARN integrates seamlessly with established battle drills, leverages the science of decision-making under stress, and eliminates the hesitation caused by conflicting guidance. FBI data, historical case studies, and military training doctrine all reinforce the same truth: the decisive window for saving lives in an active shooter event is measured in minutes, often before law enforcement can arrive. Service members, already trained to act decisively in combat, are our most capable on-scene responders in garrison, and their response model must reflect that reality. The thesis of this article is straightforward: Replace RHF with ARN for uniformed personnel on military installations—aligning policy with Secretary Hegseth’s vision and the warrior ethos that defines our military. Doing so will align policy with combat action doctrine, reduce cognitive dissonance, shorten reaction times, and improve survivability in active-shooter incidents.
George R. K. Acree is a retired colonel in the U.S. Army. He is currently an Assistant Professor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Larry W. Stoafer is a retired major in the U.S. Army. He is currently an Assistant Professor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of U.S. Army or the Department of Defense.
